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Political Affairs

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Soviet Union

Political Affairs

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9 August 1991

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Two Deputies Discuss Future of Supreme Soviet

914B0271A Moscow NEDELYA in Russian No 29,
15 Jul 91 p 3

[Interview with Supreme Soviet Deputies Yuriy Kalmykov and Professor Anatoliy Denisov by Aleksandr Yevseyev; place and date not given: "Two Views of One Problem—Does the Union Supreme Soviet Have a Future?"]

[Text]

Parliamentarian on Parliament

No, something has changed, for all that.... And although, as always, the leisurely progress of deputies heading for the USSR Supreme Soviet building begins at 0930 through the Spasskiye Gate and a patient line for the fresh press forms once again, as always, at the newspaper "mess" in the lobby and piles of documents tower up on the tables in front of the entrance to the meeting hall, awaiting the deputies and due to be examined by them today, and businesslike activity in the hall is not diminishing and debate is conducted there as scheduled, there is, for all that, in the air of the Kremlin Palace a certain expectation, a certain guardedness, a certain question which 537 persons constituting the country's present parliament cannot fail to be asking themselves today: WHAT COMES NEXT? Because "next" the Union treaty will be signed and, correspondingly, a new parliament will be elected. A different one. Not only in terms of composition but in terms of structure also. This, in any event, is what the draft Union treaty anticipates. So, is the present USSR Supreme Soviet, which has now broken up for the summer vacation, living out its final months? How, in this case, do the legislators see their future? Their immediate future, at least?

Yuriy Kalmykov: 'There Will Be No Changing of the Guard Any Time Soon'

[Yevseyev] Do you not think that the present parliament has already exhausted its potential? Is it becoming a brake on the path of the development of our statehood?

[Kalmykov] No, I do not think so. I believe that the USSR Supreme Soviet has yet to accomplish its mission. After all, even after the conclusion of the Union treaty there has to be some transitional period, when it will be necessary to formulate a new constitution, complete the work on the bills in the committees and commissions and create and adopt a new election act. Who will do this work? Only the highest Union organ of power.

This is the first point. Second, the complete denial of the role of the Supreme Soviet in the most complex transitional period is in itself, I believe, contrary to the principles of a state based on the rule of law for it was created on a constitutional basis, performs an important stabilizing role in society and has proven its possibilities of performing legislative work at a highly professional level. A skeptical attitude toward the Union authorities, on the other hand, could lead to us ultimately creating

something other than what we want—not a federal state which incorporates independent sovereign republics, but some chaotic conglomerate of states in which there is no room for Union authorities. Although, as is known, the draft Union treaty in itself precludes such a possibility inasmuch as the treaty presupposes the existence—and, consequently, the operation—of Union authorities and a Union constitution and, equally, Union executive and legislative authorities. Therefore to believe that everything should switch to the republics would, I think, be a mistake. We are talking merely about the precise delineation of jurisdiction and the transfer to the Union of the range of authority which, in the republics' opinion, is necessary for the accomplishment of some common tasks. I believe that the present Supreme Soviet still has work to do and that it will function, if not through the end of its term, for quite some time.

[Yevseyev] Explain, then, what the present mood of the deputies, which could be expressed in just four words, time to go home, is connected with.

[Kalmykov] Possibly with the fact that following completion of the work on the Union treaty, more precisely within six months, a new constitution will be adopted. Consequently, my colleagues say to me, since there will be a new constitution, it will also be necessary to create new organs of power on its basis. This proposition has engendered the following kind of talk also: We need to prepare for the fact that this Supreme Soviet and Congress of People's Deputies will be dissolved.

[Yevseyev] When will the "changing of the guard" occur, do you think?

[Kalmykov] Not all that soon, I believe. If only because the very process of the final finishing and signing of the Union treaty will take a considerable amount of time. Not to mention the fact that such a treaty, which will be signed by eight or nine republics, is, you will agree, an inferior document. On the other hand, besides these republics, almost 50 former autonomies which have declared themselves sovereign republics will have accumulated. Their approaches to the solution of identical questions could be very different. As is known, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet has its own approach to the Union treaty. As far as the USSR Supreme Soviet is concerned, it recently defined its attitude toward the Union treaty.

[Yevseyev] How would you evaluate our parliament's present law-making possibilities?

[Kalmykov] To speak of purely legislative business, I believe that the Supreme Soviet is coping to the requisite extent with its duties and that its law-making level is not now lower than that of the parliaments of other countries. I have visited the parliaments of Britain and France, have visited Chile, Finland, Argentina, and other countries, have studied the work of members of

parliament, have talked with scholars and have, naturally, inquired about their attitudes toward our bills—the opinions of the overseas lawyers has always, as a rule, been quite high.

[Yevseyev] And this despite the fact that the lack of dispatch in the preparation of our laws is, in my opinion, more the exception than the rule to which your committee adheres?

[Kalmykov] Yes, this is so.... Unfortunately, this is also reflected in the quality of the laws, although this pace is understandable.... Understandable, but no more than that.... Many of the draft laws, particularly those which come from the government, are so unfinished that putting them in shape requires a great deal of time. And this, as you understand, is simply what we do not have. These bills sometimes have to be reworked 70-80 percent, and if they assume a quite civilized appearance, this is merely thanks to the additional efforts of the Supreme Soviet and its committees and commissions.

[Yevseyev] Today, at this hot time, is the pace the same? Or have things quietened down?

[Kalmykov] The same. We are working very intensively, as before.

[Yevseyev] It may be said that, in spite of everything, the Legislation and Law and Order Committee is continuing to work at full stretch?

[Kalmykov] Yes, this is the case.

Anatoliy Denisov: 'I Do Not Rule Out Us Breaking the Dishes...'

[Yevseyev] Do you not get the feeling that the present USSR Supreme Soviet is already accustomed to the idea that it is concluding its existence? Concluding it early?

[Denisov] Of course. So it should be. In any event, if the Union treaty is signed (in whatever form), elections of the entire USSR Supreme Soviet and the president of the USSR will most likely be held in March 1992. In any case, the Supreme Soviet will sit here until the handover of its authority; at worst, it will break up early because—and this also is perfectly obvious—it is being shunted aside, even during the formulation of the new constitution.... That is, provision is being made in advance, as it were, for there being no continuity between the present Union and the new one.

[Yevseyev] So there will be no USSR Supreme Soviet at all? Who, then, will enact the laws for the country "as a whole," not for the individual sovereign republics? And who will keep an eye on the actions of the authorities exercising compliance with these laws?

[Denisov] You are not thinking about the fact that we no longer have this country "as a whole" and that there is merely a conglomerate of sovereign states, each of which will enact its own independent laws. And we will most likely have to calmly endure this period of confusion,

when the country as such is simply no more. And when it has become clear to everyone that it is no longer possible to go on living like this, only then, perhaps, will the Union begin to emerge. But in the immediate future we will not, I believe, have organs of Union power inasmuch as the republics do not want this.

[Yevseyev] Consequently, Professor Anatoliy Alekseyevich Denisov, USSR people's deputy, must shortly relinquish his deputy's authority? Do you not find this prospect distressing?

[Denisov] I do not. The more so in that I already miss my own discipline quite a bit. But in this case, as you can see, this will happen whether I wish it or not. Everything is headed in this direction.

But I would like to call your attention to something else: We have for some reason or other sincerely convinced ourselves that the Union is an anachronism and a "Bolshevik empire," but have not here denied ourselves the pleasure of borrowing from this same "empire" the system of republics as some absolute, which must under no circumstances be touched. Yet the republics are the essential components without which there would be no "empire" itself. Consequently, if we are to begin everything from the beginning, with a clean slate, why must we necessarily start from the sovereignty of the republics? Let us start all over again—from the nations' right to self-determination. And the nations are not concentrated in republics, they are scattered throughout the Union. And it is perfectly reasonable to present the issue thus: Let the nations themselves determine their position. They, precisely, and not the republics, which are a purely territorial formation incorporating merely part of a nation, and frequently not that significant a part (the remaining part is beyond the sphere of republic interests and lives it is not known where, what is more).

But we for some reason or other still sacredly and stubbornly preserve this quite unjust procedure of representation of the nation—only through a republic. And have even made an absolute of it, if not to say deified it. Truly, if we are beginning everything "in the new way," why should this "newness" be built on a foundation of the former republics? Let us put the question this way: We recognize nothing which went before and will begin everything from the beginning.... This would be more logical.

I repeat, in rejecting the "empire" we cannot recognize formations which were born of it and which did not exist prior to it.... This question is not even being put to a discussion, what is more: A republic is something God-given, something inviolable.

It seems to me that we should either preserve everything or revise everything. There is no other way. Otherwise the usual farce will result....

But a situation where the new Union treaty will not be signed at all—the parties will not, say, come to an agreement on what kind the new taxation system should

be or on something else—is entirely probable also. Who will collect taxes in fact? The Union? Or will the republics deign to allocate it the resources which they deem necessary for its existence?

But however this problem is solved, another surfaces here: The relations of the Union republics and the autonomies within them. Because if the Union republics do not agree to pay the Union, the autonomies will act just the same way toward them also. Logical? Very. And, further, all local authorities would declare their disagreement with the fact that the republics are collecting taxes on their territory: "What is this for? There is no need, we ourselves will collect taxes and then allocate the republics something." That is, they would be acting precisely in accordance with the same logic as the republics themselves. It is understandable what would happen then: a general war of taxes.

And it would only be necessary to embark on this path, what is more, and any rural soviet would thereupon declare its rights: "Excuse me, it is I, not you, who have the right to collect taxes here. You, however, be so good as to come to me with your hand outstretched. And I will think about whether or not to give you some money for your needs inasmuch as I myself need money...." Absurd!

[Yevseyev] Do you think we will manage to shortly emerge from this, I do not know what—ideological, legal, emotional—deadlock?

[Denisov] I would say that this is an economic deadlock because we need first to establish relations between the republics, which only the economy can do. Currently, however, the republics are guided mainly by passions for they have certain unrealized ambitions and claims, which they would like to satisfy as quickly as possible, availing themselves of the present general collapse.

[Yevseyev] And what is to be done in this deadlock situation?

[Denisov] I believe that they should be given this opportunity.

[Yevseyev] To satisfy their claims?

[Denisov] Precisely.... And then what is today lacking, alas, in their actions—common sense—would begin to work. The moment passions subside—and they will subside, I am sure, when they are satisfied—there will arise a most powerful urge backward, toward what was. Toward the old system of relations with the center. Because life is, for all that, compelling us all to move toward integration, toward the Union. We simply cannot live independently of one another. And not only we—the whole world can no longer live differently, there are no absolutely independent states, all are interdependent.

I repeat, I am sure that only then will that common sense in relations between the republics for which we are today so vainly calling finally manifest itself.

[Yevseyev] You are suggesting that all will learn from their mistakes?

[Denisov] Of course. Life always proceeds under the influence of emotions and passions. We are people and, consequently, we act subjectively, and none of us can say what he requires "objectively," independently of his wishes, his desires, his personal needs. This is, you know, just the same as persuading oneself and others that drinking vodka is, as science proves, harmful. Theoretically, so to speak, truly harmful. But in a specific situation, at a given moment, it turns out, it is more beneficial to me, in particular, to drink a glass than not to do so. And there is no escaping this, no exclusively scientifically proven considerations can operate here. My heart aches, and there is no salvation other than to pour something strong on it at this time....

So in big politics also—all these present passions, which have flared up all of sudden, as it were—they appear such, after all, only from a distance. It is only from a distance that it seems that a person is currently behaving abnormally. The person himself believes that he is being very "normal" even. And without having satisfied these passions, we will be unable subsequently to act rationally. During a row in the home, dishes need to be broken in order subsequently for everyone to calm down and for peace and order to emerge....

[Yevseyev] So we will break the dishes, consequently? There is no other way?

[Denisov] It cannot be ruled out that it will be necessary.... Dishes, what are they? The main thing is that things not reach the point of knives....

'Movement of Constructive Forces' Defends Soviets

914B0279A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Jul 91
Union Edition p 3

["Letter to the Editor" from members of the "Movement of Constructive Forces: To Defend the Authorities Elected By the People"]

[Text] Almost a year and a half ago, new people arrived at the highest organs and local organs of state power of the republic with the intention of actively effecting democratic transformation of our country. Unfortunately, the enthusiasm of newly elected deputies has seldom compensated for their lack of experience and professional expertise. Together with other objective and subjective factors, this has brought about a situation in which the activity of many soviets failed to justify the original expectations of voters, often discrediting the soviets as organs of power.

Under such conditions, the objective necessity of strengthening existing executive organs and creating new ones may lead, and is already leading, to a removal of the body of deputies in soviets of all levels elected by the

people from participation in the exercise of both executive and representative authority. Such a development of events, accompanied as well by the breakup of existing administrative-territorial divisions, will lead to further intensified confusion and the destruction of still-functioning economic and other ties. Dismissing the body of deputies from the privatization and de-state-ization now beginning, which will then be conducted privately by the apparatus of mayoralties and other newly established structures and organs, will increase abuse in these processes vitally important to the people. Finally, elimination of the soviets or their factual removal from power may result in the strengthening of arbitrary rule and the rebirth of totalitarianism at the most unexpected levels.

The aforementioned in no way means that the principles of formation and structuring of the soviets cannot be changed with time. Even now some of their functions might be transferred to other organs. We are advocating only that this absolutely necessary and natural process not be accompanied by "revolutionary" breakup and "destruction to the foundations," which has been the case here on more than one occasion.

Alarmed at the inevitable negative consequences of attempts undertaken in recent times to eliminate the soviets in a single stroke, and complying with the appeal "For Cooperation Among Constructive Forces" of 22 May this year (see *IZVESTIYA* No. 121), we call upon you to unite within the framework of each soviet for the purposes both of opposing such attempts and of resolving problems vitally important to the electorate.

On behalf of the "Movement of Constructive Forces,"

[Signed] Ye.G. Andryushchenko, C.N. Baburin, V.N. Belyayev, Ye.G. Borisov, V.L. Ginzburg, A.N. Zhukov, A.N. Krayko, I.E. Krugovoykh, V.I. Lisitskiy, T.Ye. Novitskaya, T.I. Pulatov, A.N. Semenetskiy.

Deputy on Constitutional Means to New Union

914B0251A Moscow *KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA*
in Russian 17 Jul 91 p 1

[Article by A. Yablokov, USSR people's deputy: "A Revolution Is Needed. But a Legitimate One"; subtitled: "How Should We Reorganize Political Power?"]

[Text] Following the conclusion of the armistice between the center and the republics based on the "nine plus one" joint statement, a certain euphoria has arisen: It has seemed that the main political problems have been successfully resolved. This is not so: The solution of many important problems has only been put off for the future. And the first of these problems is that of political power.

In the statement, the leaders of nine republics and the president of the USSR declare their desire "to complete as quickly as possible work on the draft new Union treaty" and "not later than six months following the

signing of treaty to prepare and adopt in the Congress of People's Deputies the new constitution of the Union." Knowing the fundamental differences in the understanding of the concept of the Union treaty between the center and a number of important republics, it is not hard to imagine that "as quickly as possible" will have to be stretched out for many months. After all, it is necessary not simply to agree on the wording of the text of the treaty but to decide the main unsolved question: What the new Union represents—a state or a union of states. If it is a union of states, to which it would seem a majority is at this time disposed, what kind of common constitution for different states are we dealing with? Relations between states throughout the world are regulated not by constitutions but international agreements, treaties, pacts, and so forth.

So the demand concerning the elaboration and signing of a Union treaty in virtually the next few weeks or months and, even more, the demand concerning the elaboration of a new all-Union constitution prove unrealistic when put to the test. It would, of course, be possible to break up the current state authority and rapidly (comparatively rapidly—in a couple of months, say) build new interstate relations based on a direct alliance between the most important republics, with which the other republics could subsequently align themselves, if they so desired. But this would mean a constitutional coup. We accomplished one such revolution in 1917. It is naive to think that it is possible to build a state based on the rule of law by unlawful methods.

What is the solution? The solution lies in recognizing the need for quite a lengthy transitional period from the unitary, centralized state which the USSR was up to 1991 to a union of states. Only the congress itself may legitimately dissolve the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and eliminate the constitutional structures. But it is hard to expect that the congress will do so—the self-preservation instinct will prevent it. I am sure that there are opportunities for a constitutional solution of the question of power also.

From the 2,200 USSR people's deputies the republic parliaments could elect a new Supreme Soviet (a better name, perhaps, would be Assembly of People's Deputies). The assembly's main task would be to prepare a package of interrepublic agreements, which, together with the Union treaty, could replace the USSR Constitution. Three agreements first and foremost are necessary for the union of states to arise in the place of the USSR: on the economic space, on science and technology and environmental problems, and on defense and national security. Each of these should be "framework" agreements, that is, be accompanied in addition by a whole package of specific agreements. This means immense legislative work.

The USSR people's deputies who do not become members of the assembly could continue to perform their deputy's duties up to the end of their term (a further three years remain) as republic (state) counselors, with

preservation of their deputy status. This is a key point inasmuch as it would allow the USSR people's deputies in the congress to consent psychologically to the revisions of the USSR Constitution, which would enshrine the state sovereignty of the republics and provide for the self-dissolution of the congress and the termination of the USSR Constitution as one interrepublic (interstate!) agreement or another takes effect, and to others. Thus the transitional period from the USSR as a unitary state to a union of states would begin this year and be completed by 1994. And this would happen on a constitutional, legitimate basis, which is exceptionally important for stabilization of the life of society.

In such an atmosphere the congress could rapidly examine the question, which has long disturbed our society, of the deprivation of the mandates of the deputies from public organizations (or alter their status, emphasizing that they have not been elected by the people). It should be emphasized that the union of free states arising in place of the USSR will be quite distinctive in terms of level of integration: for some this could be a federation, for others, a confederation, for yet others, an association.

The main thing now is to agree on principles. And they are as follows: The transition to the new union of states should be constitutional and should on the one hand satisfy the republics' aspiration to sovereignty and, on the other, be acceptable to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies as the legitimate and highest political authority in the country.

Union Treaty Seen as Gorbachev Power Play

914B0253A Moscow KURANTY in Russian
9 Jul 91 p 5

[Article by K. Ignatyev, political expert: "Staging... a Treaty"]

[Text] The draft Union treaty indicates that M. Gorbachev has started a new major game. The CPSU president is trying to do something which no single Eastern European leader has been able to accomplish in the period of transition from socialism: to remain in power until the end of his term.

This is the target. The game itself, as is usually the case, is brilliant. It is playing at a treaty!

In following his centrist credo, one would have thought that the president was trying to "take a step in all directions." A treaty, which was the "sacred cow" of the reactionaries, was made public. This document includes the word "federation," which they cherish. A no-win play has been initiated by Pavlov's reactionary government not without the participation of the president, in my view (possibly, the president believes that it is not bad at all to combine unpopular measures with an unpopular cabinet).

On the other hand, the president is attacking the "Soyuz" group, continuing with the talks and becoming so democratic that some democrats would like to forget the demands for his resignation and are thinking of supporting the president in the next elections while focusing their entire anger exclusively on the Union treaty!

The main shortcomings of the draft: it hinders the advance of democratic forces toward assuming power in the Union and, therefore, toward the controlling block of power and real change (including the removal of the imperial legacy).

To begin with, it is anticipated that the constitution of the new state, which will be created in accordance with the treaty, will be adopted... by the old corps of USSR people's deputies. Essentially, the adoption of a constitution means disbanding the congress. Naturally, the congress will delay its own end. Meanwhile we shall have to wait for new elections for Union authorities which, according to the draft, should take place after the adoption of the constitution. Consequently, the president will remain in his position initially thanks to the criticism of the Union treaty by the democrats and, subsequently, thanks to the unwillingness of the reactionary congress to adopt a constitution. The type of constitution which this congress of Union deputies could adopt is not even worth mentioning.

Second, no procedure has been contemplated for the ratification of the treaty by the new Supreme Soviet.

Third, many of the powers granted to the Union and the republics call for a substantial role to be played by the state. This underscores the close ties between the treaty and those among its authors who opted for socialism: "nationwide" ownership of the land, state price and insurance policies, and management of all-Union communications and information systems.

Fourth, the treaty contains vague formulations according to which a double tax system will be established.

The existence of special courts in the Armed Forces and the fact that the procedure for withdrawing from the treaty are not defined in the text itself raise some questions.

On the other hand, unquestionably, this variant is more progressive than the previous ones. An entirely workable variant for the organs of the Union has been strengthened and its fundamental principles are nice and consistent with such a document. Despite the word "federation," the document reflects the confederative form of state structure: the most important act of the state is the treaty and not the Constitution; in the framework of the powers granted to the republics and their combined administration with the Union, the supremacy of republic laws has been accepted; the republics have the right to invalidate on their territory the effect of Union laws. However, in this area the treaty is not entirely

consistent: nothing is said about the supremacy of acts promulgated by the executive branch.

Obviously, if a compromise concerning said faults could be found, it would become possible and necessary to sign this treaty as soon as possible. The next task would be to hold early elections for a parliament which will have the powers of a constituent congress, and the election of a new president. To hasten the date of the elections and to win the elections are the main tasks of the democratic movement.

In the immediate future we shall have the answers to two questions: Will the democratic forces bite the president's hook by holding back the process of signing the treaty? And will the old communist powers be prepared to pass the new electoral law?

Lukyanov's 'Masterly' Diplomacy Spurred Passage of Union Treaty

914B0256A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 16 Jul 91 p 1

[Article by L. Nikitinskiy, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA commentator: "The Parliamentary Week: Additional Time"]

[Text] By the end of last week the motley corps of parliamentary journalists looked like fans rushing to see two games taking place simultaneously in two different fields. In one of the Kremlin palaces the USSR Supreme Soviet was meeting to discuss the Union treaty; in another, the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies was trying to elect a new president of the Republic's Supreme Soviet.

As entertainment, the latter was more interesting. However, there was no score and they had to go into overtime again and again.

In my view, it is only on the surface that the parliamentary crisis in the Russian authorities seems to indicate a split in the democratic camp, considering the impossibility of the conservatives to have an absolute majority. Actually, this crisis is deeper and is less of a parliamentary than of a constitutional nature.

The corresponding articles in the Constitution were drafted while the RSFSR was not a presidential but a parliamentary Republic. In the absence of a president as the head of the executive branch, his powers were divided between the government and the Supreme Soviet Presidium, headed by a chairman who, by the logic of this Constitution, was granted certain personal political powers.

In the new governmental structure of Russia, if the executive branch is in the hands of the president, such a "politicized" Supreme Soviet chairman becomes as necessary as the fifth wheel of a cart which does not help but which impedes its movement. In this new mechanism with a more distinct separation between the legislative

and executive powers, the parliament needs not a political leader leaning to the left or the right but a neutral, able, and courteous speaker; not a chairman but a permanent chair, whose role would be limited to efficient presiding over sessions in accordance with all the necessary parliamentary procedures.

Arzhannikov, who was promoting himself, was one of the few deputies who supported this idea at the electrified congress. Such a sensible depoliticized approach to the elections for Supreme Soviet chairman earned him, in the first round, all of four votes including, probably, his own. As is customary, the deputies engaged in a harsh political struggle which was precisely what led them into an impasse. However, this draw, it seems to me, would benefit both teams, each one of which was in danger eventually to become a political hostage to its nominee.

Should the Russian deputies repeat the mistake of their "elder brothers," the USSR people's deputies? It was they who, in their time, approved for a similar position the candidacy of A.I. Lukyanov, with his quite strongly expressed political feelings, and soon found themselves clearly and denigratingly dependent on him. Not legally but in fact a significant share of their legislative powers shifted to the rostrum of the Presidium, and a number of traits indicate that the role which A.I. Lukyanov played in the Supreme Soviet was not proportional to his status of first among equals. Actually, all parliaments are headed by the type of person they deserve.

In his half-hour speech, in closing the fifth session of the Supreme Soviet, A.I. Lukyanov particularly dwelled on its place in the process of concluding a Union treaty. In particular, he emphasized that the "Union parliament tried to initiate the treaty process. We initiated it and there was nothing the congress and the Supreme Soviet could say about it." This last sentence which is emphasized in the text may be found only on the recorded tape; it had been deleted in the variant of the report which was published the following morning in IZVESTIYA. Why? Because it was all too obviously inconsistent with reality.

If the central authorities, including the USSR Supreme Soviet, made an effort to "initiate" something at all, it was the reanimation of the fictitious 1922 Treaty on the Founding of the USSR, with subsequent "annexations." As to the new contractual process among the republics which rejected the diktat of the empire, concerning the creation of an essentially new Union of equal national states on the territory of the collapsing empire, the Supreme Soviet of the former USSR not only did not initiate it but, for a long time, did everything possible to obstruct it, having already succeeded in scaring away six of the former 15 Union republics. It joined this process only at the very last moment, tailing the president of the USSR and the republic leaders, and guided by the instinct of historical self-preservation, although it is trying to conceal its reduced role.

The recent debates on the Union treaty in the USSR Supreme Soviet have left a strange impression. Speakers

in favor of the treaty, such as R. Nishanov, who presented a streamlined report on this subject, seemed bound by a pledge not to mention a few forbidden words, such as "confederation," for which reason their speeches were incomprehensible and appeared emasculated. Conversely, the opponents, headed by Deputy Blokhin, leader of the Soyuz group, showed no hesitation in calling things by their proper names. In particular, Blokhin pointed out that the USSR Supreme Soviet has been factually removed from participating in the treaty process.

We must agree with Yu. Blokhin in that the share of the Union parliament in the neo-Ogarev accord was more like the formal role of a puppet soldier. Unlike Blokhin, however, who saw here the tragedy of nations, it seems to me that this is consistent with the objective trend of developing historical processes, the opposition to which could end only in major bloodshed.

The treaties were concluded among equal subjects, whereas the historically developed center was neither accustomed nor able to treat the republics as equal. The role of consultant, claiming actively to participate as a full partner, would hardly satisfy it. However, in this contractual process among republics there is no entity such as "USSR," which is as yet to be created under the same or a different name. The republics are as yet to discuss extensively the question of what it will be and what shape will be assumed by the new entity. This is still quite unclear. What is clear is that the new form will be essentially different.

Lukyanov, the tested and very experienced politician, will, naturally, find his place in the new "center," which will be formed sooner or later as a result of the new Union treaty. However, in the case of the USSR Supreme Soviet, as it is today, in this convocation, there would clearly be no niche for Deputy Yu. Blokhin. Had it not been for A. Lukyanov's unique brand of diplomacy, who was able to control the parliament with the skill of Sergey Obratzov, pulling the strings in his puppet theater, the USSR Supreme Soviet would have assumed a stance of rigid confrontation with the neo-Ogarev process, logically and consistently expressed by the Soyuz group which, incidentally, only two or three months ago, had determined the shape of that same parliament.

But here as well, through complex compromises, it was reason that prevailed. Apparently, Deputy A. Sebestov, who spoke on behalf of the Interregional Group, is right by describing the draft not as an "eternal union," for many such unions having been known to history, and where are they now?, but as a stage, a landmark on the way to a new historical territorial community of nations, the shape of which is today merely outlined in the political struggle.

[Editorial note] At the time that this issue was going to print, Baburin and Khasbulatov, who had tirelessly been running for the position of president of the Russian

parliament, had once again failed to garner the necessary majority vote in the first round of the third circle of voting. At this point, no one can say how much longer will the Russian congress remain involved in fruitless efforts.

Advisor on Gorbachev's Leadership Style, '9+1' Agreement

914B0230A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 22 Jun 91

[Interview with Valentin Karasev, under rubric "Power," by Vera Kuznetsova: "'Gorbachev's Door Is Always Open:' Interview with Valentin Karasev, Advisor to the USSR President, After Being on the Job Two Months"]

[Text] Valentin Karasev (39 years of age)—the youngest advisor to the USSR President—is the advisor for ties with state and public organizations. Until the present time he has been part of the "mezhregionalka" [interregional group]. According to Karasev, he is actually a Communist, but proceeds from his own understanding of that ideology, without recognizing coercion or irreconcilability. He made his contribution to Article 6 of the Constitution. So the fact that he is sitting in the Kremlin, in his opinion, does not mean that he is anyone's servant.

[V. Kuznetsova] Do you completely share the MDG platform, and, as you see it, does there exist any unity there?

[V. Karasev] The MDG was conceived as a faction of opposing opinion that supports the multiparty system, the plurality of ownership... Everything that is now the object of special discussion about the extent to which this has been implemented. At that time we were united and strong in our denial. We denied state and party monopoly. The divergences began at the moment of deciding how to go ahead—that is, when the denial had ended.

Today those who call themselves the leaders of the MDG and who sign documents on its behalf have lost their tie with that parliamentary faction. Other than Arkadiy Murashev, a person whom I respect despite our politically different views.

[V. Kuznetsova] Who, then, are the real leaders of the MDG today?

[V. Karasev] Informally? Kuzmin, Ryabchenko, Stadnik...

[V. Kuznetsova] Lubenchenko?

[V. Kuznetsova] He participates, but much less. There is, for example, Boblikov, or a very good person, Burykh. And also Murashev.

[V. Kuznetsova] You said that you and he have politically different views.

[V. Karasev] He's an anti-Communist, and I'm a Communist. And this is not a kind of abstract contradiction, but one factor which, personally for me in my relations with representatives of another ideological current in state and economic practice, does not have any importance. In state activities I must subordinate myself only to the law.

[V. Kuznetsova] In your opinion, are there any parties that have formed completely?

[V. Karasev] Basically they are parties on a national or religious basis. There are no political parties, even if they have been registered. I could name several major unions, for example, the Scientific-Industrial Union. They are closer in their social base to the concept "party" than those who attempt to call themselves a party.

[V. Kuznetsova] And the LDP also isn't a party?

[V. Karasev] Currently it simply operates on public reaction. And it can become truly a strong party or can explode like a soap bubble. The social base of the LDP today is the man in the street. What is surprising about that? Most of the parties have been forced to orient themselves on him, because in the society that we are crawling out of there did not exist any differences: both the academician and the yardman were united in their position both with respect to property and to their rights.

[V. Kuznetsova] What political forces, then, promoted Bakatin and Ryzhkov?

[V. Karasev] Bakatin rested upon a program of common sense. In that program there is a kernel of doubt—therein lies both its strength and its weakness. Ryzhkov is much more unambiguous. And he apparently was supported by those who are dissatisfied with the policy of the new Cabinet of Ministers.

[V. Kuznetsova] Have you been working for a long time as advisor? Who recommended you to Gorbachev?

[V. Karasev] I've been here for only two months. The second question is not for me to answer. I sent several analytical memoranda to Lukyanov. It turned out that he had shown one of them to Mikhail Sergeyevich. There had been very serious discussions with him.

[V. Kuznetsova] How do you work with the president?

[V. Karasev] I could talk about that for hours. Incidentally, Gorbachev is the only politician whose door is always open.

[V. Kuznetsova] Which door?

[V. Karasev] The door to see him... Working with Mikhail Sergeyevich is calm and comfortable. We immediately defined the tasks, and there has never been an instance when that person jerked me around after that. I tell you honestly that it's possible to get Gorbachev to change his mind, unlike many well-known democratic leaders. And I think that the recent ukases have little to

be criticized, because they clearly shown Mikhail Sergeyevich's ability to work. He values the other person's point of view, and is able, on the run, to grasp what has to be done. He surrounds himself with people who, at that level, do not look anyone in the mouth—Yakovlev, Bakatin, Lukyanov...

[V. Kuznetsova] Does Gorbachev argue with you?

[V. Karasev] Of course. Moreover, he issues a challenge to start that argument. There is probably still living within each of us the psychology of a slave—that psychology is typical of society, regardless of who cleanses himself of it... I, for example, preach the point of view that authoritarianism of leadership is not "their" whim. It is what has been nurtured by the totalitarianism of mass public awareness. Therefore many changes that Mikhail Sergeyevich would like to bring to life today are being carried out with a delay not because of his indecisiveness, but because of the fact that, at definite moments, an elite group of people has been running off ahead, but the bulk of the people are not yet ready.

Gorbachev knows what he wants. He knows unambiguously. Glasnost, the plurality of ownership... I tell myself: not all of us have any idea of what will have to be paid for all of this. And not all of us have thought about the fact that any phenomenon that inclines toward radicalism turns into its opposite. So the independence about which there have recently been so many arguments is experiencing that same conversion: it is either autarchy, or barter by means of video tape recorders and women's party hose.

Take any program offered by an ideologist in our party or a "DemRossiya" ideologist. What are we dealing with? Every one depicts a plus, but, true, now adds: not immediately, but gradually... However, it is worthwhile thinking a bit about where the minus is. The conclusion is that today the politicians of the word who were so necessary in 1985, 1989, and 1990, must yield their place to politicians of deed. We must see the arrival of a galaxy of politicians who would provide guarantees against all harmful "emissions"—certain political games.

[V. Kuznetsova] Don't you feel that Yeltsin, Gorbachev, Lukyanov, and Bakatin are politicians for the transitional period?

[V. Karasev] I would not state it in such flat terms. The practice of the transitional period indicates that, in our country, that period can stretch out not just for a single year and not just for a single decade... Take a look at the higher and secondary school system—today we do not have any replacements.

[V. Kuznetsova] The press is still engaged in an argument of who Gorbachev is—a hostage of the rightist forces, or a representative himself of rightist views...

[V. Karasev] Neither the rightists nor the leftists should suffer under any delusion. Mikhail Sergeyevich is a realist in politics. So they say, "He has swayed to the right." But he hasn't.

Let's play a little game of fantasizing. In a certain country, at one moment, the conservative forces can be activated and become a danger. There are two paths. If society and the state have sufficient forces, the problem is resolved rather simply. But if not? Then the optimal step is to calm down the public opinion, which at that moment is oriented toward the rightist-conservative wing. If extremism in society intensifies, when it is necessary, in two leaps, to jump across the chasm of the transitional period, what can be done in politics if there are not sufficient forces? One can only counterbalance. And in this regard Mikhail Sergeyevich is more than a realist. At times even his closest associates do not understand this feature in him. But it is necessary to have Gorbachev's head in order to reckon up all these things.

[V. Kuznetsova] Can he reckon up the attack on the Lithuanian customs offices before his trip to Oslo?

[V. Karasev] Olzhas Suleymanov once said that when a caravan is moving by, the dogs always bark at the last camel. Nevertheless the caravan keeps moving.

Then, if one speaks about the position of those republics and the Center, this is a collision between two negative charges. You won't find any truth here. The truth will probably come if it manages to "take a stand" on only the logic of events, as in the attempt of the "9+1."

But linking private events with the activities of a state leader is simply discourteous. And as for the fact that it sometimes seems that it is necessary to employ force in order to prevent the conversion of a drop of blood into a stream—Mikhail Sergeyevich is well aware of that price.

[V. Kuznetsova] The attempt of the "9+1"... Why did Gorbachev take that step?

[V. Karasev] I have said that Gorbachev is a political realist. And real affairs can be done today only through those structures that are used by our authority. Our parliamentary system has not yet developed any levers for administration in society. Therefore what currently seem to be more realistic are either the structures of the executive authority, or those political forces that enjoy trust in society. And that is all. So I do not understand why, at USSR VS [Supreme Soviet] there arise fears that the "9+1" is an unconstitutional agency that is making decisions. Excuse me, but it does not make decisions. It only declares the necessity of making them: it is necessary to do such-and-such in this way. And if those decisions contradict the law, then the parliaments both of the Union and of the republics can simply fail to ratify them—there is no need for any tricks. What kind of confrontation is this! Currently the "9+1" is a necessary thing. But in the future? The preparatory committee at Novo-Ogarevo does not stipulate such a structure as a

Council of the Federation. Possibly there will be a government and structure of the people's trust...

The largest danger that I see today is not even in the ideological irreconcilability, but in the fact that the people who signed the "9+1" agreement can reject their own words. That will be (and it is difficult for me to assume this) pure treason.

[V. Kuznetsova] Actually, don't the experts evaluate the stability of the "9+1" in various ways?

[V. Karasev] I shall immediately project that question onto the positions of definite persons and forces. If the leaders who have signed their names had previously stipulated that possibility! The assumption itself concerning the "breaking up" of the "9+1" is fearful only because this will break the hope onto which a tired society has grabbed. And after the collapse, it will be impossible to restore the trust in any authority.

[V. Kuznetsova] What do you think about Nazarbayev's position in the "9+1"?

[V. Karasev] I like him a lot. If, in response to definite actions both by Russia and the Ukraine, Kazakhstan should, sort of, raise the question of independence, it will sell all its wealth to the domestic market at world prices and will live calmly. But what about you and me? It will probably be worthwhile for the leaders to take off even those eyeglasses that they were wearing when they came to power.

[V. Kuznetsova] And what about Yeltsin's position in the "9+1"?

[V. Karasev] I would like very much to believe that the practice of Boris Nikolayevich's highest state activity has yielded fruitful results. I would like to believe that this is stable.

[V. Kuznetsova] It would seem that the union parliament is not very satisfied with the "9+1". Is it possible to avoid confrontation?

[V. Karasev] Yes, it's possible... by constitutional means.

Deputy Prime Minister Rakhimova Interview

914B0262A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNY VESTNIK
in Russian No 23, Jun 91 p 8

[Interview with USSR Deputy Prime Minister Bikhodzhal Rakhimova by L. Ulyanova; place and date not given: "I Wish That People Would Have Faith in Us..."]

[Text] Pages From Her Biography

Bikhodzhal Rakhimova was born in 1941 and is Tajik. She is a graduate of the Tajik Polytechnical Institute and the Tashkent Higher School. By trade she is an electromechanical engineer. She is a member of the CPSU. She began her labor activity as a foreman at the Kayrakkum rug combine. She was a Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Youth League]

member and did party work. In 1983 she became secretary of the Leninabad Obkom [oblast committee] of the Communist Party of Tajikistan. In 1989 she became deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Women's Affairs and Family, Mother, and Child Protection Committee. Since 1990 she has been secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan.

Margaret Thatcher, Corazon Aquino, Benazir Bhutto, Gro Harlem Brundtland, and Violetta Barrios de Chamorro. The names of these most eminent state and political figures have become the embodiment of the active inclusion of women in the higher echelons of power in recent years. Women's voices are being heard ever more confidently and creatively in the register of time.

One of the international sensations of last summer was the news of the appointment of Elisabeth Rehn as minister of defense of Finland. At approximately the same time a female figure appeared in the political arena in our country as well—the editor in chief of the magazine KRESTYANKA, Galina Semenova, became a member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. I recall that this was a kind of sensation as well: It is not so often that women hold high party and state posts in our country.

But in the meantime the world continues to call out more names. Edith Cresson recently became prime minister and several other elegant women entered the government of France...

So far there is just one woman in the USSR Cabinet of Ministers that is being formed. But one wishes to hope that the women's movement, which has made itself known in such a diverse and lively way recently, will put forth worthy leaders who will come to the corridors of state power.

What kind of people do we want to see? Of course, we want them to be educated, competent, principled, and—feminine, smiling, and soft... We want them to remember the most all-vanquishing weapon they have—the enigmatic smile of the Mona Lisa. Perhaps this way we will be able to breathe warmth and goodness into our society more quickly and thus begin to live a normal life worthy of a human being.

Today we introduce USSR Deputy Prime Minister Bikhodzhal Rakhimova.

[Ulyanova] Bikhodzhal Fatkhidinovna, permit me first of all to congratulate you on your appointment to a high post in the country's government and wish you success, something none of us has enough of these days. Tell me, was the invitation to become a deputy prime minister unexpected for you?

[Rakhimova] Yes, it was completely unexpected. After all, it was only seven months ago that I left Moscow for Dushanbe, after I was elected secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan.

And when I arrived for the regular meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev invited me to have a talk. He said that a number of deputies, including from our republic, had given their suggestions about candidates from the deputy corps for the Cabinet of Ministers. My name was mentioned among these representatives. The president asked what I thought about it.

[Ulyanova] And what did you think about it?

[Rakhimova] I told Mikhail Sergeyevich that this was probably not for me. In the first place, I had just returned to the republic and in the second place, I said, I felt that the party organization needed me. And, finally, the main thing—processes in the social sphere were so complex that I simply did not have enough experience...

Mikhail Sergeyevich said that things are difficult for everyone everywhere now; nothing is simple and easy anymore. Moreover, he promised me support in my work both from him and from the prime minister.

[Ulyanova] Did you speak with the president for a long time?

[Rakhimova] About 30 minutes.

[Ulyanova] Did you go alone or with the prime minister?

[Rakhimova] No, I was invited alone. But shortly before the session at which I was appointed I had a meeting with Valentin Sergeyevich Pavlov.

[Ulyanova] What did you discuss with the prime minister?

[Rakhimova] The social sphere, in which I will be working. Valentin Sergeyevich also said that this is a very difficult area of work. I listened to him and then asked him straight out: Will it not end up that, having taken a woman into the government, and one from a remote area at that, you will shove the most difficult area of work off on her? I think that successful solutions to social problems comprise the main task facing all of us, beginning with the president and yourself as prime minister as well as all of your deputies and myself as the future director. Therefore I am hoping we can work together. Valentin Sergeyevich understood my words and promised all possible support.

[Ulyanova] Bikhodzhal Fatkhidinovna, I know that today is your fourth working day in your new office. How did the first day begin?

[Rakhimova] With a great deal of agitation. When I start a new job I always try to figure out how to become immersed in the course of events and problems as quickly as possible and get to know the people better. We have no time to waste. Therefore on the first day I found out about what was left of the previous structures, and it

turned out that in many cases we would essentially have to start from scratch... I met with the public health minister and certain other officials.

[Ulyanova] There were two women in the previous government. Is that enough?

[Rakhimova] I think there should be many more women than that in a government. But, of course, one must proceed from the, you know, quantitative ratio, but select and place women leaders at various levels of government, beginning with the republics. But, unfortunately, this is precisely where there are so few women. And yet a number of issues, especially social issues, the ones that have to do with daily life, and those that affect the family, childhood, and maternity, in my opinion, are understood much more deeply and keenly by women, and I would say they are even closer to women's hearts.

[Ulyanova] Which is it easier for you to work with—women or men?

[Rakhimova] No offense meant, but the answer is men. Women are frequently much more emotional than men and they cannot always put this aside, which, of course, affects their work and relations in the collective.

[Ulyanova] And what kind of person are you—easy-going, complicated, patient?...

[Rakhimova] It is difficult to give a simple answer to that question. A person's opinion of himself far from always coincides with that of those around him. Sometimes I feel that I should be less rigid in my communications and business contacts with people. I also think that all of us are lacking in the ability and patience to listen to others and try to understand their viewpoint. In my view, this is one of the sources of the current tension and intolerance among people in society as a whole. But as far as what kind of person I am goes—it is better to ask others, those who have known me for a long time.

[Ulyanova] What do you value most in a person?

[Rakhimova] Sincerity, honesty, professionalism, efficiency.

[Ulyanova] Bikhodzhan Fatkhidinovna, you have advanced fairly successfully up the career ladder both in the years of stagnation and in the age of perestroika. Have you managed to preserve your former relations with the leadership?

[Rakhimova] Even during the times of stagnation there were people who tried to work honestly and do a good job. As for good relations with the leadership, I do not think they were ever all sweetness and light. I too have had my difficulties with what has come to be called advancement up the ladder. I have also had to spend some time in disfavor.

[Ulyanova] How do you feel about criticism?

[Rakhimova] The same as everyone else, if I am told about my shortcomings candidly, and it does not make any difference who it is—superiors or subordinates. Although I can say frankly that it is not always pleasant to hear it. But I cannot tolerate it when people agree with everything you say while they are in your office and then as soon as they get out in the hall they begin to say and think something altogether different. That is what I cannot stand.

[Ulyanova] And do you criticize subordinates yourself?

[Rakhimova] It is not so much that I criticize them as that I say what I think, and I do it immediately, while the iron is still hot. It is not in my nature to sit there and note down particular issues and complaints so that I can bring them up later when the time seems right.

[Ulyanova] Tell us, please, about your family.

[Rakhimova] I am married and have two daughters. My husband is a highway engineer and works in the Tajik Ministry of Transportation.

My elder daughter is married and lives in Leninabad. Her husband is a stomatologist in a polyclinic. She graduated from the polytechnical institute and works in a laboratory of the automated control system of a mining and chemical combine. She is on maternity leave now—my granddaughter Zarina is a year and seven months old. But Malika—that is my daughter—intends to go back to work in the fall because it is hard to live on her husband's wages.

[Ulyanova] Your daughter has a pretty name—like the famous ballerina Malika Sabirova...

[Rakhimova] You know, I named my daughter after her. I knew her well and even gave her her Komsomol card in 1967: At that time I was working as first secretary of the Komsomol raykom [rayon committee]. Malika was an excellent ballerina and a remarkable person. Once when I was expecting a child she asked: Well, if it is a girl, what will you name her? I said: Nothing other than Malika.

My younger daughter Mavdzhuda is 21 years old and is living with us while she completes her fourth year at the Tajik Medical Institute.

[Ulyanova] Have you already received an apartment in Moscow?

[Rakhimova] No. Until recently I was living in a hotel. A couple of days ago I moved to a dacha; my whole life in recent years has been nothing but moving and hotels.

[Ulyanova] Who are your parents and are they alive?

[Rakhimova] Papa died in 1949: He was in the war and fought at the front. Mama died two years ago; she was 86. For the last 15 years she lived with me and helped raise my daughters.

Mama had no education but she was a highly moral person. Mama said: Do not be upset if you are lacking

something at home. The main thing is health and satisfying work. And through work you will receive everything else.

[Ulyanova] How did your friends feel about your new appointment?

[Rakhimova] They are sorry that I am leaving again.

[Ulyanova] What is your favorite thing to do at home?

[Rakhimova] To be a wife, mother, and grandmother. To cook something, straighten up, and do the laundry. I love housework, probably because I have never had very much time for it. But these are the most pleasant cares and concerns.

[Ulyanova] Do you need much to be happy?

[Rakhimova] You know, my idea of happiness changes in various stages of life: When I was young it was one thing, today it is something else. Now I would feel happy if we were finally able to do something for the people. If people could have faith in us and calm down at least somewhat. God help us achieve this! And, of course, there are the ordinary human things—to have my friends and relatives with me and not to have to worry about them.

[Ulyanova] Bikhodzhal Fatkhidinovna, what would you wish for yourself?

[Rakhimova] To have enough energy and good health to do this big job. Unless there is a real return, my efforts will be worth nothing in the eyes of the people.

[Ulyanova] And the last question—what are your favorite flowers?

[Rakhimova] Roses and tulips. Perhaps I like tulips better. These are the flowers of my native land. Each year in May one morning the valleys in the mountains of Tajikistan are covered with bright red rugs. These are the tulips blooming. And life seems surprising and bright, and you understand that you will always yearn for these native parts regardless of where you may have to live and work. For your roots are in this land.

[Ulyanova] Thank you for the candid conversation, Bikhodzhal Fatkhidinovna. We have spoken about your plans and future activities. I understand that it would be premature today, but I hope that we will be able to have the same kind of conversation at some later time.

[Rakhimova] Yes, of course.

Cabinet of Ministers Decree on Regulation of Government Facilities

914B0287A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Aug 91
Union Edition p 2

[Decree of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers: "On Measures Pertaining to Fulfillment of the USSR Supreme Soviet Decree 'On the Work of the USSR Supreme

Soviet Commission on Privileges and Allowances and Measures Pertaining to Realization of its Proposals"]

[Text] In connection with the USSR Supreme Soviet decree of 12 July 1991: "The Work of the USSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Privileges and Allowances and Measures Pertaining to Realization of Its Proposals" and the directives of the president of the USSR the USSR Cabinet of Ministers has decreed:

1. To instruct the USSR Ministry of Justice and USSR Ministry of Finance to verify all circumstances connected with the sale to individuals and dacha-building cooperatives of dachas and dacha property owned by the former USSR Council of Ministers Administration of Affairs Economic Agency and also to USSR ministries and departments and to study the legality of the decisions adopted at all levels of executive authority, including the procedure of the creation of cooperatives, and make an evaluation of these decisions.

To request that the USSR Procuracy, USSR Supreme Court, and the USSR Control Chamber participate in this work.

That the results be reported to the USSR Cabinet of Ministers within a month.

That the administrator of the USSR Cabinet and the leaders of USSR ministries and departments make available to the USSR Ministry of Justice and USSR Ministry of Finance the necessary material on this issue and render them the utmost assistance in the performance of this work.

2. To require the ministries and other central organs of state administration of the USSR prior to the adoption of a general decision on the procedure of the privatization of state-owned property in the domain of the social sphere to suspend the sale or change in the status of the holiday hotels, recreation centers, dachas, and other facilities of the social sphere.

In connection with the restructuring of the organs of state administration of the USSR and for the purpose of regulating and enhancing the efficiency of the use of holiday hotels, recreation centers, dachas, and other social and cultural facilities and general amenities within their jurisdiction to deem expedient a revision of the system of administration and use of these facilities in the interests of all government organizations of the USSR.

3. Guided by the provisions of the USSR Constitution concerning the impermissibility of the granting of any unlawful allowances and privileges, to deem essential an acceleration of the elaboration of the draft USSR law: "The Civil Service," making provision in it for particular guarantees pertaining to assurance of the effective activity and social protection of civil servants.

That the USSR Ministry of Justice will submit the draft of this law to the USSR Cabinet of Ministers prior to 1

September 1991, the intention being its presentation to the USSR Supreme Soviet in the period of work of the sixth session.

4. Considering the criticism expressed by the USSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Privileges and Allowances concerning the procedure of the granting of dachas to members of the USSR Government, leading officials of ministries, and other central organs of state administration of the USSR and also employees of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers administrative system, to instruct the administrator of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, upon coordination with the leadership of the staff of the president of the USSR, to prepare proposals pertaining to regulation of the use of these dachas and dacha property, and report on them to the USSR Cabinet of Ministers prior to 25 August 1991.

The USSR Cabinet of Ministers Treatment and Recuperative Association to present proposals concerning an increase in the efficiency of the use of the network of medical, sanatoriums, and other establishments of this association.

5. The USSR Defense Ministry and other ministries and departments of the USSR having within their jurisdiction transport aviation to examine the material of the USSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Privileges and Allowances concerning instances of the use of transport aviation for purposes other than intended and to adopt measures to eliminate the abuses which have been revealed and also to devise measures pertaining to an improvement in the use of transport aviation for the needs of the national economy. To report on the work done to the USSR Cabinet of Ministers prior to 25 August 1991.

6. The USSR Ministry of Justice to accelerate the preparation of lists of unpublished USSR Government decisions concerning the rights, liberties, and duties of citizens which are subject to cancellation and revision and also of the decisions which remain in effect and with regard for clause 5 of the USSR Supreme Soviet decree of 12 July 1991 to report on the results to the USSR Cabinet of Ministers by 20 August 1991.

7. Ministries and other central organs of state administration of the USSR, regardless of fulfillment of the assignments specified by clause 1 of this decree, to examine the question of the soundness of the determination of the value of the sold implements and property at the departmental dachas. To create for this purpose expert commissions, incorporating in them representatives of the local authorities, financial bodies, and the public. To adopt in accordance with the results of the work of these commissions the appropriate decision and report prior to 25 August 1991 to the USSR Cabinet of Ministers.

8. To suspend USSR Council of Ministers Instructions No. 1007 of 26 June 1990 in respect of the sale of dachas prior to the adoption of a general decision on the procedure of the privatization of state-owned property in

the domain of the social sphere and also to deem null and void USSR Council of Ministers Instructions No. 1768 of 22 October 1990.

9. To instruct the administrator of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers in conjunction with the USSR Justice Ministry and other interested organizations to prepare prior to 1 September 1991 a draft report of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers to the USSR Supreme Soviet and the president of the USSR on the progress of compliance with the USSR Supreme Soviet decree of 12 July 1991: "The Work of the USSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Privileges and Allowances and Measures Pertaining to Realization of its Proposals" and the orders of the president of the USSR on this matter.

Commentary on Government Corruption Hearings

'Creeping Privatization' Illustrated

914B0222A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 29 Jun 91 p 1

[Article by I. Sichka: "The Gentlemen at Their Dachas: The Parliamentary Commission Examined the Results of the Sovmin Experiment on 'Privatization' of State Property:]

[Text] A few days ago the well-known Deputy Sukhov was morally wounded once again and wrote his latest "personal" petition: "I ask you at the Commission to review the issue of releasing me from working on the Commission on Issues of Privileges and Benefits, since the ideology of the Commission's work is opposite in nature to my ideology. (I am prepared to fight against all unmerited privileges and benefits, but not against communists)." In order to avoid distortions, I am citing the text of the statement exactly, down to the comma.

Poor Leonid Ivanovich! Is it his fault that as soon as the Commission studies any illegal privilege it inevitably stumbles upon some one of the prominent members of the ruling party?

At its meeting the day before yesterday, for example, the Commission reviewed the issue of illegal privileges of officials in the USSR government and the central apparatus of ministries and departments when buying dachas and dacha property. And once again names that are familiar to the people began to flash by.

That is the preamble of the story. At first two simple thoughts appeared in the consciousness of certain highly placed leadership comrades. The first was that the fact that an enormous army of government bureaucrats use official dachas in the best places around Moscow for practically nothing had begun to irritate social consciousness. The second was that maintaining these dacha settlements meant losses for the treasury. For Sovmin [Council of Ministers] alone, there are 1,794 hectares of land with dachas and boarding hotels. The total balance value of all these structures is 160.7 million rubles [R].

And this system is operated by 2,610 people. From that came the following conclusion: it is time to put an end to this matter.

Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov started to put an end to it by signing an order on 29 March 1989 to sell 217 Sovmin dacha structures to the Nazaryevo Dachha Construction Cooperative. The cooperative selected was not a simple one; it is entirely made up of former or present Sovmin workers. True, two "outsiders" from the Odintsovo Gorispolkom, on whose territory the dacha settlement was located, made their way in. But that is understandable: to prevent snags with official registration from arising.

Noticing that things were progressing rapidly, in June of last year Nikolay Ivanovich signed the following order: to sell state dachas to individual members of the USSR government. And he personally headed the list. And then came his deputies L. Voronin, A. Biryukova, and I. Belousov, the Sovmin business manager M. Shkabardnya, the chief of the Sovmin services administration A. Sterligov, and Ryzhkov's assistant V. Savakov. On the whole, mass "privatization" had begun. While the USSR Supreme Soviet was laying down the law on how to carry out privatization and denationalization, the comrades from Sovmin decided to experiment on themselves.

N. Ryzhkov was unluckiest of all. After we told about his acquisition (see KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA of 11 September 1990), a scandal broke and Nikolay Ivanovich was compelled to part from his purchase hastily. It is true, he got it gratis later, in connection with going on pension. M. Shkabardnya took alarm too: he took the money back without waiting for publicity. The rest did not panic and did not miscalculate.

In principle there is nothing bad in that planned-loss dachas were removed from treasury support and sold to citizens. Let them pay the money and enjoy them. But this sale seemed strange. The fact that there is no law on privatization yet is a small loss. There is no place for formalism among friends. But the prices!

To illustrate, A. Biryukova's dacha (incidentally, let us be honest; it is a regular two-story stone house) was built in 1986; according to the balance documents it cost R75,331. In 1986 prices, naturally. But A. Biryukova paid R18,087 for it in July 1990. The situation is roughly the same with the other dachas.

And what do you think, how much can 86 hectares of land with 217 summer dachas cost in the area around Moscow? The Nazaryevo Cooperative paid only a million rubles for this whole complex. Another R2.8 million remain "hanging" on the Sovmin balance, since no one paid for the engineering structures, underground tracks, and other things. It is the same story with the individual

dachas. They were sold at clearly reduced prices, and now people rack their brains to figure out what pretext to use to write off the losses.

Similar examples may be cited for other ministries too; the same thing is going on there—accelerated sale of the dacha fund. But meanwhile the Supreme Soviet is puffing and panting over the law on privatization and denationalization. And while the legislators are deciding how to divide up everything in an honest way so as not to offend anyone, it may be that soon there will be nothing to divide. For dachas are mere trifles in the big picture. They simply illustrate the process of creeping privatization most clearly. Denationalization of much more important installations has been occurring on the sly in our country for a long time now. Time and again information appears in newspapers saying that one state association or another or even an entire sector is being transformed into a concern or only-God-knows-what. And it is usually the most profitable and successful enterprises which are being transformed in this way. Naturally, all management personnel headed by ministers or general directors overflow into these new structures. And the minister is now no longer a minister, but the chairman of the concern. And don't you dare touch his "enterprise"—it is no longer state property.

Meanwhile, the state property fund has existed in our country since August of last year; it is supposed to control all these processes. But it cannot hear and cannot see some things. Sovmin, or by its new name, the Cabinet of Ministers, continues to manage everything. But there, and this is very clear from the example of dachas, the guiding principle is: whoever had the use of something should now own it.

Accusation of Cover-Up

914B0222B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Jul 91
Union Edition p 3

[Article by Yu. Feofanov: "Privatization Stamped 'Secret': Postscript to the Commission on Privileges"]

[Text] The printer's ink had not yet dried on the IZVESTIYA issue which printed the commentary "On Dachas, Marshals, and Refrigerators" (No 153) when an incensed reader called me: once again you slander the army and expressly mentioned two names familiar to all—Marshal Akhromeyev and ex-premier Ryzhkov.

I must confess: Yes, expressly. Before me was a large selection of illegal intrigues which the USSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Privileges had discovered, an enumeration of many departments, and a long list of names. I chose these particular names exactly because those who bear them preach purity of morals and the socialist choice and look after the social protection of working people more than others, but when it concerns their personal interests, they disappear to an altogether different orbit. To confirm that, allow me to allude to a particular fact cited at the Commission's meeting.

On 11 September 1990, in answering the deputies' inquiry regarding the purchase of a dacha, N. Ryzhkov, then still premier, stated in the parliament:

"I am tired of hearing about privileges, that we enjoy some special rights. What has happened now? When official registration of the dacha began, the talk started and I sensed it, so I prepared a paper where I asked that the registration be stopped and I put an end to it, which is what I am reporting to you."

But what was really going on? On 26 June 1990 Ryzhkov signed government Order No 1007 r, which authorized "the sale of dachas which are on the balance of the USSR Council of Ministers Administration of Affairs services administration to members of the government and responsible workers of USSR Sovmin." A month had not passed before the premier himself submitted to the Barvikhinskiy Rural Soviet a statement on the sale of state dacha No 2 to him. The Technical Inventory Bureau [BTI] of Odintsovo Gorispolkom was instructed to appraise the dacha, which the Bureau had no right to do. But... it did. The appraisal was R35,000 for a private residence of 368 square meters and 1.5 hectares of land. The deal was struck on 31 July. But after several days that same Odintsovo BTI appraised that very Ryzhkov dacha at its true value—R78,000.

That was a warning signal, just as the premier's words on the coming higher prices was a warning signal for the consumer uproar. While the working people finished gathering the remains of cheese and sausage from the shelves, the premier's circle went for state property. On 14 July Shkabardnya, the Sovmin business manager, authorized the sale of a state dacha to Sterligov, the chief of the Sovmin services administration; on 9 August Sterligov authorized the sale of a dacha to Shkabardnya, and before that, to Biryukova and Savakov. Then Kozelko from the Administration of Affairs authorized the sale of a dacha to first deputy premier Voronin and simply the deputy Belousov. So, let us note, Biryukova bought a dacha worth R75,000 for R18,000; Voronin bought a dacha valued at R46,000 for R23,000; and all the others acted the same way.

This relates to Ryzhkov's words before the parliament: "I am tired of hearing about privileges..." It is no accident that the Commission's conclusions say: "The former chairman of the Council of Ministers and now personal pensioner Ryzhkov is the father of creeping privatization in the Soviet Union."

But generally you cannot surprise Russia with embezzlement of state property: secret advisers, generals, and even ministers were not against putting their paws into the state purse. But I was surprised, for example, by the petty greed of the people in whose hands material assets and power came together. So, all right, use the luxurious private residences—only pay for them! No. "The payment amount," the Commission's conclusions say, "did not include depreciation deductions, the value of which

exceeds the value of the dachas themselves; these expenditures fall on the state budget." They stole the electricity too, just as poor pensioners in communal apartments do: meters were simply not installed in the state dachas.

The more luxurious the private residence, naturally, the more one should pay for it, especially when prices are rising unchecked. But so what, if all working people are given a subsidy of R60, then why should those standing at the helm not take advantage of it? And so Ryzhkov's Order No 1768 r of 22 October 1990 came to light: "Charge expenditures for maintaining and operating dachas offered to ministers and chairmen of USSR committees in accordance with the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the Council of Ministers of 8 February 1990 No 139-23 to the income of ministries and committees." (This order, among other things, was the basis for releasing the minister of defense from paying for a private residence. But this is what I would like to know: what income does the military department have and where does it come from? It exists entirely on the state budget.

This type of document goes under the "Top Secret" stamp. And that circumstance, as the Commission altogether justifiably decided, is the first condition for abuses. In justifying the intrigues involved in selling state property (I will talk about that later), the representative of the Ministry of Defense, as well as the jurist from the Cabinet of Ministers, said "Everything was done in accordance with the law." But there are no secret laws, and there can be none; only lawlessness is secret.

And the sale of state dachas went through two channels: by direct orders issued to one another, and through the creation of cooperatives. Among other things, the Commission meeting reviewed the matter of the Nazaryevo Cooperative, which took 217 state dachas under its cover: they were appraised wholesale at R900,000, but taking into account the cost of engineering equipment they snatched R2 million from the state. But the cooperative cover is a subject for special discussion. Let us return to direct intrigues.

After proclaiming "creeping privatization" of state dachas long before the USSR Supreme Soviet began serious debate on this acute issue (the debates are not over even now as I write this), Ryzhkov authorized universal sale at reduced prices of everything that was in the state dachas, and that was quite a lot of property: televisions, refrigerators, pictures, carpets, suites of furniture, chandeliers, linen, and dishware. This total sale at discount prices went on from December 1990 through March 1991. I have long lists of sales before me. And here I will try to answer the reader's question of why I did not refrain from "yet again slandering the army and Marshal Akhromeyev personally."

On 19 July 1990 the defense minister's order No 293 was signed and authorized selling renters of dachas, marshals, and generals state property which they had used

for years and decades. Under this order the chief of the administrative services directorate [AKhU] General Koskin confirmed the "Procedure for Discounting Furniture and Apartment Property Which Has Served Its Established Service Life in Official Dachas." The norms of the discount were 80-70 percent. And an orgy of sales "in anticipation of the coming higher prices" began among the military.

I will cite a document: "From Site No 37 (the official dacha of Marshal of the Soviet Union S. F. Akhromeyev), 5 sets of furniture, including 'Violetta' and 'Balaton' sets, 3 Zil refrigerators, and other property with a total value after discount of R12,700 were sold. S. F. Akhromeyev himself acquired the goods for R8,500."

Now consider: property was discounted by 70-80 percent. Tell me, can there be such wear on German silver dishes or pictures; that is, did they depreciate that much? Tell me something else: if the owner of the dacha himself used this property, why should the discount be charged to the state? But, it seems, I am posing naive questions. And I myself am unwittingly giving in to some kind of petty calculations. Well, the generals bought up this second-hand stuff at a discount; they bought it up, as the Commission believes, illegally, since the orders and appendices to them were themselves illegal. But then who is not tempted if he receives an offer to buy something that has been written off. Those are all details. But these details develop from a system which can certainly be signified by the slogan "theft of state property on a legal basis."

Here is one example of such a "legal" transaction. In 1981 the USSR Council of Ministers was instructed to build 35 official dachas at R40,000-R45,000 apiece for the top command personnel. They built 18 private residences but at R210,000 apiece—almost 5 times as expensive as what had been authorized. This cost R3.7 million, and that included R133,000 to pay for furniture and property which "on the threshold of higher prices" was sold on a fire sale basis.

The higher ranks of this ministry are supposed to watch after the morale of their subordinates. But to accomplish that they must have the moral right to do so. Where is it? In 1989 construction began on four dachas, at R150,000 apiece, for four leaders of the Ministry of Defense, including one for the minister himself, with the authorization of the deputy chairman of USSR Sovmin Batalin. It turned out to be too little; the projects went over estimated cost.

From the Commission's documents: "An allocation of R150,000 was envisioned to erect dacha No 1 for Marshal D. T. Yazov. In fact this dacha was built on the basis of two code figures (the emphasis is mine—Yu. F.)—according to one the value of the dacha itself was determined at R156,800, but the other code figure was used to allocate R93,600 to improve its operational qualities."

At the Commission's meeting, representatives of the Ministry of Defense used two proven means to defend themselves: 1) everything was done according to orders and instructions; 2) do not undermine the army's prestige. But let us decide who is really undermining it if what was said above is compared with these facts: in that very Arkhangelsk where the private residences for marshals were built, it has been impossible for many years to build housing for the doctors of Clinical Hospital No 3, and the kindergarten takes shelter in a little log cabin next to the dacha of the Deputy Minister of Defense Kochetov, where R300,000 was squandered on service areas.

When all these and many other facts came out into the light of day, the minister of defense reported: Strict measures have been taken—the chief of the AKhU General Koskin was discharged. It is true that he was discharged, because of his age, with a 5-month salary and the right to wear the uniform—in short, with honor and gratitude for what he had done.

Secrecy is the first condition of all intrigues with state property; deceit is the second component of illegality; but the **irresponsibility of the authorities** is the basis of everything. Solzhenitsyn was certainly right when he said: "Authoritarian regimes are not terrible; regimes which are not answerable for anything or to anyone are terrible."

The democratic strata of society are naive: they entertain themselves with the hope that the representative organs elected by the people, public opinion, glasnost, and the press are capable of putting an end to the abuses of the ruling circles and to the command-administrative system itself. The Parliamentary Commission has, it seems, such formidable powers. But... "as soon as the Commission started to verify the facts of the sale of dachas and property to Sovmin leaders and workers, it quickly encountered a blind wall of open resistance, even to the point of completely ignoring the Commission and openly refusing to provide the information"—the Parliamentary Commission itself admits that. The Committee of People's Control was active while the intrigues in the departments were under study (I omitted that part altogether in this commentary), but as soon as things got to the government it was "Stop the car, a brick wall, no entry." The Commission has no hope that the USSR Procurator can help.

In short, a wall. Having sniffed the captivating aroma of ownership, yesterday's leaders latched onto land allotments, dachas, refrigerators, and all kinds of things with a death grip. Will the public be able to break it? Will the parliament want to cut off the illegal pilfering of the state treasury?

At the Commission's meeting, deputy Shapovalenko spoke straight to the point, as they say:

"The whole horror is that the embezzlers of public funds were running the country."

"I hope," a representative of the Cabinet of Ministers stood up, "that an evaluation will be made here of these irresponsible words."

"I am talking responsibly," the people's deputy was not upset, "and I am prepared to repeat it in parliament even, or even before the court if you sue me."

That is the question: will the matter get to the point of open public examination of the "creeping privatization" which government circles have begun to carry out without, unfortunately, waiting for the law. For now the only weapon in the hands of the public is glasnost. If a newspaper was found which issue after issue would begin to publish the materials of the Commission on Privileges which were the object of examination on 27 June, it would substitute for the most vivid sociopolitical commentary.

But all the articles and speeches from the podium are too weak before the for now still all-powerful and irresponsible bureaucratic powers. It is not so much courage and inflexibility which the members of the Parliamentary Commission need as a hearing of this entire matter in parliament and its mighty word invested in a legislative enactment. Otherwise we will continue to live according to the two code figures.

Burlatskiy Reviews Principles, Goals of New Political Groups

914B0252A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 27, 10 Jul 91 p 1

[Article by Fedor Burlatskiy, member of the Coordination Council of the Soglasie Association of People's Deputies: "Movement or Party?"]

[Text]

Movement for Democratic Reforms

Several political personalities—A. Volskiy, G. Popov, A. Rutskoy, A. Sobchak, S. Shatalin, E. Shevardnadze, A. Yakovlev, I. Silayev, and N. Petrakov—have issued an appeal for unification within the "Movement for Democratic Reforms."

The basic principles of the Movement are the following:

man's spiritual, economic, and political freedom; his social and economic protection;

a parliamentary republic;

law and order;

radical reorganization of the economic system, competition, and equal opportunity, have the citizens of the country own property and the results of their labor;

national cooperation, preservation of the historical nucleus of our state as a union of free and sovereign nations;

condemnation and rejection of any forms of national extremism, chauvinism, racism, and anti-Semitism;

common sense, constructive cooperation among all responsible citizens, who oppose chaos and anarchy;

equal and involved cooperation in foreign political and foreign economic affairs and peaceful development of civilization.

Soglasie

The Coordination Council of an association of groups of people's deputies, known as Soglasie, which has more than 1,000 members, has issued a declaration stipulating that the association appeals to all social strata and calls for showing a respectful attitude toward the legitimately elected state authorities, political tolerance, and rejection from the arsenal of the struggle any unconstitutional power pressure, direct or indirect coercion, manipulation of public opinion, and use of psychological warfare methods.

the main principles of the association are the following:

controlled conversion from a unitarian totalitarian system to a modern law-governed society;

variety and equality of forms of ownership;

consistent destatification and privatization;

a mixed economy, integrated within the global economic system;

free enterprise with efficient social protection mechanisms;

real guarantees of human and national rights;

all-round development of culture;

demilitarization of society and the economy, military reform, and parliamentary (Union and republic) control over defense expenditures;

open foreign policy.

United Democratic Party

Academician S. Shatalin, chairman of the Consultative-Political Council of the DPR [Russian Democratic Party], N. Travkin, DPR chairman, Sh. Yusupov, chairman of the Democratic Party of Tadzhikistan, D. Khodzha-Mukhammed, co-chairman of the Turkmen Democratic Party, V. Davituli, member of the SDPR [Social Democratic Party of Russia], E. Kovrigin, co-chairman of the SDPR social-liberal faction, A. Repnikov, member of the RPRF, A. Krichevskiy, RPRF member, and N. Bogayenko, RPRF member, have issued an appeal calling for the creation of a United Democratic Party in the country. Among others, the appeal states:

We need a powerful political party with discipline, based on convictions and with interacting and jointly acting structures....

The type of structure it will have and the way it will reflect the different platforms will be decided by the unification congress which we suggest be held no later than September 1991. The only thing that is clear is that in terms of the individual republics, it will be structured on a confederative basis.

We must be a party of action, from the very start. In areas where the democrats have won, we shall be a party of accelerated reform. We wish to accelerate the liberation of the country from anything which prevents the people from living and working normally and feeling free. In areas where the power will remain in the hands of the CPSU orthodox, we shall function as a political opposition....

Search for Alternatives

Let me start with the main thing. I believe that the initiative of the Movement for Democratic Reforms group is a new major step in combining the variety of trends which could assist in the radical reorganization of our system, on the basis of the principles of parliamentarianism and economic freedom. Whether or not it will be possible to make this movement a mass parliamentary-type alternative party will depend on the many components which are presently difficult to enumerate and, above all, on the political frame of mind of the people.

We know that for quite some time a movement embracing such principles had been taking shape among the deputies. It was no accident that a resolution "Dictatorship Shall Not Pass" was submitted to a vote at the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies. Our newspaper has systematically promoted the idea of a left-of-center bloc. It encouraged cooperation between M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin and among all republic leaders, as a necessary prerequisite for stabilization and for surmounting the crisis.

The party problems are reflected in the article "Alternative..." by S. Alekseyev, F. Burlatskiy, and S. Shatalin (LG, No 4, 30 January 1991). It was at that time that a group of USSR people's deputies was created, known as "Democratic Reforms." Two months ago a broad association known as "Soglasie" appeared, which included 17 deputy groups numbering more than 1,000 people. The basic concepts of the "Statement" of the Coordination Council of these groups (already published in IZVESTIYA), carried today by LG, indicate the similarity of their position to that of the authors of the "Appeal."

We are also publishing the basic concepts of the appeal of a group known as "United Democratic Party," in order to provide greater information about the various answers to the exciting question of the possible organization of a

multipart system in our country and, therefore, having a real rather than fictitious parliamentarianism.

And now a few words about the heart of the matter.

First: party or movement? This question, which was so pointedly raised by N. Travkin, leads us back into the channel of the traditional Soviet way of thinking. In the West, under the conditions of a civil society, this problem was solved a long time ago. A party of a parliamentary type is also a movement with rather loose extremities, which plays its main role at elections, formulates a program for practical action, and nominates leaders. The concept of a party with strict discipline, participation in the work of the primary organizations, mandatory dues, and a leadership concept is primitive. Look: Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin had no party. Instead, he relied on a loosely organized movement and won the elections, whereas Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, backed by a powerful party organization, lost them. Let me not even mention that various modern parties, such as the Republican and Democratic in the United States, or the Conservative and Labor in Great Britain, have nothing in common with the organizational models of a party of a Leninist type. Furthermore, today in our country there may be as many as 100 parties, but how great is their influence on the political process? The main thing is to create a movement as an alternative to the right-wing forces, both within the CPSU and within the soviets and, which is just as essential, among the people themselves. Only then should we look for a name, whether to call it a movement, a party, or a congress; whether a cat is called a cat is immaterial; all that matters is for it to catch mice.

Second: ideological platform or program for action? Both the "Appeal" and the "Declaration" are, for the time being, a summation of principles. This is both good and bad. It is good because it does not block the way to a great variety of movements; it is bad because it does not have clearly defined political objectives.

The most pressing issues are on the agenda: What type of Union should it be, what role would sovereign states play in it, what would be the role of the republics which will not sign the treaty, what type of program for economic stabilization would it have, how to accomplish the "great division" of the property of the people, could there be a market without private ownership, what should be the attitude toward the Federation Council as the supreme executive authority, should the soviets be replaced by a parliament and regional authorities by municipalities, do we need Western aid and cooperation, and military reform, and so on. All of this must find its place in the political action platform on the eve of the forthcoming September conference.

Third: a Union or a Russian movement? For the time being, the Communist Party remains the only big integral political organization. The mention in the "Appeal"

of the "historical nucleus of our state as a union of free and sovereign nations" (almost word for word the lyrics of the anthem) could disturb many true democrats in sovereign Union states. Here the weak spot is found above all in the intent. We must be extremely specific and extremely cautious in our aspiration to create not an organization of Muscovites and Leningraders but an all-Union movement.

Finally: Is this a **personality or political** action? Timing is extremely important in starting a truly mass movement. Usually this becomes possible only at crucial stages, under circumstances influenced not simply by a general crisis but by a specific and sharp demarcation of forces which cope with the biggest problems in life. Of late, such a crisis has been experienced by us repeatedly: attempts to overthrow the USSR president in violation of the Constitution, to block the elections for a president of the RSFSR, to ignore the strike of miners, totally to reject the Shatalin-Yavlinskiy program, to strike at a foreign policy governed by new thinking, etc.

What is the reason now? Is it the fact that B.N. Yeltsin, G.Kh. Popov, and A.A. Sobchak won the elections? Is it the establishment of a Federation Council as the supreme executive authority (9 + 1)? Is it the withdrawal of E.A. Shevardnadze from the CPSU? It is unclear. The reference to the crisis in the CPSU and throughout the country is too general, for that crisis has existed for several years. The danger, therefore, is that events may develop quite sluggishly.

The most important argument was brought forth by G.Kh. Popov: preparations for the elections of a president of the USSR and for the USSR Supreme Soviet, and regional elections. This is understandable. However, around whom is the movement rallying: is it Gorbachev, Yeltsin or Bakatin? As recent events have indicated, considering the personalized nature of authority inherent in our country, these are by no means secondary questions.

It is obvious that today no single communist or democrat has a firm chance for success in the next elections. It is no accident that B.N. Yeltsin has invited A. Rutskiy to be his vice president. Indeed, we need a new force which would encompass democrat, reformers, and liberals, both within and outside the CPSU.

This aspect has another side as well: the problem of generations. The generation of reformers of the 1960s is reaching its last years in politics. It is the people of the new times, who grew up under the conditions of a more open, a democratic state, that will build a civilized society. That is why we need not simply a union of democrats and reform-minded communists, but a true mass movement. We also need young leaders.

Regardless of all the problems which arise, unquestionably, the time has come for a unification of all forces which favor democracy and oppose the threat from the right. This is a necessary stage on the way to a multiparty system in a presidential parliamentary republic.

Need Seen for Economic Effectiveness in Democratic Reform Movement

914B0255A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
9 Jul 91 p 2

[Article by Vasilii Tsarev: "Political Crossroads. A New Step... Where and Why?"]

[Text]

A phenomenon which now leads to most conflicting views has become apparent in the country's political life, ranging from enthusiastic responses to drastic condemnation and even charges of treason. I refer to the appeal published in several media, authored by nine known political figures who, judging by the text, are profoundly concerned with the existing crisis situation in the country and would like to rally the efforts of "civic-minded and civically responsible people," in order to put an end to the chaos and lead society toward a "worthy and secure life."... To this effect, the authors of the "Appeal" have called upon anyone "concerned with the state of our state, who cares for the freedom of the individual, and who sees his future in a democratic law-governed society and who is willing and able to work," to rally in a "**Movement for Democratic Reforms.**"

One would surmise that among the readers of SELSKAYA ZHIZN many are those who "care for the fate..." and "who are willing and able to work."... For that reason, we deem it mandatory to inform our subscribers about the origins of this reform manifesto, its content, and the objectives described in that document.

Let us note above all that the "Appeal" is imbued with concern caused by the fact that "the people are no longer understanding or listening to one another," and that "life is being invaded by conflicts, bitterness, animosity, and violence." Let us then emphasize that, in the view of the authors of the "Appeal," "an essentially new situation is developing in the country, which requires taking a qualitatively new step (emphasized by the author) in democratic development." Finally, let us point out that the initiators of the "Movement for Democratic Reforms" depict themselves as politicians who firmly support "justice, the law, and constitutional means of action." Naturally, all of this cannot fail to generate our sympathy.

The objectives proclaimed in the document would justifiably earn the broad support of the people. Let us quote that part of the "Appeal" in full:

"Our movement calls for returning to the people that which was taken away from them: the land to the peasant; unpaid labor and the results of his work to the worker, making him the owner of the associated plants and factories; the right to intellectual ownership to the intelligentsia; the feeling of pride of defenders of the homeland to the officers; the Church to the believers; and the culture, tradition, history, and historical memory to the people."

Who would dare reject, not to mention condemn, an appeal for unification and accord for the sake of achieving such noble purposes, for the sake of man! What bothers us, however, is why, as they appeal to take a "new step in the democratic development" of the country, and as they proclaim their lofty objectives, the manifesto's authors present their suggestions as though this is not simply a new step but the first and, essentially, the only step never taken before by anyone else. It was as though there had never been an April 1985, the resolutions of the 28th CPSU Congress, and of a number of Central Committee plenums, noted for their novelty and reformist trend, and no decisive steps taken to democratize society and to develop glasnost and ensure deep changes in the areas of economics and foreign policy. Clearly, in the final account, it is not a question of who was the first to say something, unless the objective is to suppress the truth and belittle the significance of this renovation process which began in our country with perestroika. In this case it would be much more important to interpret the content and realistic nature of the objectives of the "Movement."

Particularly important in this connection was the communication made at the briefing of the presidential press service about his initial reaction to the publication of the "Appeal." As was made public at the meeting with the journalists, the head of state pointed out that the "Movement" is a unification of forces, the purpose of which is to achieve a consensus in society and a consolidation in the interests of promoting perestroika and democracy. It was also emphasized that the "Movement" is not of a confrontational nature.

Let us add to this that, in turn, the authors of the "Appeal" proclaim their support of the neo-Ogarev process, i.e., the consensus reached by the president of the USSR and the heads of nine republics, believing this to offer the "possibility of saving our multinational community and preserving it as a state of a new type."

The importance of any, albeit the slightest but realistic, progress toward consensus and toward the unification of the efforts to lead the country out of the crisis in a time of total confrontation among different political forces, is self-evident. The people have indeed become tired of political confrontation and instability, of the "war among laws" and "war of sovereignties," and economic chaos and clashes of ambitions. Therefore, one can confidently rely on the fact that among the rural workers the words in the statement by the "nine" will be received with complete sympathy: "enough bitterness. Enough idle talk.... Real action is needed. Priority must be given to specific projects and to results of such projects from the viewpoint of the interests of the person."

The editorial mail confirms that people are indeed fed up with the irresponsibility of their fellow citizens in economic affairs and the helplessness of the authorities. They are fed up with all kinds of verbal promises and assertions. I can predict, however, that tomorrow the mail will bring letters repeatedly asking a question which

is of the greatest interest to all rural people: What guarantee is there that the claims and appeals of the new "Movement" would turn out to be better than the present or the past? Where is the guarantee that such lofty declarations do not conceal something we would come to regret later?

Once burned, twice shy. The years of perestroika have already brought us a number of bitter lessons, the conclusion from which is that in the case of some politicians words by no means always coincide with their true objectives. Let us recall the initial Sayudis slogans, in which it described itself as a popular movement for perestroika. Not even a year after its creation had passed when it became clear that the slogans of the Sayudis leaders had changed and that their actions had little in common with democracy, pluralism in political thinking, and tolerance of dissidents. A similar scenario was followed in the development of events in Georgia, where an authoritarian regime, established under the banner of democracy, is assuming increasingly harsh aspects.

The people are already totally fed up with claims of supporting the interests of the people and all kinds of promises and bribes. One should not label as conservative or even as reactionary anyone who today shows a cautious attitude toward untested innovations and those who detect beyond phrases about the support of lofty universal human values and freedom of the individual, the aspiration toward the consolidation of society, and civic consensus, the selfish interests of some social group.

One would like to believe that the "Movement for Democratic Reforms" is indeed not confrontational and that it calls for a consensus and cooperation among all political forces which care for the interests of the people. In that case, however, why begin by rejecting the possible cooperation of those who are described by the authors of the "manifesto" as supporting other political views?

There is no need to guess the identity of the respected "nine," as they frighten society with mentions of "ultra-conservative forces," although the "Appeal" does not identify them specifically. They are openly mentioned only by Academician A.N. Yakovlev, one of the authors of the document, in his article "A New Step Is Needed" (IZVESTIYA, No 156, 2 July 1991). Was it not only recently that we saw him at the very top echelon of party power, in the role of the chief ideologue and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo? Today, judging by his article, he considers his greatest enemy on the way to reformation to be the Communist Party which nurtured him, with all of its structures "in the center and the localities." Displaying no hesitation or doubts, this respected politician dares to claim that "the party leadership on all levels and the party apparatus are hastily mobilizing the party members against democratic changes and against economic and political freedoms." Without bothering to supply any kind of proof, this academician tars with the same brush all elective party

organs, as though unaware of the fact that he thus tars the entire multi-million strong army of party members who chose their own leader.

Not a single word of condemnation may be found in this extensive article written by a former Politburo member about those who, in their populist and even openly national-fascist policy, are subverting the economy and encouraging the breakdown of the state. Meanwhile, he does not spare his sarcasm aimed at members of his own party. It is at them, the communists, and at the leading structures of the Communist Party, that he aims his sarcasm which (may I be forgiven by the readers for the abundance of quotations) is worth quoting: "And there they are: simply letting themselves go, idling, working exclusively for themselves or even putting a spoke in the wheel of change."

One unwittingly feels like asking: Who is the author of these lines working for? What are the changes he has in mind? If it is a question of the "radical reorganization of the economic system," proclaimed in the "Appeal," this blunt politician should not limit himself to the superficial patter of "competition and equal opportunity for converting the citizens of the country into the owners of property and of the results of their labor." Who if not a person who spent a number of years as a diplomat in the West could, while remaining honest, prove the entire unseemliness of the distance which actually separates such "equal" opportunities to become masters of their property and results of their labor from reality.

We should not be amazed at the fact that A.N. Yakovlev is actually trying to shift the most complex economic and social problems of social development to the level of a moral sermon. This makes it more comfortable and easier to manipulate the feelings and moods of the people who are endlessly tortured by all sorts of shortages. Listen to the emotionality with which this zealous fighter for equality, consensus, and cooperation writes: "... The changes in the country have come across a thick wall of hatred, alienation, ideological rejection, and real opposition by the forces of extreme conservatism and reaction and by anyone who is greedy, reactionary, spiteful, and lazy...."

How categorical and how scathing all this is! And all this is being written about the members of his own party with which the academician does not dare to break openly.

Yes, there have been many people within the CPSU and, clearly, there still are today who, in their time, joined the party for the sake of their selfish careeristic interests. Many of them, having determined that today CPSU membership no longer promises any sort of dividend, hastily surrendered their party cards. Others were removed from the top power positions in the party by the people themselves, who chose to replace them with new leaders. Others again are keeping quiet. However, a party renovation is under way, although not as rapidly as one

would wish. But what does this former chief communist ideologue care about all this! Today he has other guidelines and other loyalties.

What can we find behind all this? I believe that we could confidently say that it is lack of faith in a possible party renovation, mistrust in the possibility of the renovation of socialism and, in the final account, lack of faith in one's own people. The only real chance for the country to ensure a worthy life to the individual, according to this academician, is a conversion to models of "Western civilization." It turns out that anything good that was achieved in the country in the decades since the October Revolution should be deleted. The powerful development of industry and the systematic introduction of an entire range of vitally important social guarantees are to be ignored.... Meanwhile, not only in the villages but also in the cities the people are beginning to be concerned about the unforeseen consequences which the abandoning of gains, such as free education, free medical aid, and the constitutional right to housing, may have. Yes, we have many shortcomings in these areas and they should be criticized and firmly uprooted. However, this should not be done according to the "principle" that in order to get rid of the cockroaches one should burn the house down!

Let us be totally frank. Even before perestroika many of us frequently thought about how to get rid of those faults which had been made part of our economic system from the very beginning. Did we not say, with bitter irony, that "something from capitalism should have been added to the virtues of socialism."... This was, above all, a reference to motivation to work and the possibility of acquiring not that which would be "set at the top," but truly according to one's merit and efforts.

Today it is essentially this kind of process that is taking place. It was not initiated on the outside and it is consistent with the CPSU programmatic statement, although it is taking place not without difficulties. Why is it that Academician A.N. Yakovlev does not mention this as it is, without exacerbating passions? Why not look for allies in making changes, not only among the "left-wing radicals" but also among sensible and soberly thinking "conservatives?"

Speaking of the peasantry, it has long been known that the muzhik does not like to be rushed, and one should not push him by force into "civilization," the way he was pressed into collectivization. He is cautious. He is not prepared quickly to abandon the guarantees given by the socialist state for the sake of what seems today a rather problematical future prosperity which is promised to him with private enterprise. And even among urban workers and employees, views about the future social system are by no means homogeneous. The communists bear this in mind and take it into consideration. Should they be labeled as ultra-conservative for that reason?

A.N. Yakovlev's co-authors of the "Movement for Democratic Reforms" include politicians well-known in the

country: Gavriil Popov, Anatoliy Sobchak, Arkadiy Volskiy, Aleksandr Rutskoy, Stanislav Shatalin, Eduard Shevardnadze, Nikolay Petrakov, and Ivan Silayev. Their pasts may have been different but now they have joined in a common platform and, as we say, they have found a common language. Let me repeat myself: Their declaration has a great deal that is attractive and one could agree with and accept much of it without hesitation.

Alas, life has taught us no longer to accept declarations on faith. Life taught us to look deeper, to think of the political processes which are taking place and to assess their true meaning.

The "new step" taken by one of the authors of the "Appeal," after the publication of this document, reminds us yet once again of the need for such a sober approach to political declarations. I am referring to the sensational statement by E.A. Shevardnadze, the former Politburo member, about leaving the CPSU. Actually, it would be difficult to view his announcement as all that unexpected. The "Appeal" itself of the nine is essentially oriented toward the appearance of some kind of new political party which should emerge from the "Movement for Democratic Reforms." Does this mean goodbye CPSU? Or else could this be a hope, once again, to become part of the group of 10?

More likely, the declaration of the "nine" lays a claim to representing the interests of the entire people or, as the text reads, "all responsible citizens." According to the authors of the "Appeal," their cooperation could result in convening, next September, a constituent conference of the "Movement" and, possibly, the founding of a party, this to be decided at the conference itself. The question immediately arises: a party representing what class, what social strata? There can be no political party for everyone. Parties express and defend the interests of specific social groups. How not to recall here the fact that some of the authors of the "Appeal" have already repeatedly complained that their future party will not have a reliable social base, concluding that such a base should be created. It should be founded on a conversion to the market and represented by the so-called middle class, the entrepreneurs.

But what about the peasant who is still far from acquiring the status of entrepreneur-owner? Furthermore, would every kolkhoz member or sovkhoz worker be willing to take a chance by depriving himself of the social and other guarantees which he enjoys in a good collective? And, under such circumstances, why should he rely on the claims of those who are seeking their support within the "middle class?"

Consensus and cooperation in society provide, naturally, a great advantage. It is important, however, for this not to turn into the "cooperation" between the horse and the horseman. It is worth considering this today, when politicians, even quite noted and prestigious politicians, call for them.

Chief Editor Tretyakov Skeptical of Democratic Reform Movement

914B0254A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 4 Jul 91 p 1

[Article by Vitaliy Tretyakov, chief editor of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: "Instant Happiness to All but to No One in Particular; The Adult Disease of Communism in Soviet Democracy"]

[Text] Nine noted political leaders in the country have called for the founding of a "Movement for Democratic Reforms:" Volskiy, Petrakov, G. Popov, Rutskoy, Sobchak, Silayev, Shatalin, Shevardnadze, and A. Yakovlev.

The next day, an appeal for the creation of a united democratic party appeared, signed by less familiar names, although names representing several republics. The main feature in this list is Travkin, who refused to join the Movement, because it is a movement and not a party, and Shatalin who, it appears, recalled his signature on the first list.

Thus, the birth of the united "Movement" or the united "Party" was marked by a division. The joy of orthodox communists was so obvious that SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA printed the full text of the sarcastic note by Afanasiy Barsukov, the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA commentator, on the increased secrecy and hesitations of the "Movement" leaders regarding the CPSU.

Alas, I must admit that my skepticism concerning the future of the "Movement" coincides with the criticisms of the movement in the communist press. I willingly believe Yu. Makhurin, who wrote yesterday in PRAVDA: "I read this document and I catch myself thinking that these are the same objectives, only formulated more specifically and clearly, as those of the third draft of the new CPSU Program."

What is the matter, why is it that the left and right critics agree in their views on the "Movement?" It is because the idea of the "Movement" in its present aspect is very vulnerable. It is theoretical and nomenclatural, and I am not afraid to use this strong label as I face the democrats.

The communists suffer from many shortcomings. One of the principal ones is the desire, perhaps even in fear, of making everyone happy immediately, en masse, but no one specifically. The real outcome of this, with one minor exception, is that they will manage to make their leaders happy (mainly in terms of material well-being and power). The same fault may be found in the concept of the new "Movement:" to unite all people for the sake of the general happiness.

The creation of a united party, movement or front in a country such as the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union is impossible. It is impossible even geographically, for the possibility of controlling it from a single center is zero, given the great distances; not to mention its multinational composition and many other social stratifications. This can be achieved by force, with the help of

gulags, the secret police, and party-state monopoly. It is impossible to achieve it democratically. Democrats are not united by definition, for otherwise they would be not democrats but former communists, who would like to become democrats. However, the distance between wish and possibility is sufficiently great and governed mainly by the old habits.

Another genetic fault stemming from communism is the inability to tell the full truth, even if one wishes to do so. On the one hand, it is clear that the "Movement" opposes the CPSU. On the other, a certain influential segment of the founders of the "Movement" are inhibited from doing so or else, in fact, even intend to insert fragments of the totalitarian CPSU (their own past) in the new "Movement" and into the country's future.

Nikolay Travkin does not want this and says it openly. He openly pits his united party against the CPSU. Incidentally, this gives him a greater chance to succeed although, naturally, he too will be unable to found a democratic party covering the entire country and equal to the CPSU in terms of power. Should he succeed, this would not be a democratic but a similar type of totalitarian imperial party.

No, our democrats should not become involved in such things. They should clearly determine their attitude toward the CPSU and each one of them should work on strengthening his own party. It is precisely this that will yield real results for the democrats, happiness in parts, happiness for individuals but never happiness for everyone, instantly.

Ryabov Interview on Tasks Facing CPSU Humanities Department

914B0238A Moscow GLASNOST in Russian No 14,
4 Apr 91 p 5

[Interview with V.V. Ryabov, head of the CPSU Central Committee Humanities Department, by unidentified person; place and date not given: "New Central Committee Department—Humanities"]

[Text] A Humanities Department, which has united the Department of Science and Scientific Institutions and the Culture Department, which had existed previously, has been formed in the CPSU Central Committee. They were formerly merged within the Ideology Department, and now two years later a new reorganization. What is the reason? What tasks face the Humanities Department? These questions were answered at the request of the editorial office by Viktor Vasilyevich Ryabov, member of the Central Committee, deputy chairman of the CPSU Central Committee Science, Education and Culture Commission and head of the CPSU Central Committee Humanities Department.

The formation of the commission and the department was brought about by the CPSU's new role as a political organization. The party has emphatically abandoned both the function of ideological censor and the practice

of administrative and political goading in the spiritual sphere. The attempt to accomplish the new tasks in the sphere of education, science and culture via ideological departments was unsuccessful. Many professionals and experienced party officials had left the departments of science and educational institutions and culture, which had been abolished previously. This weakened the party committees' contacts with leading scientists and figures of culture and education and the party organizations in these spheres. We are now having to reestablish them from scratch.

An important direction in the political activity of the CPSU today is the expression and defense of the interests of the scientific, pedagogical and artistic intelligentsia, the professional, creative leadership of the Communists in this sphere and the elaboration and implementation of practicable programs contributing to the priority development of the spiritual sphere and the strengthening of its consolidating role in society and the state. The party is interested also in the formulation and realization of its policy being based on scientific knowledge, the authority of culture and modern education. Any political decision should be scientifically based.

The Science, Education and Culture Commission and the Humanities Department are called upon to contribute to a stimulation of intellectual potential in the surmounting of the social crisis and the accomplishment of all-party tasks. Incidentally, twenty top scientists and specialists in various branches of learning have become advisers and consultants to the commission. Our practical activity is determined by the 28th congress resolution "CPSU Policy in the Sphere of Education, Science and Culture," which moves the country's intellectual and spiritual revival to the forefront in party work. In accordance with a proposal of the commission and the department, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo decision "Reform of Party and Scientific Establishments of the CPSU" has just been adopted.

[GLASNOST] Not the least part in the concentrated campaign against the CPSU is being played by certain prominent representatives of intellectual circles. How under these circumstances do you evaluate the actual prospects of the party's constructive cooperation with the intelligentsia?

[Ryabov] The emphasis on the detachment of the intelligentsia from the party is a notable feature of the new twist of the antiparty and anticommunist campaign spiral. The intention is clear—depriving the CPSU of support among the intelligentsia. After all, 40 percent of the lecturers of higher educational institutions and research personnel, one out of every three teachers and the vast majority of leaders of educational, scientific and cultural institutions are Communists.

The recruitment of representatives of the intelligentsia for the anticommunist coalition on the wave of the extensive and disparaging "exposure" of outdated dogmas, which have been debunked by the party itself, is

intensifying. The trend toward a kind of "privatization" of the CPSU's contemporary theoretical arsenal is being reanimated. It is indicative that many of those who have finally broken with the party and have crossed over to another camp are reserving to themselves the ideas and efforts from program party documents which are attractive to people and proclaiming them on behalf of the forces in opposition to us.

Not general political debate but constructive cooperation with those who consider it their duty to bring people together, tackle the specific tasks of creation and contribute to the development of science, education and culture and the ecological well-being of society and its material and spiritual health will best help expose political hypocrisy. These are, incidentally, the main directions of the activity of both our commission and the Humanities Department.

[GLASNOST] And can we speak of any real results?

[Ryabov] Undoubtedly. And not only about individual examples but also about large areas of work. About, for example, the development of legislative initiatives aimed at economic and social support for the creators of spiritual riches and fruitful participation in the development of science, culture and education. Meetings of the CPSU Central Committee commission have already studied a package of bills on fundamentals of legislation concerning public education, official S&T policy, scientific intellectual property and the status of the research associate. At all stages of their development members of the CPSU Central Committee and staff of the Humanities Department cooperated actively with the state authorities, USSR Supreme Soviet committees and commissions and people's deputies of the USSR and the republics. Leading specialists were enlisted in the expert appraisal. The commission sessions themselves were open. Leaders of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Union republic academies of sciences, the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology, the USSR State Committee for Education, the USSR Ministry of Culture, university deans and teachers in public education took part in them.

Specific proposals for the government, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the president of the country were prepared in respect to the results of the discussion. The commission's findings concerning the basic principles of S&T policy have been examined by the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat, and it has been decided to discuss the entire set of problems of basic research at a meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo.

Preparations are being completed currently for discussion of the fundamentals of Union and republic culture legislation.

Of the specific forms of work, I would mention the department's interaction with the secretary councils of the party organizations of higher educational institutions, academic institutes and artistic unions and constant contacts with the corresponding departments of the

republic and local party committees. A public scientific council for problems of education and training operates under the auspices of the department, and a group of student youth activists is being formed.

The commission and the department are participating actively in work on the preparation of material for the draft new CPSU Program.

Shevardnadze Book Published: The Early Years

914B0276A Moscow *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA*
in Russian 16 Jul 91 p 8

[Excerpts from E. Shevardnadze book: "My Choice: Love Is Stronger Than Hate"]

[Text] Today in the Novosti Publishing House there is to be a presentation of Eduard Shevardnadze's book: "My Choice." This book has been long awaited. But as often happens with a work of this kind, it was the foreign readers who first became acquainted with it. There—abroad—it has been called the "best political book of the year."

Now it is the turn of Soviet readers. Eduard Shevardnadze's book is a true political book, the story of international events of the not-too-distant past—the improvement in Soviet-American relations, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, German reunification—and also the author's reflections on why our society has found itself in its present situation. Let us warn you immediately that those who love information about "behind-the-scenes infighting" will be disappointed; Eduard Shevardnadze believes that the time has not yet come for him to write his memoirs. One chapter in the book deals with the author's childhood and youth. We offer some pages from this for the *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA* reader.

I was born in 1928, four years after the anti-Soviet uprising that in the official historiography is called the Menshevik adventure. There were many people in my circle who had fought on different sides of the barricades. They argued about whether it was an adventure or a fight for freedom.

It is time to tell you about my parents. My father was Amvrosiy Georgiyevich, my mother Sofiya Glakhunovna, nee Pateishvili. My father's mother was Grandma Sarla, who tried as hard as she could to give her children a good education. When he had completed his studies in Batumi, my father returned to Aksana, the native place of the Guriskiy Shevardnadzes, and started to work as a teacher in the village school in Dzimiti. It was there that he met his future wife, my mother.

My father taught Russian and literature. A list of names of the first Georgian subscribers to a prerevolutionary publication of an anthology of the works of Tolstoy was recently found in the archives of that time. My father's name appears in it as one of the first subscribers. People used to try to push back the boundaries of the world they

lived in and move out into the broad expanses of the advanced ideas of their times. Along with the weapons in the houses they also preserved the works of Georgian classical literature—Ilya Chavchavadze, Akakiy Tsereteli, Vazha Pshalev—and later the books of Tolstoy appeared, along with the Russian revolutionary democrats and the legal Marxists—Plekhanov, Kautskiy...

My father and his relatives were not exceptions. Nor was my mother's brother. An old man, Akakiy Glakhunovich, a former officer in the tsarist army, had fought in World War I, and to the end of his days he remained loyal to social democratic views. My father was also sympathetic toward the social democrats but became disillusioned with them and joined the Communist Party. He explained this step by saying that the Mensheviks had failed to solve the main problem that goes along with the creation of national statehood, namely, they had not created and could not create a healthy national economy, and this had led to great deprivations among the people. Chaos reigned in the country. It had been easy for the Bolsheviks to gain power. Akakiy was a violent antagonist of Stalin and Bolshevism, and for that reason engaged in endless discussions with my father. My father's brother Konstantin, a man of similar destiny and conviction—he had also been a tsarist officer and a social democrat—possessed an unusual, original, and sharp mind, and he always found the most unexpected ways to reconcile the views of the disputers. His arguments were striking in the complex simplicity of the logical answer.

This was a unique kind of multiparty system within the framework of a large and friendly family. Friendly despite the political views that divided its members. I tried to compare them in order to make my own choice, but it was difficult for me because I loved them all equally.

The year 1937. People started to disappear from Mamati and the surrounding villages.

One day my father also disappeared. He had been a party member since 1924, and had achieved the opening of a secondary school in Mamati, and was one of the most enlightened and respected people in the village. My mother became withdrawn and did not answer our questions, but her tears were more eloquent than words. Outside the home I sensed a cold alienation around me. At school I was regarded as a leader, and had been elected as head of the pioneer detachment; I was always surrounded by a crowd of boys. Then suddenly, total isolation, no one played with me. The label of son of an "enemy of the people" had already been hung on me, and I felt it in my breast when I learned that I was not to go the rural pioneer camp.

That was the first and strongest upheaval in my childhood.

After some time my father returned. It was only then that I learned that an order had been issued for his arrest, but he had avoided repression thanks to one of his pupils

who was an associate in the rayon department of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. This pupil had warned him of his impending arrest and recommended that he go into hiding. To wait out the time of trouble in the forest. Many people did that. The repressions of 1937 were so large in scale that no one worked, and in February-March of 1938 the terror came to an end. At that time I was unaware of this, I was just glad that my father had turned out not to be an "enemy of the people." But even then, for the first time I started to think about the reasons for the broken families and the disruption of the fine "choir" in the rural community. The main reason was said to be the class struggle, in which the highest law in its conduct and laws was kinship, human propinquity, and the simple and vital relations between people who were close. They loved me, they taught me well, and they were good to me and surrounded me with care, affection, and warmth, and it was impossible for me to reconcile myself to the idea that they were hostile. I believed in their uprightness and rightness, but there were other, brutal arguments, and it was difficult for a teenager not to accept them.

The war became for me a particularly convincing argument. The attack by fascist Germany on the Soviet Union. The thesis of a dark force bent on enslaving our country had been confirmed (...)

The war against fascism became for me a personal fight. It was being waged against the communists, and communism was my religion. Victory in that war became a victory for communism, and that meant my victory.

The war shaped me, as it did millions of my contemporaries. It shaped my convictions and pointed out the goals. I became involved in politics in the very early years. Or, more accurately, politics attracted me to it. In seventh grade my contemporaries elected me chairman of the student committee. People who were close and dear to me were teaching me, and they looked at many things differently, and I looked at things the same way, "with the eyes of others," but it would be more accurate to say that I was educated in the spirit of the times, and that was a powerful "spirit" that was all-permeating (...)

In 1948 I joined the Communist Party. I was attracted to sociopolitical work. It offered me an opportunity to carry out my father's instructions: Be with people, work with people. Many years later when talking about political pluralism I allowed myself to remark that it had been monopoly of power by a single party that had destroyed political life here as an arena for the interaction of diverse political forces. Now, I would add this: The Komsomol and party, which I joined at the age of 20, has remained the only sphere for political self-expression. Some people joined it prompted by the instinct of self-preservation and a recognition that it was impossible to find a place in society in any other way that was worthy of their real capabilities. Others, and there were also many of these, joined at the behest of their souls and hearts. I would be sinning against my conscience if I were to say that in my case the former motive prevailed and

there was none of the latter. But here, while following one parental instruction, I neglected another, and subsequently regretted this on more than one occasion. I am talking about choice of profession, but this must be dealt with separately in order to make clearer the most important choice that determined so much in my life.

After I had completed the eighth grade in Mamati I enrolled at the Tbilisi medical school. This was done at the insistent request of my relatives. They all wanted to see me as a physician. Not at all just because it was a prestigious profession. The incurable disease of my elder brother—malaria, the former scourge in our area and the nightmare of children and adults alike—was also overtaxing the health of my parents because of the difficult labor it involved, and was constantly posing for us the question: Who can help? The local doctor was run off his feet, unable to visit all his numerous patients, and many of the simplest medicines were unavailable; hospitalization was an unresolved problem. Healthy peasant pragmatism prompted the search for support and help from people close by. It was obvious that in deciding my profession for me my parents believed that I would not disappoint their hopes. Alas, they were wrong (...)

To the end of their days my parents never forgave me for this. Many years later, when I was already working as minister of internal affairs in Georgia, not long before she died my mother said to me: "You have taken on the job of curing social ills. A meaningless business. You would have done better to relieve my sufferings..."

* * *

In 1951 my sister and I took a vacation in the mountain sanatorium at Tsagveri. Located in the Borzhomi gorge, this resort settlement was filled with children summer and winter. The large enterprises and institutions maintained pioneer camps there for the children of their workers and associates, and recruited young men and women to work with them. For young people this was a not bad chance to live with nature and earn a little. In their free time they could go to the sanatorium and the rest home to concerts and cinemas and the evening dances.

It was there that I met Nanuli Tsagareyshvili, my future wife.

At that time I had graduated with honors from the party school and started to teach in the history department at the Kutaisi Pedagogical Institute while waiting for an appointment to work in Kutaisi Oblast Komsomol committee. Life was quite good. My parents and Yevgraf (Shevardnadze's elder brother—editor's note) still lived in their own places, but now we could help them. I informed them of my decision to marry Nanuli. They answered that they were happy, were expecting us to be their guests, and were making appropriate preparations to accept the future bride.

One day in summer we met in the park in Borzhomi. I proposed, and was awaiting the answer. It stunned me.

"I cannot marry you," Nanuli said.

I had not been so presumptuous as to count on a quick "yes," but many things told me that the proposal would not be rejected. And suddenly "I cannot!"

"You cannot or you will not?"

"I cannot!"

"But why?"

"There is a circumstance that prevents me from accepting..."

I said that I knew of no reasons that could prevent our marriage except one—unwillingness. That no circumstance could stifle feelings, if, of course, they existed...

"You could never guess that I am an orphan," Nanuli said. "My father was arrested as an 'enemy of the people.' I do not even know if he is alive or dead. And now it is a question of careers. So, before it is too late, let us part, I shall not be offended, I understand everything..."

We parted, but met again a few days later, and after that we were never separated. What I had learned could not stop me...

I married knowing quite well that it might have consequences for me. With my admission to the party—an outcast, with all the consequences stemming from that. There were examples enough right there before my eyes.

My case could have been conducted under the rubric: "When feelings triumph over reason" had everything not been somewhat more complicated.

I do not belittle the strength of my own feelings, but neither do I want to disparage my convictions of that time. However, I do recognize that my reason was confused by what was happening around me.

The collectivism that I served with all my strength had literally performed miracles in transforming barren land, beating fascism, and raising up the country from the ruins; herein lay its great rightness. But it had also been transformed into a terrible and unjust force that used the individual as a cog that it was of no consequence to break. And if a person is merely a part of a machine, I reasoned to myself, what will the machine become if parts essential to it are constantly being broken?

When many years later the machine started to disintegrate before my very eyes I remembered the alarming thoughts of my youth. But in 1951 I simply asked myself this question: Why should I make my love a victim of hatred?

USSR, Hungary Join To Fight Crime

91US0615A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Jun 91
Union Edition p 6

[Article from Moscow by S. Aleksandrov: "The USSR and Hungary Have Agreed To Catch Criminals Jointly"]

[Text] The export of Soviet crime to Hungary has more than doubled during the last two years. Our countrymen broke the laws of that country, which we once called brotherly, 613 times in 1990.

Boris Pugo, the Soviet Minister of Internal Affairs, and Doctor Peter Borash, the Hungarian Minister of Internal Affairs, decided to put an end to this improper relationship henceforth, and, on 25 June, signed an agreement on cooperation in the law enforcement field. It mainly calls for the institution of high-quality exchange of information concerning the crime situation and specific violations of the law.

As Boris Pugo said at a press conference immediately after signing the agreement, he has informed his colleague of the political situation in the country. The political information concerned the Union Treaty's future signing. The Soviet Minister noted that crime in the USSR, according to his diagnoses, will increase even more this year, and therefore it is necessary to fight it hard, something that is included in his primary duties anyway.

Lawyer Views Rapid Crime Rate Growth

91US0615B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 29 Jun 91 First Edition p 3

[Article from Moscow by lawyer V. Ilyukhin, state justice counselor second class, under the rubric: "Lawyer Ruminates on the Endlessness of Today's Crime: Ruination Through Autonomy"]

[Text] Crime is increasing in the country with rapidly mounting speed and, it seems, is about to become yet another national disaster or plague of the 1990's in the immediate future. And the point is not even in the constant increase, by 20 to 30 percent per annum, in the number of crimes; such surges were also encountered earlier. The danger lies elsewhere—in the more and more organized nature and brutality of the crime forms, and in the presence of a great number of armed mobster groups and their branching out throughout the Union.

Interethnic disputes and conflicts, and the crimes committed in their name have seriously aggravated the crime situation in the country. Hotbeds of ethnic tension have spread into Russia and the Ukraine. The "Russian Question" will soon explode in many regions. The country may disintegrate in mutual territorial claims and disputes, and in mutual accusations and conflicts concerning who is feeding whom and who is devouring our extremely meager food supplies. The political leaders'

disputes and altercations are stirring up the country. The dependence and parasitism syndrome has become widespread.

It is still possible to counteract the oncoming catastrophe. More circumspection and foresight, and less idle talk and demagoguery are necessary for this. At the moment, the idea of a bright future's hasty construction has been replaced by the illusory dogma of the "salvational" market. At the same time, not everyone wants to consider what a cruel nature the market will assume under conditions of the economy's collapse, and how it will trample and degrade the individual.

By the way, not a single economic innovation in the country has yet been subjected to expert legal evaluation. The collateral processes that may be brought on by these innovations have not been studied and have not been taken into account. This is absurd!

For example, the sort of explosion cooperatives would cause in profit-seeking crimes, and not only profit-seeking crimes, has never been a secret to criminologists. Preventive measures were opportunely proposed. However, the specialists were not heeded. The cooperation itself assumed improper forms that, in fact, seemed to be allowed to take their course.

Breakup of the auditing system that had existed was begun without instituting new taxes or financial services. A decree on the abolition of People's Control became one of the Russian Parliament's first legal acts. The concentration of capital, mainly obtained by deceiving the state and the people, at cooperatives gave rise to numerous bodyguards and watchmen; that is, armed groups of people. Precisely these are aggravating the crime situation today with constant altercations, trials, and the dividing up of what has been stolen.

Thanks to the cooperatives and the various mercantile and other houses of "business" people organized under the ispolkoms [executive committees] and Councils of Ministers, bribery is spreading within the state power structures. As reported in the press, the Russian Government's ministers rushed, one after another, to the "Russian Mercantile House" ["Rossiyskiy trgovyy dom"], where the initiators of the notorious ANT transactions call the tune. One need not be surprised that the pernicious "scam of the century," involving the sale of 140 billion rubles abroad with precisely the highest Russian Government approval, has also come to light.

And the other republics? Lithuania, having found itself in a most serious economic crisis since breaking off relations with the USSR, is now diligently seeking a way out. Approval has been given at the highest governmental level to contacts of any kind with the strike committees at mines and the workers of Russia's ministries and departments, including the bribery of these, and it is not ruled out that the bribery will occur.

The bribers and shady business sharks, like hyenas, have latched onto the weakened state's body. Under conditions of the privatization that has begun, they are trying somewhat harder to tear off a piece and drag it to their dens, or, better—transfer it to foreign banks. The magnitudes of the illegal financial operations and bribes are amazing. They amount, not to tens, but to hundreds of thousands and millions of rubles.

What is pitted against bribery today, what forces are fighting it?

Let us begin with our deputy corps in the republic and local soviets. Unfortunately, people with a questionable past, associated with shady business sharks, have also gotten into that corps. Is it not absurd that former criminals have appeared at the head of a number of the soviets' commissions on legality? How they would organize and direct a fight against lawlessness is quite obvious. For them, the criminal world is their own past and present. It is dangerous that the criminal world is being drawn more and more into political intrigues and being introduced into the worker's movement.

Attempts are being made to form a strike force of criminals in the anticommunist fight. Z. Gamsakhurdia, the president of Georgia, began with the granting of amnesty to everyone sentenced to imprisonment for up to five years inclusively. Some were then armed and sent to fight against the Ossetians. Convicts are also fighting at the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. In the Baltic States, they are counted on in the struggle with dissidents.

Special services have been created in the USSR KGB and MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] to fight organized crime, bribery, and the Mafia. However, these cannot fully prove themselves: Too many prohibitions have been placed on timely investigations involving high-ranking officials of legislative, executive, law enforcement, and other bodies.

I am also profoundly convinced of the necessity to change the Law on the Status of Russian Deputies, which prescribes the procuracy's need to go to the soviets for approval to initiate proceedings involving popularly elected officials as a result of their commission of crimes of any kind. Such a law probably exists only in Russia. Its legal absurdity is obvious, but no one wants to reject it on this basis. The improper and unfair "armor" apparently suits many deputies.

The law enforcement agencies, which were a unified force not so long ago, are now broken down by national divisions. The Union's unified legal field has been disrupted under the pretext of the republics' sovereignty. I see, and I know, how professionally competent and honorable jurists are being forced out of their positions and replaced with people subservient and fanatically devoted to the new "political leaders." Thus A.V. Buturlin, a prominent professional and former deputy to the republic's procurator, found himself expelled from the RSFSR Procuracy. He was unsuitable because he was an

opponent of the "war of the laws." "Their" republic procurator was preferred to him.

Many judges, especially in Moscow and the RSFSR, already pronounce sentences with an eye to the Moss-ovet [Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies] and the Russian Parliament. The point is that the judges are frequently examined for a new judgeship term now, and those who were quite recently before them as "clients" or, more accurately, sat before them in the dock are appointed rather often. It seems to me that the innocent judgment with respect to V. Novodvorskaya, political leader of the DS [expansion not given] tried for public insult to the USSR President, was determined by this factor.

Everything that is happening in regard to judges is not simply a paradox, but a social tragedy. In the republics, lawlessness is occurring with a national tint, and the Union law enforcement agencies, for all practical purposes, are unable to stop it because, as they say in the periphery, any "interference" or, more correctly, any attempt to restore justice "violates the sovereignty" of the republics....

Here are some facts. According to available data, no fewer than 200 persons died during the bloody incidents in South Ossetia, and many were beaten and robbed. However, in "free and independent" Georgia, no one can or, it seems, even wants to investigate the circumstances of what happened, and the Georgian leadership regards the appearance of MVD and USSR Procuracy workers in the region as an infringement of sovereignty. Autonomy wins.

Here is another argument. Thousands of defective court judgments and investigative agency findings have been annulled over the objections of the USSR Procurator General and his deputies, as well as directly by workers of the USSR Procuracy's central apparatus. Now they want to deprive, and are already depriving, citizens of this legal opportunity to restore their violated civil rights. However, even the fact that there existed a higher level of control and supervision over local judges, procurators, and chiefs of police [militsiya] itself disciplined these, not permitting parochialism; and we have no greater evil than it for devouring lawfulness.

Parochialism is burgeoning at all power levels. The position of A. Rutskoy, current vice president of Russia, stated even before the elections, is noteworthy in this regard. The periodical that published critical material concerning B. Yeltsin greatly enraged A. Rutskoy. It seems that "democrats" who fought so long for pluralism, having come to power, absolutely reject it, and are prepared to initiate, and in a few places have already initiated, terror against dissenters.

Perhaps A. Rutskoy's position is a prologue to groundless and all-embracing accusations. He demands: "Institute an investigation of oblast executives who engage in adverse propaganda against the activity of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and the chairman of the RSFSR

Supreme Soviet." He further complains that a precedent will otherwise be set for chaos in the entire republic. However, it may first be necessary to look into who is sowing the chaos.

Bribery and the Mafia are striving to penetrate even the law enforcement agencies themselves. The excessive collections on the part of Gosavtoinspektsiya [State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate] workers have long been known. We have somehow come to accept this. Something else is more dangerous: Police officers are joining armed mobster groups more and more often, even heading them, and committing very serious crimes. There is also occasion to read about the bribes and other crimes of procurators and judges.

Many BKhSS [Fight Against Theft of Socialist Property and Speculation] workers abuse their positions, enter into unauthorized deals with trade and cooperative workers, and are closely connected to Mafia families. Otherwise, why has the number of criminal cases involving thefts in especially large amounts that were investigated and sent to the courts during four years fallen to little more than half as many as at the outset about the country, and the number of cases involving bribe taking—even to a fourth as many? This in the presence of a bacchanalia of bribe taking and losses due to cash and inventory shortages, thefts, and spoilage amounting to billions of rubles!

In this regard, I cannot overlook a rather brief dialogue that occurred at a USSR Supreme Soviet session. One of the deputies asked V. Shcherbakov, first deputy to the country's prime minister, to take firm steps against speculators in state goods in the Moscow stores. To this, the honorable vice prime minister answered that it is necessary, as he sees it, to form a Soviet FBI [FBR] for this purpose. This was said from a high speaker's platform and with firm conviction. I do not presume to judge V. Shcherbakov's legal competence. I shall just observe that five or 10 FBI's may be formed and an additional mass of parasitic officials created, and the situation will not change. In order to drive the speculators out of a store and stop the sale of goods from under the counter and out the back door, two or three policemen are sufficient if, of course, they perform their occupational duty honestly and conscientiously.

MVD Official on Illegal Weapons Trade

91US0642A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 13 Jul 91 First Edition

[Interview with A. Gurov, head of the Main Directorate for the Fight Against Organized Crime of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, by N. Modestov; place and date not given: "Operation Window"]

[Text] Arms trade has become a profitable type of criminal business. So thinks the head of the Main Directorate for the Fight Against Organized Crime of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), A. Gurov.

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA] Aleksandr Ivanovich, you head up a part of the country's MVD that is fighting the most dangerous criminal structures. At what level are they armed today?

[Gurov] This can be judged from the figures. Since the beginning of this year, in the course of implementing the decree of the country's president on the disarmament of illegal formations by the organs of the KGB, the MVD, and the USSR Ministry of Defense, 50,000 illegal firearms have been confiscated and more than 1.2 million units of ammunition. The activity of groups involved in the manufacture and sale of remote control explosive devices has been stopped.

Virtually every organized criminal grouping has weapons. Naturally, not every individual is armed. But brigades of criminals that use "rods" in thefts and robberies and defend themselves in "rumbles" with other bands also have high-quality rifled automatic weapons. Today that's become the norm.

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA] In operations summaries you see occasional reports of confiscations of a grandfather's nearly antique weapon.

[Gurov] Quite true, the weapons are quite varied. Recently, for instance, a criminal had an antique .20 Colt confiscated from him. On groups of burglars they find sawed-off shotguns, submachineguns, revolvers, and rifles with optic sights and take away night-vision apparatus. What conclusion can you draw? Criminal terrorism, the growth in organized crime, the trend toward cruelty, the increase in negative phenomena in society that actually psychopathologize the individual and make him merciless toward people, have led not only to an upsurge in violence. We are also seeing an enormous rise in the demand for weapons. Active trade is going on in them.

This type of criminal business has become just as profitable as the drug business or trade in computers and foreign cars. The trend is very alarming. It's no accident that here more workers in the lawkeeping organs die than in other countries. I was asking the Italian deputy minister of internal affairs how many policemen died last year at the hands of the Mafia. He thought and answered: "Seven." To us this is an insignificant figure. Every year in this country hundreds of policemen die. Moreover, there is a steady increase in the number of crimes involving the use of firearms. Last year 1,389 murders involving firearms were recorded. That's 385 (!) more than in 1989.

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA] How do weapons fall into the hands of criminals?

[Gurov] There are plenty of channels. For instance, the manufacture of weapons in factories and cottage industries. Moreover, we're even running into instances when they manufacture Israeli Uzi-type submachineguns. You can't help but be amazed at how they can make such technically perfect weapons in a cottage industry. Right

now the underground manufacture of automatic rods has been put on virtually an industrial basis. There is another channel, too: searching for weapons on the sites of past battles. Groups of illegal trackers scavenge military dug-outs, trenches, and forgotten partisan stores. Everything found is restored and enters the market.

Unfortunately, quite a few weapons get to criminals from servicemen. Recently, for example, a submachinegun was discovered in the search of an officer. We carried out Operation Window and verified the contraband channel for the entry of rods from military units. In addition, a certain portion of the weapons comes from abroad.

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA] How important is that last source of arms for criminals?

[Gurov] Arms are brought in in international motor caravans and carried across the border through specific corridors. There was an instance when they tried to bring a submachinegun across in a violin case. Every year at border crossings more than a thousand firearms are confiscated from our own citizens and foreign citizens. Still, the lion's share of them get into the criminal world from the country itself. No one's arming us—we could arm any country.

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA] Recently the MVD worked out a draft law on weapons control. More and more often in this connection we are hearing voices calling for lifting the prohibition against the sale of weapons to the population. It's time, they say, to live like "the entire civilized world." Buy a gun in a shop and your safety is in your own hands. What do you think about that?

[Gurov] First about the law. I think we need it. Although, of course, it won't solve all our problems. No one law in and of itself can yield the desired results. We need mechanisms to implement it, material provision, and the regard and preparation of the population. After all there is criminal responsibility for theft, but the number of such crimes is growing. Nonetheless the law is a legal core, a restraining principle controlling people's behavior.

There exists among us a so-called authorization system that monitors arms. You can acquire a hunting rifle, for example, only with the permission of the MVD. Those laws exist in any country. Weapons are issued only to those who need them for a specific type of activity. But today in the press, and especially in the deputies' building, we are hearing calls to arm the population. As if to say, since the criminals are armed, that means we need to repulse them. I am categorically against this, these are very dangerous tendencies.

Let me go back to those same Italians. After they found out about our inclinations, they warned us not to make mistakes. In Italy—we have on this score an inaccurate picture—not everyone gets permission for a weapon right off the bat. Such documents are presented only to a certain category of the population. The same goes in the

United States. I have spoken with people who have such a license. The FBI issues weapons for a period of one year, but in doing so documents are presented on the psychological health of its bearer, his clean record, and so forth. That is, taken into consideration above all is the person's reliability and need: why does he need a weapon? He's not just going to walk down the streets with it, is he? By the way, in the USA only 40 percent of the population owns firearms. Although the traditions there have deep roots.

There should be unwritten laws that do not allow weapons to be used for other than a specific purpose. Remember our Cossacks. The Cossacks loved to go out and fight but they never used a fighting weapon against one another. That was only for military actions. But we have lost this tradition.

It must be said that in Russia the population has never had weapons. Procuratorial and judicial officials were armed, and nobles bore arms. But these were individual, small groups. And now we suddenly want to arm every last one of us!

Let's give some thought to who we want to defend the working class from? Racketeers and thieves? No, the pockets of the working man, unfortunately, are in such a state that they hold no interest for even a common thief. Therefore I don't understand whose purpose it will serve to demand issuing arms to every last one of us.

I'll cite this example. Imagine a line in a wine store with very drunk armed people in it. Where are they going to wind up? I'm sure that a large part of the line, given our psychopathology, irritability, and embitteredness, will wind up in the morgue, not the store.

But objectively evaluating the state of things, it is time, in my opinion, to start working out the question of presenting firearms by way of an exception to certain groups of the population. For example, if threats are heard addressed to an official and he risks finding himself an object of attack, he, taken into consideration all the requirements, could be issued a license for a weapon. I have in mind not only people's deputies, political figures, and leaders, but also shipping clerks, farmers, and foresters, as in the United States, for example. Everything must be strictly regulated so as not to permit any abuses. Recall the law on the fight against drunkenness and alcoholism. The goals were fine, but what did it all lead to?

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA] We're still trying to come to our senses. Here, probably, we need to take into consideration the experience of other countries.

[Gurov] In Poland certain citizens were issued gas canisters for self-defense. In the United States mail carriers protect themselves from dogs by special means. Tell me, what does an ordinary person need a Colt or Makarov revolver for? You can use gas to repulse a criminal's attack. By the way, it is forbidden in many countries to

carry gas guns around. They're kept only at home for protecting the family against thieves.

Here we need to think how law-abiding we are so that, once we get a gas gun, we don't take it outside the confines of the home. I'm sure lots of people are going to carry these "cannons" around. And now imagine that a policeman sees you with that kind of a "toy" one night. What could that lead to?

We've reached the main point: the fact that our citizens are not law-abiding. In Russia from time immemorial people have had a rather cool attitude toward observing the law, to put it mildly.

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA] You can't forget about the practice of using gas guns. Far from everyone could use a means of defense correctly in an extreme situation.

[Gurov] Even if someone were armed, if a criminal decided to attack him, the person wouldn't be able to use the weapon without training. In that kind of situation neither a gas canister nor a .32 Colt would help because the initiative is on the side of the attacker. You need the right training and experience. Not even all our police-ment can shoot well.

We should give serious thought to permitting the use of gas as a means of defense. Their use has the least terrible consequences and at the same time might in certain instances help people repulse attackers or thieves. Gas canisters are already being disseminated among citizens anyway. But today it's being done without any control. They pay 300-500 rubles for them on the black market. Recently we confiscated 1,500 canisters.

You can produce canisters with tear gas, which is harmless to your health. A young woman could carry it in her purse—easily and safely.

And of course, apart from the production of canisters, we need a legal base for determining the degree of responsibility for the use of gas. Permitting gas as a means of defense is a necessary measure. We haven't come to that point because we've had a nice life. But it is essential that we take that step. Today people are forced to buy hunting rifles, signal rockets, and sidearms for purposes of self-defense. There are also peaceful, law-abiding people—peasants whose closest police station is far away, solitary old people, travelers. If we, taking all the details into consideration, and having thought through a set of legislative and preparatory measures, remove the ban on gas as a means of defense, for many people this will be a resolution of the problem and a help. For the lawkeeping organs as well.

Rate of Increase in Crime Up in First Quarter

91US0656A Alma-Ata LENINSKAYA SMENA
in Russian 30 Apr 91 p 3

[Unattributed article: "In the USSR MVD: No Major Organized Crime Group Has Been Apprehended"]

[Text] Speaking at the briefing at the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Press Center, Gennadiy

Lezhikov, deputy head of the USSR MVD Main Information Center, colonel of internal service, stated that in the first three months of 1991 the tendency of crime to grow remained unchanged.

The rate of crime increase reached the total of 16.6 [as published], compared to the same period of last year. From January through March, the internal affairs organs recorded over 694,000 criminal acts. According to G. Lezhikov, they were especially concerned with the increase of crime against property.

"Unfortunately," said the colonel, "the number of serious crimes is not going down either. Street crime is on the rise in certain areas also."

According to the MVD data for the first three months of this year, the worst situation with an increased rate of reported crime is in Estonia—39, in Armenia—23, in RSFSR, Azerbaijan, and Lithuania—18 in each. [as published]

The head of the USSR MVD Sixth Main Administration, Militia Colonel Aleksandr Gurov, in his turn, informed the audience that none of the large organized crime groups had been apprehended. According to him, crime has become politicized lately; criminals penetrate the power structures and law enforcement organs. At the same time there are known cases of racketeering at state-owned enterprises.

Number of Auto Thefts Grows Steadily

91US0656B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 25 May 91 p 6

[Article by Boris Petrov: "What Happiness It Is To Buy a Car, What Misfortune It Is To Lose It"]

[Text] The number of auto thefts in the USSR is on the rise. This figure grew eight-fold during the last eight years. In the last year alone over 100,000 cases of car theft were reported in our country and almost as many cases of people's cars being driven away. By official data, damage may be estimated at about a billion rubles. Several dozen thousand vehicles are listed as missing. This list includes over 20,000 cars.

Fighting this kind of crime is a difficult job. Lately our militia has been confronted by well organized criminal groups which have wonderful equipment and a rich criminal experience. Many of the car thieves previously worked as auto mechanics at car service stations or other automotive facilities and they are very well-versed in their profession.

Even a garage cannot be considered a reliable means of protection any more. According to the results of research conducted by the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] All-Union Science and Research Institute, 32

percent of the cars are "removed" from garages; the number of motor vehicles is even higher—50 percent. [as published]

It takes a lot of work to investigate and find proof of a car theft. Sometimes officers spend a month or more in an ambush. They know who stole the car and for whom it was done but the investigators need more than that. The thief has to drive the car to a hideout and start overhauling it. Then they catch him "red-handed"...

Let us look at the commentary on the RSFSR Criminal Code. Article 144 deals with larceny or theft of people's personal property. Article 212-1 deals with the driving away of any automotive or other self-propelled vehicle without the intent to steal. Punishment for driving away a vehicle is much smaller than for a car theft—it is up to one year in prison or a similar term of correctional labor. But the punishment may be restricted to a fine of up to 100 rubles [R] or to public reprimand measures. Meanwhile, the cost of a car at the black market often exceeds R50,000 or R100,000. The senior official for prevention of car theft and fraud of the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee Main Administration of Internal Affairs, Valeriy Streletskiy, says:

"Just think about this legal contradiction: Driving away is stealing without the intent to steal. Article 144 is clear, well-defined, unequivocal. But 212-1 did and will do a lot of harm yet if we do not amend it. I hope there will not be any such mistakes when they draft the new criminal code."

According to him, some of the republics decided to intensify the severity of their measures in fighting car thefts. They resorted to much harsher punishment. It seems to be the right way. But...

"We have a historic tradition," says V. Streletskiy, "of especially 'warm relations' with the Georgian car thieves. In Georgia, among other places, they resorted to stricter punishment for car thefts. Even before that the local thieves did not steal much in their republic, anyway. But after these new, stricter measures they all rushed to Russia, to Moscow primarily. Here they can run loose, here they have a lot to choose from. Lack of coordination in legislative initiatives helps some people and hurts others. Russia was simply put on the spot."

American companies mark their cars in 40 different places, including the windshield, undercarriage, engine, and other parts which may be resold at a high price. The entire procedure takes about 45 minutes. The number is marked with the help of a small sand-blowing gun which can engrave digits on any material—glass, metal, or plastic...

The number engraving by no means provides a guarantee from a car theft. But the unemotional statistics testify that the sand blowing gun hits car thieves pretty hard. They do not like such cars and try to avoid them.

It is not all that difficult to start making such guns. The procedure can be done with the help of various technologies, from a laser to chemical etching. But the need of that kind of a "weapon" is immense.

Another blow to the car thieves will be dealt by an automated system of vehicle registration. It is already being designed in the USSR MVD State Motor Vehicle Inspection Administration [GAI].

The first phase of such an automated information and search system has become operational in some areas of our country, including Moscow. More and more often one can see the glow of display screens and people in uniforms looking at them in the premises of the Moscow GAI headquarters. Recently, eight new yellow and blue Moskvich cars came off the AZLK [Automobile Plant imeni Leninskiy Komsomol] conveyers. They were made for the militia exclusively. Apart from a powerful motor, they also have an on-board computer which can provide various information right in the car.

But it is not computers only that can help the militia to rein in the insatiable car thieves. Some of the GAI officers in Chelyabinsk Oblast changed over to... motor hang-gliders.

"That kind of patrolling is a lot more efficient than in a Zhiguli," thinks GAI inspector Aleksandr Lavrov.

Every day he conducts observations from his winged motorcycle above one of the busiest thoroughfares linking the Urals with the heart of our country.

These are just the forerunners so far. An experiment is going on. But it is clear already that the view is a lot better from above. The Chelyabinsk militia plans to set up an entire unit of air-borne inspectors.

(The unabridged version of this article will be published in Nos. 6 and 7 of the AVTOMOBILNYY TRANSPORT magazine.)

Reasons for 'Losing' Struggle With Organized Crime

91US0657A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 16 Jul 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by N. Modestov: "Excess in the Schoolyard—Why We Are Losing the Struggle Against Organized Crime"]

[Text] The nighttime silence of the neighborhood was ripped by machine gun fire. The militia patrol summoned by residents of nearby buildings found a terrifying picture. The "settling of accounts" had taken place in one of the schoolyards of the Cheremushki region in Moscow. Two dead bodies lay in the snow, riddled with bullets. Thirty rounds point-blank from a Degtyarev machine gun. One of the victims was tattooed across the middle with bullets; the other had lost half his head.

There is a homicide or attempted homicide every 23 minutes in the country today. The number of them increased 29 percent last year and reached the highest level, 24,875 crimes. Many criminologists believe that with this "black" record we have put even the United States, the superpower in crime, to shame. In any case, hardly anyone in the world can compete with us for the level of this crime.

The figures on suspended criminal cases are equally alarming. In just the last decade the number of unsolved homicides was 19,000! Whereas 887 cases were suspended in 1987, last year the number tripled. More and more people who have violated the law are going unpunished; fewer and fewer victims believe in justice and retribution.

Incidentally, the killers who fired a machine gun in one of the densely populated parts of Moscow were nonetheless captured recently. Members of the Moscow Criminal Investigation Division caught them in a forest cottage in the Russian provinces. From the criminals they confiscated a machine gun, a whole arsenal of weapons, and ammunition. The bandits were preparing for new "exploits." The investigation of the case is not completed yet, but we can already say one thing: even experienced detectives do not recall such excesses.

S. Pikalov, deputy chief of the homicide division, worked more than 10 years in the Moscow Criminal Investigation Division. He calls the present situation a "chain reaction." The law is not just being violated; it is being ignored, and in a kind of blatant manner. No one is surprised any longer when drunk drivers are stopped with automatic weapons fire at their tires. Homicides are committed in a casual way, as if they were not the most terrible crime but something like riding the streetcar without a ticket.

The murder of a grandmother and her grandson has just been solved. It turned out that the murderers were 20-year-old boys. They sneaked into a strange apartment and started looking for valuables. The owners returned unexpectedly and the apartment thieves, without thinking very long, "remade themselves" into murderers. They confessed to the crime a few minutes after they were arrested, just as casually as they had committed it.

Where does such lack of respect for the lives of others come from? Perhaps it is from a contemptuous attitude toward one's own life? A young man who had several killings on his conscience was asked: "What were you thinking about when you pulled the trigger?" "Nothing," he answered simply. Later, when he found out that he, a young and healthy man, was facing a minimum of 15 years in jail, he began yelling: "Shoot me, I don't want that kind of life!" In fact, his desire did coincide with the court's decision.

The cruelty of the present-day criminal is also frightening. He is not stopped by the age of the victim or pleas for mercy. Col A. Fonarev heads the criminal militia

subdivision of the City Internal Affairs Administration of the Moscow Oblispolkom. Until recently, he says, a killer rarely burned the victim's body. This year several burned corpses have already been found. And here is another horrible and distinctive fact. The criminal rarely stops with one cut with the knife. Even if the victim has departed this life, the killer still cuts and slashes in some kind of savage stupor.

Crime has grown younger. In Moscow, for example, one out of four crimes involves participation by an adolescent. Three young fellows were arrested in the city of Khotkov. They had knifed a peer on the suburban train. They took a liking to his jacket. One of the adolescents said in the interrogation, "Why did that fool wear such a nice jacket?" And, sighing heavily, the young villain continued his thought, "If he had been dressed like everyone else, I'd be walking around free right now." In other words, the victim himself was to blame.

A similar incident that took place this winter comes to mind. In a subway car a secondary student went up to a man in an imported windbreaker, "Take it off, I like it!" The passenger answered with some ugly words, and the student pulled out a razor and slashed the man's throat.

The most repulsive type of crime—hired killing—has become common lately. How much is a human life worth? Just two-three years ago people could be found to carry out the "assignment" for 500 rubles. Today the rate has risen (contract prices here too); the "honorariums" go from 5,000 rubles up. Professional killers have appeared. And banditism has reappeared. It had been forgotten since the early 1950's. More and more courts are hearing cases under Article 77 of the RSFSR Criminal Code; just a short time ago this was quite unusual. The Ivanov gang was disarmed by members of the Main Criminal Investigation Administration of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. Its "work history" showed hired killings in Yalta, Andizhan, and Tashkent. There are other examples as well. The body of the commercial director of a Moscow business was found on the Strogan floodplain. His killing was set up by "comrades" at work, who found three military deserters willing to do it for 20,000 rubles. This "service" cost the members of a suburban Moscow group from Dolgoprudny a little more, 23,000 rubles.

The reason for the hired killings is basically the criminal economy: dividing up spheres of influence among partners, settling accounts, conflicts over changes in the "charge" for protection. Criminologists believe that the number of these crimes will increase, and in the near future. After all, the period of initial accumulation of capital for many brand new entrepreneurs is just beginning.

The people who helped prepare this material—detectives, investigators, procuracy employees, and criminologists—had many bad things to say about the so-called "humanization" process. One of them even said that humanization is the mafia's biggest victory.

Why? Well, is there any less cruelty around? Or perhaps the conditions of incarceration have greatly improved or the arbitrary power of "thieves within the code" [who follow the 'rules' of the criminal world] under prison conditions has diminished? No, it has not become easier to expose wrongdoers, shield the weak ones from violence, and protect them from insult and injury. On the other hand, even with evidence in hand and statements from the victims, criminal justice organs are by no means always able to punish the criminal. And he does his dirty work again.

The body of a young girl who had been killed was found in the swamps near Shatura. With great difficulty experts were able to determine, from remnants of her rotted coat, that it had been made in Kazan. It turned out that only 25 of these coats had been made, and the entire batch was shipped to the city of Kem. Step by step, through painstaking criminal investigation, the criminal was identified. He did not deny his guilt, and the court sentenced him to 10 years in jail. But...

The case took place at the height of "humanization." The defense attorney appealed the court's verdict and demanded more and more new facts and testimony. Finally, two years later, the Supreme Court of the RSFSR reversed the earlier verdict. And the criminal, who had confessed his guilt, went free.

The present excess of crime is a natural continuation of the disorder in legislation, the economic collapse, and the one-sided understanding of democratization. For example, try to bring a currency speculator, prostitute, or pimp to criminal accountability today! That's what you think! No way! You cannot even touch an ordinary black marketeer, who himself drops his eyes when he gives the price of his goods. After all, he is nothing more than a salesman, a "herald" of the economic reforms, you might say.

Even when they know the names of the pimps who are trading in young prostitutes at the National Hotel, members of the militia are unable to put them behind bars. Why? It is theoretically impossible to picture a situation where a pimp can be caught "with the goods." To do this it would be necessary to get the client's explanation, officially record it, and get evidence of the fact of the "temptation" and of the transfer of money. And beyond that to the completely fantastic, you would have to force the client and the pimp to admit that they both knew the girl was a minor.

Why live honestly if you do not get anything for it? And so perfectly normal adolescents head off, some to the streets, some to the Riga Market (it was closed, but probably not for long) to gather priceless life experience. And the militia, understanding the situation perfectly, can only record the growth of crime and struggle desperately with "old men" living in luxury and "thieves within the code."

It is noteworthy that, according to figures from the USSR KGB, the age of those who attempt to hijack airplanes to go abroad ranges from 18 to 23. It is not

hard to predict what awaits us in the future. According to a statement from the Moscow statistical service there will be more than 100,000 unemployed persons in the capital by the end of the year. Under such conditions if they themselves do not gather in gangs or run off to groups, their fathers or brothers will take them by the hand and lead them there. That is what happened, according to the testimony of G. Chebotarev, deputy chief of the Main Administration for the Struggle Against Organized Crime of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, even in better times. Fathers brought their sons to "thieves within the code," saying: take them for training, benefactor, we will pray for you.

But the real golden age is arriving for those who commit crimes "in white gloves"—all kinds of big-time manipulators, swindlers, businessmen, and economists. Does anyone really believe that the multi-billion-ruble shadow economy, when it has emerged from underground, will change its principles? Those who got around the law before when they were in illegal status will continue to circumvent it now. Most of them simply cannot operate any other way.

Theft on an especially large scale, which the country is choking on today, will increase many times. And this is in a situation where the tax and financial inspection services are in fact powerless and there are no appropriate laws and mechanisms to realize them and no specialists or experience working in conditions of a free market economy. That which others did unhurriedly, over decades, we want to accomplish in one sweep, while pretending that we understand the gravity and complexity of what we are intending.

The operations reports are becoming more and more terrifying and the incident columns in newspapers and chronicles of crime on television are taking up more and more space. We already take the rising tide of crime as natural and talk about the need to struggle against it and reinforce those whose professional duties require them to defend society. Many committees are being formed and programs are being developed. Important new directors are being appointed. But what is really changing? Nothing at all!

Specialists of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, psychologists, and scientists long ago worked out a comprehensive program for the struggle against crime. But it is simply sitting in some high official's drawer. The same fate probably awaits the laws on the struggle against organized crime and corruption, without which the battle against the domestic mafia is like a game. Even the laws that have been adopted, good and timely laws, are not provided with a mechanism for their realization. The use of video materials and recordings of telephone conversations of criminals is now permitted in court, for example. But ask the people in practice how many cases they know of where this right was employed!

But the sorest point in our law enforcement system is the miserly pay. An ordinary employee of a security cooperative receives more than a subdivision head of the Moscow Criminal Investigation Department, the most highly regarded such department in the country. How can one be surprised at an understaffed militia, the departure of many experienced members, and corruption? We ourselves are helping those who want to "tame" the militia and turn it into an element in the structure of the mafia.

The gunshots in Rostov that took the life of Colonel Blakhotin sounded a harsh warning. For a long time we have had immunity from terrorism. Now it is gone. Extremist groups have begun fighting in the open. Bombs go off in buildings where the families of servicemen live. Completely guiltless passengers of scheduled buses perish. The cars of express trains fly into the air. Terror is becoming a real force.

Broad-scale terrorist actions, it seems to me, are being held back only by state control of weapons. But it appears that we do not have long to wait before that is abolished. The voices in favor of selling "means of defense"—at least to the chosen, to those who supposedly "need them because of the nature of their activity"—are growing ever louder. Is there any need to say that as soon as the valve is loosened the situation will go out of control? The bulk of the "means of defense" will find their way to the very opposite of the law-abiding population and will be used for something quite different.

I recently heard this story. In a provincial city two guys meet in an entryway. The first brings a knife out from behind his back and says, "Do you have any money?" The other, pulling an axe from under his arm, answers, "How bad do you need it?"

We are slowly and steadily making our way into the age of the "rule-of-law state." Who are we to thank for this?

Crime Statistics 'Alarming' in Vladimir Oblast

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[Article by L. Gladysheva: "The Nightstick Will Not Save Us—Commentary on Alarming Statistics"]

[Text] For number of crimes committed there Vladimir Oblast, outwardly a tranquil and pleasant region, has recently gone far ahead of the central and even the northern parts of Russia, the latter of which are settled, as we know, by many people of upset destinies who have served time in prison. Vladimir Oblast has just 1.7 million inhabitants, and in the first half of the year there were 9,616 crimes in the oblast, an increase of 147.3 percent! It is a terrifying number.

What has caused such a swift upsurge in the conditions that breed crime? Has an assault party of bandits

descended on the Vladimir region, just as in ancient times when foreigners appeared there to rob, kill, and rape?

I. Sorokin, deputy chief of the criminal investigation department of the oblast administration of internal affairs, dispelled my doubts:

"The criminals are, with rare exceptions, not from elsewhere, not outsiders. They are our own people, from Vladimir Oblast. In the last 24 hours there were 50 crimes in the oblast, while two years ago there were 14 in an average day. Unfortunately, we are growing."

We talked with Igor Ivanovich in his office. It was evening; the big city was resting after a day of labor, but here the work continued. I asked him for an analysis of the number of crimes, which has now passed 10,000.

In first place on this unhappy list stands theft from enterprises, construction sites, farms, terminals, stores, institutions, apartments, and dachas. The crisis in the economy encompasses not just shortages of the most essential articles, but also theft, robbery, and swindling. Anything that can be sold is stolen: building materials, livestock, motor vehicles, ikons and church articles, bed linen, foodstuffs, television and radio equipment, items made of gold, clothing, spare parts, vodka. In short, they steal everything that is poorly stored or poorly guarded. The rich, unlimited assortment of items to steal is maintained not only by shortages but also by increased prices. Take for example the bicycle, a boy's dream. Formerly they were available in the stores and cost 40 rubles; now they cannot be bought even for 150 rubles. It turns out to be easier to steal than buy. So people steal.

The wave of theft is building faster than any other type of crime. In all of last year, for example, 30 motor vehicles were stolen; this year that many have been stolen in six months. The overall figures are even less consoling: in comparison with 1989 theft of state property has almost tripled and theft of private property has nearly quadrupled. This means that the number of thieves has also increased. But the number of members of the criminal investigation and detective systems of both the rayon militia departments and the oblast administration remains low as before. The workload of operations workers has grown immeasurably. And although the important indicator of crimes solved is improving, it is still far from giving us ease.

Who is breaking into apartments, picking locks in broad daylight, and "cleaning out" dacha settlements? Bitter as it is to admit it, most of the burglars are juveniles, boys. It is disturbing that they are committing more and more crimes in groups, not alone. The thirst for easy gain forges the adolescents into predatory gangs. They often join together under the direction of "professionals" with criminal records, becoming less vulnerable and even more dangerous to society,

And society counts on the militia alone. The operational Komsomol detachments and comrade's courts at work

and the place of residence have withdrawn from the struggle for peace and order and the people's guards are retreating. I inquired recently how many public volunteers had gone out on duty the previous evening in the cities and settlements of the oblast. The answer given was a little more than 400. But it does not seem so long ago that more than 2,000 people's guards were participating in protecting public order at once in all the cities and towns. Moreover, the points for protection of public order located in residential areas and subordinate to the local soviets have begun to be forced out under every kind of pretext: a lack of space for them, a lack of money for them, their telephones are taken away, and so on. And in many places there is no longer any place for councils of veterans, who worked here in the evenings, and inspectorates for minors' affairs to assemble. Volunteer legal consultation offices have gone out of existence.

We are not going to say sarcastically that the "voluntary" nature of the work of many people's guards was supported by the three additional days of vacation they received. What is wrong with that? Working on patrol during your time off is not like taking a walk in the moonlight, and the guards should be paid like any other public labor. It is an old truth that money likes to be counted. And we are profoundly misled when we begin to economize on non-departmental security, on paid automobile parking areas, and on warning signals and stronger locks. Each theft, even of small sums, is much more expensive. And this is chiefly because of the uncompensable moral loss.

An adolescent behind bars. That is truly terrible and inhumane. It often begins with fooling around, with seemingly innocent play, and imperceptibly grows into a series of crimes. It is unnatural that our children today are often educated not by their fathers and mothers, nor by schoolteachers, but rather by the militia. It seems that the phrase "My militia takes care of me" is beaten into our heads. But here they did not save us. Unneeded by their family and school, the children become society's rejects. First they go to special schools, the colony, and then jail often becomes their home.

A sociologist recently posed this question to inmates at the Sudogda Colony: What did they think could be done to reduce the number of crimes? They answered, "There should be more goods for young people, and they should not be so expensive. We should be accepted for work and given a chance to earn money." Everything seems clear and simple; adults have known this for a long time, but they are not doing much about it. If all the soul-saving decisions of local soviets about reserving jobs at enterprises for adolescents, for the "difficult" ones, are not being carried out in practice today, then under conditions of a market economy who is going to carry them out?

Or consider this question: Will anybody ever find the resolve to open a social rehabilitation center for ex-convicts? In the meantime their desire not to trouble themselves with socially useful labor coincides in full

with the interest in not hiring "specials." What good does it do when the man finds himself again in the familiar, but hard defendant's seat? In camp he will have his rations and a roof over his head.

I tried to find at least some positive examples in the cities and rayons of the oblast, and what I found is supported by enthusiastic and righteous people. Through the efforts of the militia a dormitory has been opened in Vladimir as a temporary shelter for ex-convicts. A summer market for child labor began operating this year. The enterprises in Gus-Khrustal'nyy set up a public employment fund for adolescents. As I was in the rayon, I dropped in on V. Fomin, first secretary of the party raykom.

"I am working on forming and dispatching a detachment of older secondary students to pick vegetables and fruit for a city in the southern oblasts of Russia. They won't be wasting time and they'll be doing good work."

The young people travel off to work very enthusiastically. But an agrarian specialist from the oblast center was not happy.

"The party is functioning outside its regular area."

Well, excuse me, but who is there today that is working with people?!

Be that as it may, in the matter of dividing up functions we have become quite artful. This is because a function is not a pound of raisins, even less is it an activity as such. It is nothing more than a set of duties: divide it up as you like, and don't be left hurting. According to the RSFSR Law on the Militia, which clearly defined purely law enforcement and protective tasks for this department, preventive work with juvenile offenders and pedagogically neglected children is passed on to the organs of public education and the newly formed committees on the family and the demographic situation. You would think that today more than ever, in our extremely difficult crime conditions, it would be necessary to unite the efforts of party and Komsomol committees, the militia, the court, the procuracy, and public organizations in work to prevent legal offenses. But we are separating ourselves off again, like neighbors in a communal kitchen who cannot get along, and forgetting our children. Once again we are running ahead of the train. Without having created new ones, we today are destroying operating structures that are somehow still producing positive results.

We certainly should not lie to ourselves. If the militia members now leave those receiving-distribution centers where by the will of fate we find not just people who love to travel about the country and runaways from families and children's homes, but also juvenile offenders, will the teachers there be able to handle them? The inspectorates for minors' affairs will close; who will need their unfortunate sponsored families? Who will need the adolescent who at present is watched over and led dependably along by an inspector in a militia uniform? Is it not

clear that the criminal world will swallow up all who are rejected by society? How great will the scale of unsupervised children be in the immediate, irrational future, and along with that how great will growth in crime be?

We should at least look back on our miserable two years of the so-called experiment with humanization of court practices. Unfortunately, the good intentions did not work out. Massive reprieves of juveniles from accountability for criminally punishable offenses, not backed up by any other, for example administrative, measures of prevention such as fines or brief arrests, produced a surge of new crimes. And now it is much easier for the courts to decide the cases: most of those who got reprieves now have enough charges of theft and robbery on their records to be imprisoned for two, three or even more years.

Humaneness without humane laws is impossible, but the new Criminal Code, which would correspond to the rule-of-law state and democratic society that is being created, is disastrously late. For now we apparently are left to count on the precinct officer from the movies, the virtuous Aniskin. But how many Aniskins do we have? The precinct militia service is growing in numbers now, but certainly not in the quality of people capable of such wise and complex work. It is not accidental that the press and radio in Vladimir are carrying invitations to work in

the local militia that is being formed. Not everyone can be given a nightstick and entrusted with people's safety. And indeed, by no means will everyone take on this responsibility. Cadres are a critical issue, and not just in Vladimir Oblast. The militia everywhere is short of specialists with legal education, sociologists, and legal scholars. One can talk endlessly about the problems of the militia, and of course they cannot be solved by the law alone; but the main problem, in my opinion, is that our awakened and unbearably sick society continues to try to heal its socioeconomic pains using the militia only.

Everybody has seen these pictures. A store is selling scarce items, and a militia detachment is summoned to keep order. Young people hang around the video salons; members of the inspectorate for minors' affairs monitor the repertoire. A man released from prison cannot find work; the precinct officer goes with him to open the way to the directors' offices. People take sausage home from the meat combine; the duty militia member is lying in the bushes to catch them with the goods. A wandering woman with children in her arms has lost her documents and handbag. She comes to the oblispolkom for help. They call the militia: sort it out and take steps.

But how many militia members will be needed for us to hide behind them? Is that perhaps why there are not enough nightsticks to handle the thieves and robbers?

Vladimir Pozner Interviewed on Reasons for Leaving Central TV

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[Interview with Vladimir Pozner by Vadim Sokolovskiy, correspondent of the Literature and Art Department and simultaneously a student of a journalism faculty; place and date not given: "Vladimir Pozner: 'I Believe Only in Independent Journalism'"]

[Text] Kravchenko's television and radio company is losing its employees. Some are being dismissed, others are leaving of their own accord, not waiting for the punitive measures. Among the latter is political commentator Vladimir Pozner.

[Sokolovskiy] Vladimir Vladimirovich, you have left Central Television. Was this the result of pressure or were there some other reasons?

[Pozner] I should say right away that I experienced no pressure on the part of the leadership of the All-Union State Television and Radio Company. On the contrary, it was proposed that I become a political observer of the highest category in the new structure, and lengthy efforts were made to dissuade me from leaving. I do not, therefore, want the readers (and television viewers) to get the impression that I was hounded out of television and gotten rid of and that this departure was a result of my personal conflict with Kravchenko. It was a question of something else here. I came to the conclusion that I could not remain. I sensed that I would have to choose between a settled position and well-being on the one hand and what I call journalistic probity on the other. Given the current monopoly of state television, when (to speak on the national level) there is no other television, a journalist has, if there are disagreements with official policy, say, one way out—remaining silent. In all other cases he is simply dismissed—I have no need, I believe, to cite examples. I have nothing against state television as such, many countries have such. But the relations of the state and television there are such that the government may influence broadcasting policy indirectly. In our case, however, this is not simply state television. It is television of the president of the USSR personally. This is very important, and it is not a question of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev here—although he is now president and this applies to him also—but of the system itself and of the principle whereby the president of a television company is appointed by the president of the country personally and may be replaced only by the president. The president thus acquires absolute control over television via the person whom he himself appoints. And, consequently, a journalist wishing to criticize the actions of the president is deprived of an opportunity to do so on the air. The possibility of expressing freely one's views on any problem is, in my view, not only the right but also the duty of the journalist. And for me the need to choose between obedience and what I understand by journalistic duty became the decisive factor of my leaving television.

[Sokolovskiy] Do you believe that the existence in our country of another television company, independent of the state, is possible?

[Pozner] You see, there cannot, like the press either, on the whole, be altogether independent television. We can only, therefore, as you rightly said, speak about independence of something or other, of the state in this case. And I can answer definitely, yes, the creation of such television is realistic and inevitable. This will be television which will depend only on those who pay the money—on advertisers, if television is commercial, or on sponsors, if it is noncommercial. And here it is possible to speak of real independence—after all, advertisers are very often diverse, and it is hard to imagine that they would unite and dictate their will to television. This has not happened anywhere and hardly could—different firms' interests are too different. In the case of sponsors television will be independent only when the charter clearly specifies that sponsorship does not convey the right of broadcasting control.

[Sokolovskiy] We can only dream of such television. One has the impression meanwhile, however, that glasnost began with television and is ending with it also...

[Pozner] This is natural—television is the most powerful of all the mass media in terms of influence. It is for this reason that the first tokens of glasnost—among which was my Leningrad-Seattle television hookup program also—appeared on television. But to say that glasnost began with television would be wrong. It began with Gorbachev and the people who supported him. And God forbid that we should ever forget this. But that the people who initially supported glasnost have come to fear it is perfectly understandable also. For them glasnost was an abstraction, a splendid slogan, and nothing more—there had been no freedom of speech in the country since the 1920's. And when, therefore, journalists began to "bite," the reaction was ambivalent—some people applauded, some, hooted. Attempts were then made to put the squeeze on the press, the price of paper being jacked up. But the journalists survived thanks to the support of subscribers and sponsorship. Television, however, in the hands of the state, proved defenseless, and it was given "special" attention. Note, after all, that in the six years of perestroika the leadership of television and radio has been changed four times—Lapin was followed by Akse-nov, then Nenashev and, finally, Kravchenko. This says something in itself. And it is for this reason that we have on television witnessed an abrupt limitation of glasnost. But to say that glasnost is ending—this is a strong exaggeration. There are the newspapers and journals, after all...

[Sokolovskiy] But the danger of this partial limitation of glasnost cannot be downplayed either, in my view. After all, the glasnost, say, in the sphere of international journalism which had begun is also on the wane. And international affairs writers are always alert to current conditions...

[Pozner] You know, international affairs writers have never had the freedom, inner freedom, which journalists covering domestic policy have had. In criticizing our life a journalist never criticized the policy of the Soviet state as a whole, until recently, in any event. The international affairs commentator, on the other hand, knew that any criticism of the foreign policy course meant criticism specifically of the Politburo and the leaders of the party and the state. And this does not afford a sense of great inner freedom. I recall even how at a meeting in the CPSU Central Committee international affairs journalists were called upon to write more pointedly, with greater candor and more critically. And one well-known journalist, leaving the meeting together with his editor, said: "I'll really write something tomorrow!" The editor, turning around, said: "And tomorrow I will not publish!"

The force of inertia is quite strong. And even having begun to emancipate himself, no international affairs journalist has permitted himself criticism of foreign policy. I know for a fact that many people were unhappy with the unification of Germany, but not one journalist expressed his unhappiness. Yet expressing their opinion is their duty as journalists. By and large, the mass of journalists writing on international topics, with the rare exception, have remained either those who have taken a vow of silence or bailiffs in the "what can I do for you" posture. I am speaking relatively sharply because it seems to me that these are people who are concerned for their own welfare and who are giving little thought to the welfare of the state, otherwise they would be expressing their viewpoints openly. Glasnost has essentially enjoyed no development in matters of foreign policy. And when the war was being fought in the Persian Gulf, many people were, I believe, disappointed with its coverage in our media and the evaluations of the actions of Iraq, the forces of the allied coalition and the United States. This was evidence that the international affairs writers, once considered the "blue blood" of journalism, are not up to it. It is not only a question of habit here but of a lack of readiness, on the whole, to cover international life objectively.

[Sokolovskiy] But is our audience ready to receive objective information? After all, try telling anyone something bad about capitalism...

[Pozner] This is a natural reaction. When, for decades, all we did was abuse capitalism and show its sores, which are indeed sores—unemployment, drug addiction, homeless persons, criminals—people became accustomed to believing that all was bad with them and all was good with us. And when they suddenly came to see that they have it far better than us, a particular change of consciousness occurred. And now they believe nothing negative: "The unemployed are loafers and parasites. The homeless are drug addicts and blacks." And they are sure that "in actual fact life there is splendid." To some extent the same change of consciousness has occurred as regards religion also. Earlier on television, say, the church did not exist, and any attempt to show on the screen the cupola of a church even was perceived as

undermining principles. But now you cannot turn on the television without seeing a cross and a bearded individual brandishing a censer. And everyone is moved, although, if you think about it, the church is a reactionary institution, granted all that is positive which religion entails. One can be a person who believes deeply without recognizing the church as an institution. So we have always had distortions—in one direction or another. As far as the West is concerned, it is now difficult to restore the balance in the public mind—the gap between our life and theirs is too great. The main argument is: "All the same, it is better than here." And what can we answer to this? It is indeed better. The only thing I call on people to do is this: Let us see "their" mistakes and not repeat them. But calling for anything now is very difficult. People are so imbued with nihilism and cynicism that they are simply unwilling to listen to another opinion. The audience believes no one...

[Sokolovskiy] But you, as the creator and anchor of the celebrated television hookups remember another audience also—dutifully reiterating the clichés of counter-propaganda...

[Pozner] Yes, people have changed, and this is remarkable. And I am pleased that my television hookups helped our people change. You know the kind of letters I would receive following the first television hookups, following the Leningrad-Seattle hookup: "Where did you get those idiots who were in your studio? Why were they so tightlipped, why were they unwilling to tell the truth?! If you had invited me, I would have...." People saw their own face at that time and greatly disliked what they saw. And I am pleased if this helped them change. And even if our splendid audience is now frequently impatient, distrustful, irritable, the main thing is that it has lost its fear. And the distortions in perception will in time pass, as soon as our country really becomes part of the world community.

[Sokolovskiy] There may be no people left in the country by that time. We are now seeing a tremendous wave of emigration, caused, *inter alia*, by this "unbalanced" attitude toward the West...

[Pozner] Well, first, I see no such wave. This is as yet in the majority of cases ethnic emigration—Greek, Jewish, Turkish. But if an exit law is enacted, I say now "if," although even recently was saying "when," because I have recently formed the impression that it is not the intention to enact it and that it is not a question here of putting the final touches to details, there are people who want to take us back to the situation where overseas travel was a gift of the authorities or a privilege of the official appointments roster. So if this law is enacted, we really will witness a tremendous wave of emigration—people will want to go to the West in order to really work to really earn...

[Sokolovskiy] And you have never entertained thoughts about emigrating? Your life has, after all, been a far from simple one...

[Pozner] You know, for a long time I was altogether permanently resident. I had an "inappropriate" biography—I had come from another country and had come pretty much as an adult, and this gave rise to suspicion. Generally, to use Nevzorov's terminology, I was not "one of our people." In addition, I was outspoken. Even when, at the end of the 1970's, I had begun to quietly "go out," I was once again, having spoken in 1981 disapprovingly of the commitment of forces to Afghanistan, black-listed. As far, however, as emigration is concerned... One may generally, in my view, leave a country for two reasons. One is to work overseas on contract. This is perfectly normal and, in addition, useful both to the individual and his country, to which he brings foreign currency. The second is when a person cannot live in a country, is suffocating therein, and is prepared to go wherever, as long as he does not have to live in this state. So in the first instance I would go with pleasure, provided that I could work for a Soviet audience also. As far as the second reason is concerned, I do not have and have not had the feeling that I am suffocating. In the years of stagnation I worked in foreign broadcasting and addressed a Western audience, and this, however strange, afforded great freedom of self-expression—much of what could be said "there" could not have been said here. Now, however, the situation has changed fundamentally. It is difficult, of course, but interesting. And I can say a great deal and about many things. I sense my use here, I sense people's support. And no one has yet put pressure on me to the extent that I cannot work and do my duty. But to leave for a pair of pants, out of material considerations... You understand, I have an advantage here, and I am aware of it—I can go there and purchase a pair of pants there, it is not mandatory for this to leave for good. I have now had a booklet published in the West, which is called "Parting With Illusions." It has sold very well, and there have already been two editions—in hard back and soft back. So I have the money. But material questions would not, for all that, be decisive for me.

[Sokolovskiy] Will the viewer see you on the screen or will we now only read you?

[Pozner] No, the television company and I have arranged that, when this is in mutual interests, I will broadcast on Central Television and will continue to anchor programs on the Moscow channel. But I will be appearing as an independent journalist.

[Sokolovskiy] At the start of discussion you spoke about the need for the creation of an independent television company. Is this just a project or are there actual plans?

[Pozner] I intend to participate quite actively in the creation of independent television. There are actual plans also, of course. But I would not want to speak about them now inasmuch as when there are plans, there

are always those who like to break them. I may say that creating such television is a difficult business. The monopolists will not give in without a fight...

TV Show's Cancellation Seen as Latest Loss to Central TV

914B0226B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 2 Jul 91 p 2

[Article by Sergey Fomin, under rubric: "Television: 'Before and After Midnight' Is No More"]

[Text] Rumors to the effect that Molchanov was planning to leave TsT [Central Television] circulated for a very long time, but people stubbornly resisted believing them. The hurly-burly television world is capable of inflating any nonsense to the level of verisimilitude, but, most important, that was opposed by the very spirit of the "Before and After Midnight" program, which was concentrated in the image of its host—the image of a person who was so well established in his own place that it was difficult to imagine that he could ever leave it.

"Before and After Midnight" was the first program to be televised live, after an entire era of total video recording and preliminary viewings, and it was precisely for that reason that it breached the intellectual and creative bashfulness of the television of that time.

A surprising and unnatural phenomenon startled TsT, beginning with December of last year—it can be called a "phenomenon of earth-shaking emptiness." It was not the appearance of new programs, not creation, but the destruction, the disappearance of that which had been created, that became the chief events in the television world. The political pressure made itself known in the only form possible for itself—the form of annihilation, the form of creating emptiness. Deputy chairman Reshetov, who assumed the responsibility for shutting down "View," was for several months the most popular figure in TV, not to mention Kravchenko, whose name rumor had immediately and, apparently, for a long time conferred on Central Television.

Molchanov and his team withstood that destructive attack with the maximum amount of bravery. During the days of the Lithuanian crisis, when TsT had dropped to a state of being unable to use its photographic apparatus, since showing anything at all for people to see before their very eyes would have meant showing the truth, it was only "Before and After Midnight," out of all the TsT broadcasts, that opened its doors to those who wanted to appear on live television in order to rebuff the lies, and it was only that program that gave its commentary to the events that had just occurred. That was probably the peak hour of the program, when it found, before it was subsequently doomed by its monthly format to permitted academic tardiness, an irreproachable emotional equivalent to that which was known by everyone who did not cover his eyes and ears to what was occurring. The latest news items from the events in Vilnius, that had been removed from all the television programs

except for "Fifth Wheel," were shown to the accompaniment of the apocalyptic sounds of Ravel's "Bolero."

Ascertaining the details now and guessing where and when the last drop had overflowed the cup would mean guessing about the confusion that surrounds television. Guessing about the decision is clear from the last program, which, using materials from the life of Donbass miners, presented not a traditional survey, but just a single topic—the topic of the public's indignation.

"Before and After Midnight" is no more, and there is no sense in hoping that the program will ever return under that name.

As was reported by Olvar Kakuchaya, editor in chief of TsT informational-programs studio and the former director of the "Before and After Midnight" program, Molchanov's decision seems to him to be strange, but they had parted as friends. He has certain plans but apparently he does not want to work on TsT, or on Russian Television.

On 29 June, the day that the last program of "Before and After Midnight" was aired, Molchanov left Ostankino, refusing to give any interviews.

Battle Over Independent TV Service for Leningrad Continues

PM1507112991 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Jul 91 p 2

[Report by correspondent Yuriy Kukanov: "The Leningrad City Soviet Will Not Surrender"]

[Text] The struggle for the independence of Leningrad Television is not over yet.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA has detailed for its readers the ups and downs of the struggle for the independence of the Leningrad Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting. City soviet deputies twice adopted legally sound decisions on its independent status. But Anatoliy Sobchak, former chairman of the Leningrad City Soviet and now mayor of Leningrad, ignored the sessions' decision and is insisting that Kravchenko's presidential company should be a cofounder of the autonomous Leningrad Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting. This position was set out in a letter to USSR Cabinet of Ministers Chairman Pavlov (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA No. 96).

Not unexpectedly, the ploy of involving the chairman of the presidential television and radio company and the union premier was an utter fiasco. With Valentin Sergeyevich's tacit consent Leonid Petrovich simply "swallowed" Leningrad Television, declaring it a branch of his, that is, of the presidential company. With a charming smile, the presidential television chief spread his hands: He would not object to an independent Leningrad Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, but there is no one to "feed" it, apparently, apart

from Kravchenko. There and then, as if out of the blue, it was promised that journalists' salaries would be increased. I think Comrade Kravchenko knows full well that the Leningrad Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting and he too, in fact, are "fed" entirely by our—that is the taxpayer's—money.

At a press conference in the Mariinskiy Palace Anatoliy Sobchak confirmed that his position was unchanged and said that in the circumstances he would be appealing to the country's president. Well, let us await the results, although I doubt very much whether the president will support Leningrad Television's acquisition of independence.

But the deputies will not yield ground. The ninth session of the Leningrad City Soviet adopted a statement in which there was a protest "in connection with the fact that the USSR president and the USSR Cabinet of Ministers ignored the decision on transforming Leningrad Television that was adopted by the Leningrad City Soviet in accordance with article 151 of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Constitution."

The Leningrad City Soviet asked Russian President Boris Yeltsin to back the creation of an independent Leningrad television and radio broadcasting company with a founder in the shape of the All-Russian Television and Radio Company, the Leningrad City Soviet, the Leningrad Oblast Soviet, and the labor collective of the Leningrad Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, making this issue a condition of the signing of the Union Treaty.

Lukyanov Meets IZVETSIYA Correspondents, Staff

PM1907131191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Jul 91 Union Edition p 1

[Report from roundup of IZVESTIYA, TASS, POST-FACTUM, REUTER, and AFP reports: "Meeting at USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium"]

[Text] An extraordinary conference of the newspaper's own correspondents in the republics, krays, and oblasts has ended at the IZVESTIYA editorial office.

In the Kremlin the own correspondents and staffers of the IZVESTIYA editorial office and the NEDELYA and SOYUZ supplements had a meeting with A.I. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, who described the work of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the situation in the country. In a businesslike and comradely atmosphere there was a comprehensive examination of the package of problems concerning mutual relations between the newspaper and its founder—the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium—the complexity of the work of the IZVESTIYA editorial office and publishing house in moving to the market, the new conditions in which the newspaper's representatives are working in various

parts of the country, and the strengthening of ties with readers. A.I. Lukyanov answered the IZVESTIYA journalists' questions.

PRAVDA Publishing House Ends Relationship With Journal

914B0226A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 25 Jun 91 p 2

[Interview with P. Demidov, under rubric: "In Brief", by Aleksandr Martines; "ZHURNALIST Without PRAVDA"]

[Text] According to an NG [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA] report, V. Leontyev, director of the PRAVDA Publishing House, sent ZHURNALIST magazine two messages. In the first of them it is indicated that the PRAVDA Publishing House has been "forced to leave the makeup of the founders of your journal." The second one is a copy of V. Leontyev's letter to the chairman of USSR Goskompechat [State Committee for the Press], in which he explains that the leadership of the publishing house was taking that step with the purpose of "the further democratization of the mass media" and the "development of a genuine pluralism of opinions." In order to clarify the attitude that the magazine, which has been left without any material support, takes toward that decision that was made, an NG correspondent had the following interview with P. Demidov, the responsible secretary of ZHURNALIST.

[A. Martines] E. Topol's novel "Kremlevskaya zhena" [Kremlin Wife] (concerning a failed attempt on Gorbachev's life in 1988) was printed in three issues of your magazine. Issue No. 5 printed an article about the violation of the law governing the press on TV [television] with the arrival of Kravchenko. The same issue published an article by O. Kalugin, with new facts about the activities of the KGB. Issue No. 6 published an interview with V. Korotich. Could those items have had an influence on the action taken by the PRAVDA Publishing House?

[P. Demidov] That is not precluded. True, it is also possible that it was a coincidence, but a very strange one. Judge for yourself. After E. Topol's novel, the director of the PRAVDA Publishing House left the makeup of the editorial board of ZHURNALIST. The documents that you mentioned appeared after issue No. 5.

[A. Martines] What will happen to you in the immediate and long-term future?

[P. Demidov] In the letter to the editor in chief, Comrade Leontyev mentions the readiness of the publishing house to fulfill the functions of a print shop. But a number of questions arise. First, we do not have any contract with the publishing house. We do not know what conditions will be given to us. The more than free prices of paper can kill the magazine. But I want to state that the editorial office will apply all its efforts not to raise prices. Without a doubt, our publication is operating at a loss. We always used to be supported by the

Journalists Union. The new leadership has also confirmed its self-interestedness in rendering assistance to us. It is necessary to seek new methods of existence. Advertising, parallel publishing activity. I think that the magazine could be helped by the newspapers that have "got up strongly on their feet." They could assume a small part of the maintenance of the magazine, which, in the ideal situation, must be **their magazine**.

[A. Martines] One has observed a massive offensive against the independent publications. How can you survive in that struggle?

[P. Demidov] It must be understood that the stifling of glasnost is achieved not only by abolishing the law governing the press. It can be stifled by a shortage of paper or printing capabilities, by a distribution monopoly, etc. The struggle against the Draconian rules of Soyuzpechat [Main Administration for the Distribution of Publications] prompts the creation of alternative structures. But this is very, very difficult. Because the state structures were created over a period of decades, and were aimed at a complete monopoly. To speak honestly, I do not have any answer to that question. For example, we are always intimidated by the lack of paper in the country. But the number of publications that are currently being printed is 5 to 10 times larger than previously, and paper is being found for them. It is necessary to search for alternatives, to test new forms of cooperation among the independent publications. We must hold together.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Lowers Subscription Rate; Plans Daily Publication

914B0278A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 18 Jul 91 p 1

[Article by Vitaliy Tretyakov, chief editor of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA: "A 1992 Annual Subscription to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Will Cost 89—Not 114—Rubles"]

[Text] The decision was made to lower the cost of an annual subscription to our newspaper by 25 rubles [R] as compared to the price determined at the beginning of May and announced in the Soyuzpechat catalogue.

A storm of phone calls came crashing down on our editorial office. The essence of most was that 114 rubles was somewhat expensive, of course, but all the same we will be subscribing. The high cost announced in the press for an annual subscription to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA became the subject of stormy discussion among journalists, publishers, writers, advertisers, and politicians. The TASS information, based on data taken from the Soyuzpechat catalogue, was published by many newspapers. PRAVDA even printed it on its front page.

A separate paragraph was devoted to the cost of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA. True, for some reason the explanation I gave the TASS correspondent somehow disappeared (from the CPSU central organ publication): that the catalogue data was outdated and the editors were preparing changes to it, that the cost of a subscription would be substantially lowered. A letter to that effect had already gone out to Soyuzpechat.

And so an annual subscription to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA will cost R89 in 1992. A six-month subscription will run R52, three-month—R27, and a one-month subscription will cost 9 rubles 50 kopeks. It is intended that the retail cost of a single issue of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA (as sold in the kiosks) will remain the price announced in the catalogue—60 kopeks. Thus, a subscriber will save (as compared with an individual who buys the newspaper every day at the kiosk) over 60 rubles.

Yes, by all accounts, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA will be the most expensive daily newspaper published in the USSR, which does not frighten us. Primarily because this is dictated by the economic situation in the newspaper market—the high cost of paper, monopolization of printing production (and, consequently, high cost estimates for printing “other” publications—the category to which NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA belongs), and monopoly (simultaneously with a weak material base) of the distribution system in the USSR. Thus, the main culprit for the high price of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA is not the editors but the party-state communist monopoly in journal and newspaper publishing and distribution. Incidentally, the high subscription cost of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA provides the best evidence of our independence, about which party publications continue to speak ironically and with wretched crudity. But their directors and journalists know full well in fact who is dependent and who is independent. One need only take a look at that same Soyuzpechat catalogue to see that the low subscription cost of the great majority of publications can be explained through grants from the party treasury, replenished either by membership dues (a hidden form of exacting additional payment from the subscriber) or by profit obtained by the monopoly through inflated cost estimates for printing “other” publications.

There is no party treasury backing up NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, and income from advertisements while our circulation is still low (circulation size in our case is dictated not by demand for the newspaper, but by conditions stipulated in the typography contract, for typography not belonging to us) do not enable us to substantially exceed our printing expenses.

Nonetheless, things are going well for NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA to the extent that we revised downward the May estimates for the cost of a 1992 subscription. This is a result of the high degree to which copies are bought up

and the increased interest of advertisers in the publication (a significant index of its quality, especially with low circulation for the time being).

Furthermore, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA is issued three times per week this year. Beginning with the new year, it will appear daily, retaining its eight pages, i.e., twice the volume of traditional publications (consequently our subscription price, when compared with other newspapers—four-page publications, as a rule—realistically does not even amount to 89 rubles, but rather to 44 rubles 50 kopeks). And if the typography contract will allow, one issue per week of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA will consist of 16 pages. We continue to strive to become the first “thick” Soviet newspaper.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA will of course acquire the necessary features of a daily newspaper. There will be a sharp increase in its volume of current-action information (today we often do not publish official reports simply because the official press is overflowing with them). Like every daily newspaper, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA will begin publishing television programming (for the week and daily)—beginning not 1 January, by the way, but in autumn of this year. Many surprises are planned, about which it is not yet time to speak. But faithful readers of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA will take my word, I believe, that this is a guaranteed fact.

Finally, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA will preserve its status as a “quality” (according to the generally accepted categorizations of “quality” and “mass” publications), independent newspaper. Our reader is educated. He is interested not only in politics but in culture as well. He is among those who make the decisions in this country or who influence the making of decisions through their public or political activity. We place extraordinary value on these qualities of our reader and we will work for those people who are self-critical, use irony, are capable of independently—and not just with the aid of a newspaper—analyzing events in the country and in the world.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA will continue to be a newspaper that regularly sheds light on the life of the sovereign republics and of diverse peoples, presents detailed and currently relevant information, and affords various sides the opportunity to express their views.

These are our plans in their most general outline. We will have further opportunities to speak to this matter in greater detail.

Foreign subscription to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA was recently announced through Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga [International Books]. Interest abroad in the newspaper is quite great. NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA was invited into an international pool consisting of 16 newspapers, from France (LIBERATION), Great Britain (THE GUARDIAN), Italy (LA STAMPA), Spain (EL PAIS), Germany, Israel, Belgium, and other countries. We are operating within the framework of the “World Media” common project.

The first issue of the American-based Russian publication NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA has just appeared. As far as we are aware, it is the first Soviet publication of its type abroad. If the undertaking is successful, two copies of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA will be published in the United States—one in Russian and one in English. Negotiations are underway with other foreign partners.

But the most important thing for us is our own country. In the near future it is planned to begin publication of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in a number of republic capitals and in several major cities of Russia. Interest in the newspaper is growing at a faster rate than we are presently able to satisfy. But our goal remains as before, an ambitious and somewhat immodest one—to become the best Russian-language newspaper in the world, a newspaper that would provide its readers all necessary information and the entire gamut of commentary and assessments.

The Center for Sociological Research of the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee conducted a survey 27-28 May of this year of 1,503 individuals in 15 regions of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] (based on a representative all-Russia sampling). Here are some of its results:

- 26 percent of those surveyed read NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA (in 15 regions!—but the lion's share of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's small circulation has until now been in Moscow);
- up to 5 percent of those polled (i.e., 4 percent of Russia's adult population) intend to subscribe to the newspaper in 1992. According to the most modest calculations, this amounts to several million (present circulation is 170,000) subscriptions.

These figures, presented to our editors by Doctor of Sociological Sciences Ye. Levanov, open up those prospects for the newspaper which NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA has consciously strived to achieve. The present subscription campaign will be conducted under conditions of far greater choice for the reader than existed before. And greater material stringency on the part of potential subscribers. For NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA this is the first subscription campaign ever.

We are convinced that he who selects NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA selects an independent life style and mode of thinking. There are far greater numbers of such people in our country than some people imagine. Yes, it is sometimes expensive to be independent today. But this brings satisfaction that one cannot get from the most widespread—and therefore the most inexpensive—pleasures.

'Progress' Publishers Become Joint-Stock Media Company

*PM1507093191 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 10 Jul 91 p 1*

[A. Kosulnikov report: "V. Molchanov Working for 'Progress'"]

[Text] Yesterday there was a banquet at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs press center. Fedor Burlatskiy, Andrey Dementyev, Grigoriy Baklanov, Mikhail Nenashev, and many other well known people unhurriedly engaged in society chitchat.

True, there was plenty to discuss. The "Progress" Publishing House, which was once featured in the Guinness Book of Records on account of its gigantic production scale, was celebrating its 60th anniversary with champagne and simultaneously drawing a line under its propaganda past and becoming a free joint-stock company. I believe that the people attending the gathering slightly envied the "Progress people." After all, it was a matter of the establishment of the first publishing group in the USSR to unite under one roof all kinds of book firms, journals, a video service, an alternative book trade structure to the state structure, and also its own television company.

The new "Progress" has attracted people who have made a name for themselves. Vladimir Molchanov, for example, whose departure from Central Television caused a lot of fuss, was also present at the press center on Zubovskiy Boulevard. He will have his own program with the future "TV-Progress" firm. "I want it to be free and interesting," Vladimir Kirillovich told your correspondent, refraining from further comment. Obviously, he was trying to avoid attracting the evil eye.

Specialists Question Safety of Chernobyl Sarcophagus

91WN0593A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 5 Jun 91 p 3

[Article by Irina Khmara: "Chernobyl—Again?"]

[Text] A conference on the problems of the safety of the Chernobyl sarcophagus was held at the USSR State Nuclear Inspection Office. The conclusion the specialists drew is not comforting: "The Chernobyl sarcophagus can be described as a potentially dangerous object."

The conditions within it are clearly bad: cracks have already formed in the shell, the seal has been broken, and there is a possibility of radioactive dust escaping. A quantity of fuel, no less than 150 tons (at a concentration of 90-96 percent), has spilled under the sarcophagus, in the chambers of the fourth unit. At this point it still has not been established where the rest of the fuel which was in the unit before the accident is.

The sarcophagus rests on construction structures which were subjected to the strong impact of the blow during the explosion. And, they have been partially destroyed and so it cannot be ruled out that the cover may simply collapse. There is also no information on corrosive destruction of the elements. The biological protection lid (the "Yelena" structure), which stood "upright" during the explosion, also arouses anxiety. Incidentally, its weight is colossal.

It is not known what will happen to the installation or whether it is stable (safe) given external impacts—earthquakes or influxes of ground water and sediment. No one will say specifically how the fuel-containing elements will act in all these troublesome situations. Their condition may change. And that means that there is a danger of a spontaneous nuclear reaction.

But why is the cover so unreliable? The point is that its structure was produced in extreme conditions—on the run, in an extremely short period of time. The installation had to be covered as fast as possible and the escape of radionuclides into the air cut off. There was no opportunity to make a detailed analysis and expert study or to obtain information on the condition of the construction elements of Unit No. 4 during the accident. The work done did not always meet existing nuclear power engineering norms and requirements. The work to strengthen the elements continued in subsequent years. It was held back by the fact that many of the chambers were inaccessible because of radiation conditions. Even now, five years after the accident, it is very difficult to do a detailed examination of the elements.

Nonetheless, it was stated at the conference: Further research is needed and simply essential, and measures to rule out danger are needed. Many people proposed removing the installation altogether so that there would be only a "green plot of grass" in its place. Their opponents asserted that it would be difficult to dismantle

the structure while maintaining radiation safety. For thousands of tons of metal structures and fuel elements demand careful handling. In addition, all the dismantled equipment would have to be stored somewhere. Where? Would it not be better right at the site? A second sarcophagus must be built over the first. This time a completely reliable one. There are already proposals to develop the design of the second sarcophagus. But decisions on its construction have not yet been made. The matter again rests on the shortage of data and the need for research.

But what are we waiting for now? God forbid a second Chernobyl. Why are the specialists so calm?

Here is the prognosis A. Belyayev, the first deputy chairman of USSR Gospromnadzor [State Industrial Inspection Office], gives: "In the next 5-10 years the "Cover" installation may continue to perform its localizing function, but to ensure this careful observations of its behavior are needed. For now no serious changes in the installation's behavior have been noted. At the present time the potency of the radiation doses within the installation are decreasing monotonically."

To the question of whether cave-ins may occur, he answered that most likely that will not happen, although there is no 100-percent guarantee.

Supreme Soviet Members at Odds With IAEA Chernobyl Findings

91WN0593B Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 27, Jul 91 p 2

[Article by Yu. Voronezhstev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Issues of Ecology sub-committee on ecological problems of the industrial complex: "It Is for Them To Draw Conclusions, and for Us—To Live: 5 Million People Suffered From the Chernobyl Accident"]

[Text] Recently many officials have been referring more and more to the results of the work of the international group of experts from the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] when discussing the Chernobyl problems. One of the main findings of the commission which analyzed the concept formulated in the USSR of it being safe to live in the contaminated territories and the effectiveness of measures to protect the population's health says: "Safety measures adopted or planned for the long-term on the whole go beyond the bounds of what is strictly necessary from the standpoint of providing radiation protection." In other words, the devil is not so black as Soviet specialists paint him.

Nonetheless, most of the members of the USSR Supreme Soviet working on this problem believe that is, to put it mildly, too daring a conclusion even for such respected and competent scientists.

The results of their work were presented in May 1991 in Vienna at a representative conference. The report of the

International Consultative Committee contains five parts which include findings and recommendations. But what is it that one must disagree with?

The "History of Events" Chapter. This chapter perhaps does not contain disputed points, with one exception: "... this problem ("neutralization" of the radioactive iodine—Yu. V.) was resolved by using such measures of intervention as supplying the population with potassium iodide tablets." The population was not supplied with the iodine compounds when they were needed; and it appears that the experts were misled by our bureaucrats in medicine who, trying to avoid responsibility, cover their mistakes with lies about the iodine preventive measures supposedly applied. Referring to the resolution of the 28th CPSU Congress rather than the documents of the USSR Supreme Soviet when describing the present situation at the very least causes confusion. The impression is given that the organization mentioned is still making decisions today just as it did in 1986.

The "Contamination of the Environment" Chapter. Experts analyzed contamination of the soil, food products, waters, and air. Random samples and measurements were made and analyzed in the laboratories of six countries. The findings that the levels of surface contamination with cesium which were indicated on official maps are in keeping with reality are in my opinion indisputable. The evaluation of contamination with strontium proved to be more optimistic than the official estimate and, I believe, requires careful analysis and verification.

The international experts also confirmed the low concentration of radionuclides in drinking water and "in the majority of cases in food products." Unfortunately, our population does not have the opportunity to control the products in "the minority of cases." And the possibility of "dirty" products appearing on our tables is not ruled out.

The "Radiation Exposure of the Population" Chapter. The conclusion of this chapter is: "Official procedures for evaluating doses were sound from a scientific viewpoint. The independent evaluations for the study of populated points obtained within the framework of the Project were lower than officially presented figures for estimated doses." It is a very optimistic conclusion which, however, contradicts the following point in the report: "... It proved

impossible to confirm the initial levels of contamination of soil and exposure of the population with isotopes of iodine." We may objectively speak only of the content of radionuclides in the organism of a particular person today, but even world-renowned experts cannot unfortunately precisely determine what dose he received beginning on 26 April 1986. And that should be clearly indicated in the report, but it is not.

The "Impact on Health" Chapter. For all my respect for the scientists who took part in the Project, this chapter raises a great many questions. Here are just a few points. The research did not include the "clean-up workers" or the population evacuated from the contaminated regions. The group of 1,356 patients studied by the experts is hardly representative for the 5 million who suffered as a result of the catastrophe. The report says that an exhaustive examination of each person was not done, and in so saying the following conclusions are cited: "The children examined were considered on the whole to be healthy." Pardon me, but what about the data from the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health, for Lelchitskiy Rayon in Gomel Oblast for example: "In dividing the school children into groups by health, it is noteworthy that there is an extremely low percentage of healthy children (1.4 percent) and a very high (38.8 percent) number of sick ones." An enlargement of the thyroid gland of the first degree was identified in 50.7 percent of the children and of the second degree—in five percent. Figures are roughly the same for other contaminated regions too.

Or these findings of the report: "... a future increase in the number of cancer illnesses or hereditary changes as compared with the natural level will be difficult to determine even given broad-scale and well organized long-term epidemiological research. No statistically significant difference was found among any age groups in the surveyed contaminated and control populated points (this means illnesses of the thyroid gland—Yu. V.). The imprecision of such assertions can be proven by comparing the incidence of illness in "clean" and in "dirty" rayons of one oblast of Belorussia, which suffered to such a degree that it has no completely "clean" rayons, but there are rayons which were more fortunate. In this sense the table compiled from data at the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health Scientific Research Institution of Radiation Medicine is very instructive.

Incidence of Certain Types of Illnesses in the Population of Gomel Oblast (per 100,000 population)

Oblast Rayon	Malignant Tumors			Endemic Goiter		
	1981	1985	1989	1981	1984	1985
Contaminated Rayons						
Vetkovskiy	203	252	361	16.39	22.11	62.86
Dobrushskiy	206	203	249	5.10	5.39	119.40
Khoynikskiy	175	218	303	6.11	2.15	210.39
Checherskiy	184	171	338	6.21	9.87	98.90
Yelskiy	168	211	315	39.29	3.62	159.53

Incidence of Certain Types of Illnesses in the Population of Gomel Oblast (per 100,000 population) (Continued)						
Oblast Rayon	Malignant Tumors			Endemic Goiter		
	1981	1985	1989	1981	1984	1985
Less Contaminated Rayons						
Oktyabrskiy	178	186	230	4.61	5.05	14.63
Rechitskiy	179	180	194	11.22	17.39	22.75
Petrikovskiy	173	251	220	14.84	3.85	24.54
Svetlogorskiy	163	160	248	96.26	46.44	101.24
Zhitkovichskiy	137	198	191	—	5.54	26.52
Oblast as a Whole	184	202	246	26.48	21.13	55.86

The following is the position of my colleagues at the USSR Supreme Soviet who are working on the Chernobyl problem: All the authorized programs and those under development as well as measures within the law will be fulfilled regardless of the findings of any one group of scientists. We are grateful to all those participating in the scientific support of our actions and are taking note of the various opinions, clearly understanding that no one has a monopoly on the truth and that even very highly qualified scientists are often mistaken in their findings and of course have the right to this mistake. But people who are making decisions do not have the right to make a mistake.

PRAVDA Series Examines International Chernobyl Project Findings

91WN0581A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian Second Edition 5, 6, 8 Jul 91

[Article in three installments by Vladimir Gubarev: "Portrait of a Catastrophe: Reflections on the International Chernobyl Project"]

[5 Jul 91 p 3]

[Text] A squall of rumors, conjectures, and denials has arisen over the cities, villages, and settlements and over the many hundreds of thousands of people who were affected by the Chernobyl disaster. And once again there have appeared on the stage the prophets, unmaskers, and truthseekers who claim that only they are protecting the people while the rest, including the international community, are trying to destroy them.

Reason sleeps and so a mother does not know what awaits her child, old people do not know where they can live out their remaining years, and men lose heart out of helplessness, while women's tears, most often unseen, can no longer relieve their minds and hearts. Sorrow and pain... They alone hold sway over people, because people do not know what will happen tomorrow and it seems that nothing can bring them peace.

The Chernobyl world needs help, help rather than ringing phrases. A person must see the outlines of the future; it may be a harsh one but it must be clear. And

then strength and courage come to him, for without them he cannot overcome any misfortune. So what really helps on this path?

No, not fear, but knowledge and sober calculation. And that is precisely what the findings of the International Chernobyl Project, a project which is now under fire from many to whom "Chernobyl" is just a word, not life, provide.

But I want to caution you right away: we face a difficult path to cover the thousand pages of the report by the International Consultative Committee, and not all arguments and findings may seem convincing. Some will astonish and, moreover, involuntary protest will rise up. But we should fight our way through all these thorns, because, perhaps, for the first time a portrait of the most serious nuclear catastrophe in the history of civilization has been created.

A Matter of a Million Dollars

A press conference was held in Kiev. Its participants had just flown in from Vienna where the results of the work on the International Chernobyl Project were discussed.

One of the journalists wanted to know: "How much did this expert investigation cost?"

This is the answer that followed:

"Mention was made at the conference in Vienna that the Soviet Union spent a million dollars. The participants in the study spent the same amount of money."

So, a million dollars.

The follow-through seems extremely simple. A million divided by 200; each of the experts gets 50,000 [sic], quite a large sum even for a scientist who is known throughout the world, and the expert who has been "helped out" is ready to write any conclusion.

"The IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] has been bought by the Soviet Government."

"Hans Bliks—the Herald of the Soviet Atomic Monster."

"Atomic scientists of the whole whole have united against us."

No, these headlines are not from the West's yellow press; unfortunately, they are from our domestic press. There are dozens of similar slogans, headlines, and quotations in my journalist's file.

If only they were merely newspaper "slaps in the face"! What kind and grateful feelings Robert Gehl was met with five years ago in Kiev, which was petrified because of radiation. And when he brought his children there it shocked many people: most Kiev leaders had tried to send their children away from the city by fair means or foul. And now, 5 years later, that same Robert Gehl sees a shoe flying toward the side of the stage where he is standing. That is how effectively one of the listeners expresses his protest—do you see; the American doctor is not saying what the owner of the shoe wants to hear. Excuse us, Robert! Let that same kindness that has been living these past years remain in your heart and do not let the pain which does not let go of your heart abate; forgive us sinners. And as you do that, accept that very man who hurled the shoe, if he becomes ill, into your clinic. But God grant him good health; there are enough sick people, including those whom you are treating free of charge.

No, Robert Gehl was not the only one to know a moment of humiliation. Obviously, human nature has not completely rid itself of baseness, although people say that tragedy purifies. Not everyone. Not everyone.

Remember something else, Robert! We stood near the stage in the Cinema Center and recalled the first, incredibly difficult days of May 1986, and all around people were waiting for our talk to end. Each of them wanted to say something good about the film "Chernobyl: The Last Warning," which Muscovites had seen for the first time and in which you are the main hero. Suddenly a young fellow fought his way through this wall of people and tears were in his eyes. He embraced us and then began to laugh and then cry again. You saved his life and he regained his vision—his eyes saw the world, the real one and the one presented in the film in which even he was assigned a role—a sad, bitter but truthful one. He was a fireman, one of those who shielded the planet from the nuclear fire and who fortunately survived with your help and recovered his sight.

From the Project documents: "Members of the International Consultative Committee express their gratitude to the numerous participants in the most diverse measures carried out within the framework of the International Chernobyl Project."

The International Consultative Committee is made up of a constellation of the most prominent scientists and specialists assembled within the Project from all continents. It was headed by I. Shigematsu, the director of the radiation consequences fund of Hiroshima. M. Rozen, a representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency, became the deputy. Among the members of the Committee are L.

Ansper from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (United States), B. Bennet from the UN Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation, G. Kolpe from the International Bureau of Labor, R. Kulon from the Atomic Energy Commissariat of France, F. Fry from the National Council on Radiological Safety of England, J. Jovanovich from Manitoba University in Canada, and N. Kelly from the European Communities Commission. I am cutting off the list of such well-known names, but not at all because the others do not merit mention or have made less of a contribution to world science than their colleagues; it is simply impossible to list all the members of the committee and the experts. There are about 200 of them and each is known in the world community. But those already named not only attest to the quality of the work done but also blow to smithereens the extremely popular notion that the the expert investigation in the Chernobyl zone was done by the IAEA. That is not so. The Agency coordinated the work, but it was carried out by practically all the international organizations belonging to the UN system. And the IAEA essentially could not influence the specialists' findings; moreover, the Agency was just as interested as we were in the findings of the Consultative Committee in order to plan its work. It is completely natural that Soviet specialists were also part of the Committee; they included representatives of the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Russia, as well as the State Committee To Clean Up the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station].

There is a science fiction story called "Two on the Moon". By Ray Bradbury, I think. Anyway. Two people fly to the moon and work at a station there. They have no communication with Earth. Some time later they return. They come out of the ship and fall on their knees—they are still six times heavier here. A close-up on television shows their eyes and all the inhabitants of Earth notice that they have a special look in their eyes as if the two of them had experienced Something incomprehensible and inaccessible to us earthlings.

The same thing happened in Chernobyl. In the first days after the accident we looked into the eyes of the nuclear devil. Thousands of people did not become frightened and began to fight him, and they won. So how could they be afraid now?! "Chernobylites" are special people who know Something, and so it is impossible to frighten them and make them keep silent. No one can do it, even if all the presidents of the planet were gathered together, with all their power. They are infinitely sensitive to only one thing, the pain which lives in each one of them. And this pain helps protect the helpless, the dim-witted, the young, and the old—everyone who must deal with the atomic devil every minute. They include babies, old people, women, fox-cubs, streams and plowed fields, forests and abandoned hamlets—all that other world which against our will and desire and out of nothing but folly and irresponsibility was created after April 1986 on an enormous territory of the country. And that is not only our Big Motherland, which people customarily say now, but the Small Motherland too, because our relatives

and close friends live in a tiny hamlet not far from Mogilev. Before we often remembered the war and talked about the partisans and the punitive expeditions, but now it is always curies per square km, rems and roentgens, gamma radiation, and radioactive cesium.

We followed the work of the experts closely. And not just when they went to the contaminated zones, but also in their laboratories in Austria, England, the United States, and France. And our correspondents were always given full cooperation; for the whole sense of the International Chernobyl Project is, in fact, its glasnost, notification of the broad public, and cooperation with all interested organizations. And what is more, the Project is divided into three parts itself. The first is the technical part; it takes up about a thousand pages. In it any specialist from any country will find everything he is interested in, from methodologies to a particular experiment or study. The second part, "Evaluation of Radiological Consequences and Safety Measures," is intended for managers of various ranks and orientations, as well as for all those interested. And finally, the third part is intended for all the people in the contaminated regions. It is a brief and very intelligible analysis of the situation. In my opinion, the experts of the 25 countries did what we were supposed to try to do several years ago. At least what was within our powers.

And now, the million dollars. No, I have not forgotten about it. So, was the labor of the 200 highly skilled specialists from 25 countries worth a million dollars?

V. Gubanov, the leader of the USSR delegation in Vienna:

"The cost of the work was at least twice as high. The government allocated 1.5 million rubles to implement the program. That involved paying for the experts to live in our country as well as transportation costs—they came in on Aeroflot planes. The expenditure part of the program was appraised in Vienna, and we do not know about it. The statement was made that the participants spent 1 million dollars directly. Plus about a million was spent on equipment: the expert study was conducted with the latest scientific equipment, which would be difficult to find even in the most progressive clinics. In this way, the total cost in hard currency announced at the conference was estimated to be 2 million dollars.

"The most prominent scientists of the world came to our country during their vacations and did not demand money for it; moreover, they often paid for the equipment and for conducting the experiments themselves. On the whole they spent about 2 million dollars. Essentially they gave it to our country. And instead of thanking the scientists, some of our fellow countrymen try to accuse them of venality. And another thing: we may agree with their recommendations and findings or not, but we simply must be grateful to them. **Is that not so, Viktor Afanasyevich?**"

"Most certainly."

"Incidentally, I cannot recall anything like this in history. Has such a large-scale project existed before?"

"Opinions at the conference in Vienna on this question were unanimous: this project is unprecedented. Both in terms of the nature of the work, and in terms of the constellation of scientists who took part in it."

The opinion of Itsuzo Shigematsu (Japan):

"Within the framework of the project groups of experts used their collective experience and knowledge to separate facts from erroneous opinions and the impact of radiation from factors unrelated to radiation. A large amount of data was obtained and studied in order to understand the existing situation and draw conclusions regarding future steps which will possibly have to be taken to alleviate the consequences of the Chernobyl accident. Only time will enable us to assess the real significance of our contribution."

A 'Hot' Cloud

Experts of the International Chernobyl Project recreated the chronicle of the accident's development.

From the Project documents: "Early in the morning of Saturday, 26 April 1986, an accident which was fated to have global consequences occurred in the fourth unit of the Chernobyl AES (UkSSR). Several seconds after 0123 hours (Moscow time) two explosions one after another ruptured the roof from the building of the fourth unit. Concrete, graphite, and other debris were expelled through the hole that had been formed and the active zone of the reactor was exposed. Smoke and steam with a large quantity of radioactive material formed a 'hot' cloud which rose to a height of up to two kms and then passed over the western regions of the USSR in the direction of East and West Europe, and with much less density—over the entire Northern Hemisphere. Heavier debris and particles fell near the site of the power plant, but the light particles were carried away to the west and north of the plant where they fell in adjacent regions and the neighboring Union republics."

I want to direct your attention to the "two explosions." This fact was one of the main stumbling blocks in those first days of the accident. In my second report from the emergency station, I had written about an explosion, and the mention of it caused a sharp reaction among various leaders. For during the first week a great many people asserted that there had been no explosion at all!

And if we try to figure out why our country did not inform the world community about what had happened for several days, one of the reasons was the distorted information coming both to the government and to the Politburo. The leaders of departments and atomic specialists for a long time did not want to admit what was obvious, namely that the reactor had exploded.

From Project documents: "Many Soviet experts in the nuclear field considered an explosion of this type impossible and initially did not believe the reports of the workers who were in the fourth unit building on the destruction of the active zone. The operators continued to release water into the reactor building, trying without success to cool the active zone."

The document presented to the international community does not examine the course of events at the Chernobyl AES in detail. The experts, in my opinion, provided the right focus: they direct attention to those problems which complicated understanding of the scope of the catastrophe.

But first let us turn to the meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

From the stenographic report:

K. Masik, the first vice premier of the UkSSR Cabinet of Ministers: "The party directly to blame for the catastrophe is the Union department, not the peoples of the republics which suffered."

V. Belov, the secretary of the governing board of the RSFSR Writers' Union: "The creators of the mongrel atomic technology sat calmly during the deadly 'Chernobyl storm,' which even now, five years later, has not abated, and when it will no one knows. The real Chernobyl consequences are being concealed as carefully as possible by such people as Izrael and Guskova, Ilyin and Knizhnikov, who armed themselves with international support (IAEA shamefully supported all these atomic energy figures)."

I cited both the quotations for only one reason: they are typical of sentiments in society today.

The leader of the government of the Ukraine asserts that everything is clear—who is guilty and who is a friend, and who is an enemy.

The desire to divide responsibility—or rather irresponsibility!—into two parts and choose for oneself the one which is more suitable at a given moment; that is certainly one of the reasons for the catastrophe in Chernobyl and one of its lessons which we have just not learned in the last five years.

No, this is not a position nor the ability to manage effectively; it is only playing at politics which tomorrow may become a new catastrophe.

With all responsibility I assert that in those days of April and May 1986 the leadership of the Ukraine not only was afraid to make any decisions at all, but even promoted (involuntarily, of course) the development of the accident. And in full measure with the Union departments it bears responsibility for what occurred. And that includes what happened at the Chernobyl AES long before the catastrophe.

"None of the firemen had been taught to fight a fire given contamination with radioactive materials."

"The rescuers, firemen, and operations personnel on the whole had no idea how serious the risk of radiation was. The available dosimeter equipment there did not allow them to measure such high levels of radiation."

"There was not enough equipment and means to fight the accident. The emergency brigades did not have individual dosimeters and the surrounding area was not equipped with automatic dosimeter monitoring posts."

"The leadership of the civil defense forces pointed out possible shelters and suggested to the Ispolkom of the Pripjat City Soviet of People's Deputies that they inform the population by radio of the radiation danger, but this was done only on the Sunday right before the evacuation."

"The civil defense personnel did not put on respirators until after the evacuation, since they did not have enough even for the children. The city park of culture and recreation had been reopened only a few days before the accident, and there were a great many people there. There were no official warnings or instructions on the need to be in enclosed spaces nor was planned distribution of potassium iodide tablets organized."

It is common knowledge that before April 1986 the Chernobyl AES enjoyed the "favor" of the bosses. And distinguished guests were brought there and the republic's leaders liked to hold party and economic aktiv meetings there and found jobs for "their own people" there—it was nice to have Kiev close by; they took them to task for disruptions of the plan and wrote out reward sheets. Incidentally, this procedure was used even after the accident, nor did they forget themselves. But let it go, let the past go. All the same I do want to mention responsibility.

So, five years have passed since Chernobyl. The mistakes and errors are well known. Among them are those which the republic's government and the local organs are responsible for. But there is only one thing I fear—nothing along these lines has been done at the other nuclear power plants in the republic. And the shortcomings which the International Chernobyl Project correctly identified have not been corrected—letters which lie on my desk regularly attest to that.

I was a witness to how "those responsible for atomic energy" in the Ukrainian CP Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the Ukraine in 1986 asked to be "told in everyday language about radiation, about rods, about graphite, and about uranium." And then they spent a long time expressing gratitude for the lecture. Has nothing at all changed?!

It is for that very reason that I put the two statements by K. Masik and V. Belov at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet together. Perhaps the writer should not be blamed for being out of his field, but it was necessary to call for restraint.

Guskova is also on the list of names which resounded from this lofty podium. But we should kiss her radiation-exposed hands and kneel down to her!

I am not going to hide it: my relations with this doctor are complicated: somehow she gave it to me at the House of Scientists for the play "Sarcophagus." She spoke insultingly and not always fairly—Guskova has a stern character, that is how she was born. But she has to her credit the highest professionalism and lives saved. The lives of those very fellows who shielded humanity from the nuclear fire.

From the Project documents: "Less than an hour after the start of the accident, the first case of acute radiation sickness was noted. Clinical manifestations of radiation exposure or burns were found in 203 of the people who had been at the reactor site early in the morning of 26 April."

For the information of V. Belov and others: it was extraordinarily complicated, and perhaps even impossible, to choose precisely those who first of all should go to a specialized clinic from among the hundreds of people who had no dosimeters and no data. But Professor A. Guskova's group did its work without mistake. Moreover, the doctors did not wait for any orders or instructions "from on high"; they flew in, chose those who had suffered most seriously, and took them to Moscow. And if it were not for their ability to assume responsibility and if it were not for their highest professionalism, the lines could have been much longer. Yes, the doctors were helpless when a person received five-six fatal doses, but they returned to life some who by all laws of science should have died twice. And that is not emotionalism, nor is it resounding talk; it is a fact.

We will speak more of the role, mistakes, and omissions of the institutes and institutions which Ilyin, Knizhnikov, and Izrael head. Many pages are devoted to them in the International Chernobyl Project, but for now we should mention something else.

The accident at the Chernobyl AES occurred for many reasons. Some of them have not even been studied yet, but one thing is certain—it became a symbol of the unprofessionalism which has permeated our society in all areas. We encounter it everywhere, at all levels, when we try to analyze the prehistory of the catastrophe and its development. But in struggling with the consequences of Chernobyl, unprofessionalism is many times more dangerous—for we are speaking of the fates of thousands of people who are living today and of millions who will live in the future.

It is much more difficult to get out of a labyrinth than to enter it. We have become fairly lost in the Chernobyl labyrinth. I am certain that we will not be able to get out without professionalism. We should of course have a critical attitude toward their proposals, but we must listen and trust. It is like trusting the pilot of a plane: medical checks are certainly necessary before the flight, but once you have taken off, all hope rests on the pilot—only he can bring the machine to its destination.

From the Project documents: "The accident in Chernobyl had social consequences unprecedented in the history of industrial society. Early consequences led to the evacuation of more than 100,000 people and affected the fates of hundreds of thousands of people who were part of the emergency brigades. An enormous part of the population of the Belorussian SSR, the RSFSR, and the Ukrainian SSR continue to live under stress and with a feeling of alarm because of continuing uncertainty about the future. International cooperation in applying an increasing amount of humanitarian and scientific effort will be an important element in the measures focused on completely overcoming the consequences of the Chernobyl accident."

[6 Jul 91 p 3]

[Text]

A Third Attempt?

Gradually Chernobyl is turning into the Land Beyond the Looking Glass, a country which has its own operating laws and principles.

I remember how much work was needed to get the red pass where it was written laconically: "Passage on foot and by vehicle anywhere." Such a document was necessary for work in the "zone." It had to be presented often: when entering the 30-km zone, and then—the 10-km zone and at the power plant site, at the administration building, at the first and second units, and at the third separately, and then right next to the "sarcophagus."

That is how it was.

But today a hundred dollar bill is becoming the "pass." But what am I saying!—the "Price" has doubled, and some "services" are much more expensive.

DER SPIEGEL confirms: "Representatives of the Western media can no longer visit Chernobyl without paying 'tribute' or 'duty.' The California firm Multi-Entertainment Holdings got all rights to the sale of the photographs of Chernobyl and is charging a pretty good price for them. A helicopter trip where you can record this colossus on film costs 800 dollars."

Your reason refuses to understand what is happening.

Hundreds of dollars to visit the "zone," while at the same time thousands of Belorussian, Ukrainian, and Bryansk boys are flying to Germany, Norway, England, and Australia, where they are invited for the summer.

The owners of the "zone" hope to sell some of the radioactive waste to Western scientific research centers, while at the same time the International Chernobyl Project experts, little concerned with their health, travel along the dusty roads of the Gomel region.

The "Land Beyond the Looking Glass" of Chernobyl appears in the fact that new, mysterious, and unexplainable distortions are being imposed on the moral, psychological, and economic distortions which are inherent to

the country as a whole. I cannot understand how many dollars pain and grief are appraised at. How much do the tears of a mother and child cost?

There are legends that supposedly radiation creates monsters. They include gigantic mushrooms and cucumbers, calves with five legs, pigs without ears, freaks. These legends appeared long before Chernobyl, but their flourishing in luxuriant color certainly came after it. Nuclear monsters from science fiction, ignorance, and conjectures have taken on real outlines. They have jumped from the pages of not very conscientious newspapers and begun to wander among people who are unable to separate truth from fiction. They simply do not understand anything in radiation but are forced to live with it. Are they really to blame for that?

Ignorance has crowded out Knowledge in Chernobyl. Science has begun to be replaced by mysticism and pulp writing. Unfortunately, this process has been facilitated to a considerable degree by people who have learned titles but nothing to do with physics, radiation biology, and medicine.

It was precisely in such an atmosphere that the experts of the International Chernobyl Project began their work.

In October 1989 the USSR government appealed to the IAEA to conduct:

"... an international expert investigation of the concept formulated in the USSR of people living safely on territories which were subjected to radioactive contamination as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl AES and an evaluation of the effectiveness of measures to protect the people's health which are being conducted in these regions."

Hans Bliks and his associates faced a difficult problem: should they accept this proposal? The prestige of the IAEA was always high both among physicists and among governments. The inspections, expert studies, and monitoring of the agency are a guarantee of high quality research, and at the same time it is precisely the IAEA which is carrying out a most difficult task: monitoring the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

After the accident at Chernobyl the situation changed somewhat. Above all because of the powerful attack on the IAEA by opponents of atomic power. Moreover, even the agency itself had to review its positions—it was undeniable that before this most of the specialists could not have imagined that such a large-scale accident was possible in an atomic reactor.

The Soviet Government's proposal for an expert investigation forced the most important international organizations to unite—what is more, the nature of the catastrophe at Chernobyl demanded it.

There had already been two attempts to organize an investigation by international experts. In June 1989 a group of experts from the World Health Organization

(WHO) worked in the USSR. In early 1990 experts of the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies arrived in the catastrophe zone.

From the report of the WHO experts: "... the scientists, who did not have a great deal of experience in the field of the consequences of radiation, explained various biological and medical aberrations as the result of radiation. These aberrations cannot be attributed to radiation exposure, especially when the normal level of incidence of disease is not known, and it is most likely that they are the result of the impact of psychological factors and stress. The fact that these aberrations are explained by the impact of radiation not only helps increase the psychological pressure and provokes additional stress impact on the people's health, but also undermines faith in the competence of the specialists in radiation safety."

The experts of the League expressed a similar conclusion.

There was no need to wait long for the outburst of dissatisfaction. Certain Soviet scientists significantly promoted this too. Yes, they quite accurately made the "diagnosis" and the findings of the foreign specialists to a certain degree confirmed their data, and so the main and determining thesis became: "Radiation has no significance, radiophobia determines the state of the people's health." Oh, how we love extremes! If something is not white, it must be black. And it is difficult to really convince people that the truth lies somewhere in between, that you just have to find where that is exactly. But in the clash of emotions we began to forget about the truth.

From the stenographic record of the meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

I. Smolyar, chairman of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Problems of the Chernobyl Catastrophe: "There are certain specialists of the Ministry of Health who are simply assessing the situation incorrectly. But the actual data suggests that the incidence of disease in this zone has increased by one-third and continues to increase."

V. Yavorivskiy: "Heaven help us if something more happens. This time, forgive me, we will not find fools to go there. I am talking about people who became disabled right on the spot."

V. Doguzhiyev: "We are doing our job and deciding questions on a professional level. Emotions belong elsewhere. Comrade Yavorivskiy has no arguments. So the best argument is to shed a tear and show yourself to be a protector of the people. All of us who are working on the Chernobyl problem have done no less for the victims than Comrade Yavorivskiy. I cannot sprinkle ashes on my head and say that we are so-and-so's. Everything which depended on us we have done, and we have twice reported to the Supreme Soviet. So reproaches that someone is pinching pennies is an improper populist trick."

The leader of the Soviet program to clean up the accident at the Chernobyl AES, V. Doguzhiyev, though he has a reputation as a "man with nerves of steel," all the same is not always able to keep his feelings in check—the attacks on himself he has to endure are too massive. No, not constructive talk, but precisely bold cavalry raids. Incidentally, the IAEA is regularly mentioned in these "battles," and naturally in a negative context.

I think that the only possible solution has been found—to unite under the aegis of the Project:

the European Communities Commission (ECC);

the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO);

the International Organization of Labor (IOL);

the UN Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UN CEAR);

the World Health Organization (WHO);

and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO).

A group of 10 scientists arrived in the regions which suffered. They not only met with deputies, their own colleagues, and leaders of various ranks, but also and above all with the residents of the seven populated points in the three republics where they proposed to work.

From the Project documents: "The main subject of discussion was anxiety over the health of children and concern regarding the effectiveness of the measures proposed by the government to limit the impact of radiation over a person's lifetime. All this occurred in an atmosphere of the population's distrust both of their own competent organs and of many representatives of scientific and medical circles."

The first week after the accident went down in history as the "week of lies." Unsuccessful attempts initially to hide what had occurred in Chernobyl and then to diminish the scale of what had happened, deceive people, and not tell them the truth, thereby hoping to calm them, all lay like a dark stain not only on the country's highest leadership and the leaders of departments but also on all domestic science. Unfortunately, many scientists who had been specially clothed with power were unable to assume the blame and tried to lay the responsibility on others; in short, in this situation they behaved according to the "Me first" principle. Science was deprived of the most important thing—trust in it. And now it is extraordinarily difficult to get it back; most likely that will take many decades. This great fault of science lay like a shadow on the generations, because mankind will never forget the tragedy of Chernobyl.

"A discussion with the population" of the most complex scientific problems? It sounds unusual to our ears, does it not? I cannot recall a case where the associates of the Atomic Energy Institute or the Biophysics Institute "discussed with the population" the construction of a new

reactor or research in the region of Novaya Zemlya after a series of nuclear tests. A great deal of what we are encountering after Chernobyl is hidden here!

The practice of world science means broad discussion with the public of all problems involving nuclear power engineering. It is not without reason that there must necessarily be "information centers" at all nuclear power plants, for example in France or Japan, where anyone who wants may learn about the work of the AES, speak with specialists, or discuss particular problems. And even now such centers in France rival the Loire castles in terms of the number of tourists. And in Japan the construction of any nuclear facility begins precisely with these centers.

Fortunately, the situation in our country as well is beginning to change little by little. Scientists and specialists understand that today it is impossible to develop nuclear power if the population does not give its okay; otherwise spontaneous rallies occur, roads leading to the AES are blocked, and construction projects are frozen. Agreement between science and society is necessary. Unfortunately, we began to understand this only after the tragedy in Chernobyl.

From the Project documents: "Doing work within the 30-km forbidden zone and around the most damaged reactor was not part of the Project's task, with the exception of describing measures to localize the accident in the early stage. The Project deals only with the radiological consequences of the accident for people who lived in these regions at the moment the evaluation began in 1990. According to official data, the population of the regions which suffered was roughly 825,000 people, and of them 45 percent lived in the Belorussian SSR, 24 percent—in the RSFSR, and 31 percent—in the UkSSR."

In 13 of the country's rayons, the level of contamination with cesium-137 exceeds one curie per square km; unfortunately, we are still using the old units of measurement, the international system of units (SI) is not yet applied. 25,000 square kms have a cesium level of more than five curie per square kms, and of them—14,600 are in Belorussia, 8,100 are in the RSFSR, and 2,100 are in the Ukraine. It was precisely in these regions where the experts worked.

Recently a heated argument has developed regarding who suffered most as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl AES. The Belorussians claim that it is precisely their republic, the inhabitants of Bryansk area lament that they are forgotten, and the Ukraine insists "on its priority, since the Chernobyl AES is located on their territory." It seems to me that the principle of dividing the territory by nationality is inappropriate; it is an enormous misfortune for the entire country. And if one of the main mistakes of the past years of perestroika is analyzed, I am certain it is that right after the catastrophe we did not declare the Chernobyl tragedy a

nation-wide disaster with equal bearing on the residents of Central Asia, and the Baltic Region, and the Transcaucasus.

One of the greatest services of the International Chernobyl Project is the lack of "boundaries" in the research. Yes, the documents constantly mention all three republics, but for the experts what language was spoken by the residents among whom they worked had no significance.

Cities, settlements, and villages were chosen by agreement with the local organs. Some of the populated points were located in the "zone of strict control," while in others the level of contamination was relatively low but their residents may have gotten a high dose of radiation during the first period of the accident. At the same time "clean" regions were chosen for the international expert investigation.

Bragin and Veprin, Narodichi and Novozybkov, Gomel and Savenki, Malozhin and Khoyniki, and many others, on the one hand, and on the other—Kirovsk and Unecha, Surazh and Khodichi, Krasilovka and Chemer.

From the Project documents: "The desire of the population of the regions which suffered to obtain practical information on how they should act in the particular radiation environment was mentioned. The international experts came to the conclusion that the population of the contaminated regions has a poor idea of the basic scientific principles of radiation and its consequences (that, incidentally, is characteristic of all countries of the world), which was a reason for the many medical and social problems which exist."

Two hundred experts from 25 countries and seven international organizations made 50 trips to the USSR. Laboratories in six countries did the selection and analysis of samples. The governments and private companies of five countries offered equipment and materials, dosimeters, and computer time. All the experts and the research in the 14 laboratories of the world were presented to the International Chernobyl Project free of charge, on a voluntary basis.

Particle 'Rain'

"Five years after the nighttime explosion in the fourth unit, everything looks like war rolled through the plain located between Pripyat and the Dnepr," that is what the journalists of DER SPIEGEL write.

In May 1986 I wrote a report entitled "The Nightingales over Pripyat." There were a lot of them that lavish spring; at night they sang so clearly that the soldiers could not fall asleep. Those very soldiers who had returned from the accident unit. And I ended the report with a line from the well-known military song: "Nightingales, nightingales, leave the soldiers alone." The editor crossed out this comparison with war then, in 1986: he said making the analogy was inadmissible.

During the war one out of four people in Belorussia died.

The Chernobyl catastrophe affected one out of five.

Nowadays the nightingales do not sing over Pripyat. They have disappeared somewhere. They have been replaced by iodine-131, cesium-134 and cesium-137, strontium-90, plutonium-239, and plutonium-240, all that radioactive rain which erupted from the reactor and scattered in various directions. Moreover, there was other highly active debris of the fuel—"hot" particles which penetrated the lungs, the stomach, the eyes, as bullets used to penetrate the human body.

For 10 days the wind and the rain spread the "dirt" around Belorussia, the Ukraine, and Russia. It was chaos, because there were no patterns to the radioactive fall-out. The elements ruled. Because of the heavy rain and the particular features of certain rayons, "hot spots" formed where the potency of the dose was 5,000 times higher than the natural level.

Complete maps of contamination with cesium, strontium, and plutonium were first published in 1989. By that time iodine-131, which had "attacked" the thyroid glands of many hundreds of thousands of people, had already decayed and disappeared.

We published maps in PRAVDA three times, first in 1989.

"How close to reality are they, are there any distortions?" I asked Izrael.

"Here are the data which we have," answered the chairman of the USSR State Committee on Hydrometeorology and Monitoring of the Natural Environment.

As is common knowledge, right after Chernobyl Yu. A. Izrael was criticized bitterly: he was accused of hiding the scope of what had happened. I worked together with him and his associates: I know that the governmental commission received all the information which could be obtained in the particular stage of the work from the state committee. I know that this information was brought to the attention of the leaders of the country and the republics. It is something else again why it did not reach the rayons and cities. Or rather, why it reached those places, but lay in secret safes.

"New spots" appeared on the new maps—in 1990-1991. That is not because they were not discovered before; unfortunately, there was a certain variability in activism and, what is more, the instruments became more precise.

One of the first questions directed to the experts of the International Chernobyl Project sounded like this: "Did the official maps reflect the actual level of surface contamination?"

The experts not only analyzed the official data and became familiar with the 20 state institutions and laboratories where the samples were studied, but also conducted their own research. They used independent methods and equipment to determine the radioactivity on the surface and in the soil, the air, water, vegetation,

milk, and food products. Control measures in "clean" populated points were conducted at the same time.

The specimens were sent to six countries. And they were "anonymous"; that is, the associates of the laboratories did not know exactly where the samples came from.

It was a surprise to many experts that we have a well developed infrastructure for evaluating radioactivity. I think that is a kind of revelation for my fellow countrymen too; for we have become accustomed to the idea that there are shortages of everything in our country. But it turns out that the aerial dosimetric monitoring which began to be conducted right after the accident is now done twice a year. The central data base is enormous. It is in Obninsk. Each republic has its own data base. A very widespread network for monitoring the quality of food products exists.

No, it cannot be believed!

The experts worked for six months. Anonymous samples of soil, dry milk, and vegetation came to the laboratory in Zeibersdorf.

From the Project documents: "The results presented on the content of cesium-137 in the soil agreed well with recommended values. On the other hand, the results on strontium and plutonium showed a trend to overstate their content in the soil (by a factor of up to four). Such a trend to overstate estimates was noted when determining the content of strontium (up to a factor of 10) and cesium (up to a factor of three) in milk."

The experts conducted 2,000 measurements in Bragin, Novozybkov, Poleskiy, and Daleta. The samples were also examined for the presence of radionuclides.

Why do the data on strontium and plutonium differ so much?

Academician S. T. Belyayev comments:

"No matter how strange it may seem, there are no mistakes. On the whole the great skill of our specialists was confirmed. But the international experts did not take into account certain national characteristics. In our own measurements we oriented ourselves to the maximum indicators. For example, in a room is one thing and on the doorstep of the house is something else. But do you spend much time right on the doorstep? The experts take the average value, while we take the value at the doorstep of the house, if it is greater there. Or the ground. The school yard. Kids are always there and if there is a "hot" place there, we have reason to take it. But the experts believe that is wrong—they work with the average values."

"But all the same the variation is too great!"

"I agree. Unfortunately, the attention of many people who are not specialists has been drawn to Chernobyl. And they all are involved in measurements. In speaking of cesium, it is difficult to make a mistake with it.

Strontium and plutonium are something else altogether. They demand more skilled work on several levels. We have been working with plutonium since the very first days of the accident. The plutonium is mainly in the 30-km zone. In general, over a year's time we established precise boundaries for plutonium and strontium. And suddenly there was a report that plutonium had been found near Rovno. Wild figures were cited but we certainly knew that this could not be. We organized a joint expedition with those who passed on this information and together we found that a mistake had been made."

"Be frank. How accurate was the State Committee for Hydrometeorology? Did they inform us correctly? Did they not conceal data?"

"There were no flagrant mistakes in evaluating the territory's contamination. The international expert investigation confirmed this too."

You can agree or take issue with Spartak Timofeyevich; but all the same, in my opinion, the "variant readings" for plutonium and strontium are too great. Perhaps our scientists were guided by good intentions, but any inaccuracy in this type of catastrophe does not help create trust between specialists and society. I think that Yu. A. Izrael and his associates deserve criticism—we need precise data and it is equally dangerous to either understate or overstate the doses.

Water.

There were clear skies over Chernobyl the entire summer of 1986. It was impossible to allow rain; it could carry the radionuclides along the entire Dnepr, even to the Black Sea. And thousands of soldiers worked on the shores of rivers linked to the Dnepr to protect their shores. Clean water was one of the main concerns after the accident.

I remember on 6 May 1986 we were on a boat on the Kiev Reservoir and took samples of the water. We entered the Pripyat River and went up to Chernobyl. The bottles of water were carefully packed in boxes; the analysis was done in Kiev.

After several days I asked at the laboratory: "How is the water?" "Still within the norm," came the answer. But nonetheless they drilled wells in Kiev and an extra water line was laid from the Desna—who knew then that even on this little river danger spots would appear?!

The scientists reassured us: for now there are no problems with water. Were they wrong?

The experts of the International Chernobyl Project took samples in 16 populated points of Braginskiy, Novozybkovskiy, and Ovruchskiy rayons. Of water in wells and in the supply system for the population, in ponds, lakes, and rivers. Moreover, samples of ground sediment of lakes, ponds, rivers, and reservoirs were taken.

From the Project documents: "The concentration of cesium in the water was as a rule lower than the sensitivity thresholds of the instruments which were used. However, in samples of the sediments from regions with a comparatively high level of contamination of the soil, higher levels were found in the upper layers of sediment, which is a potential source of contamination of the biota in these regions in the future."

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[Text]

When the Milk 'Shines'

Documents are checked carefully at the control point. It makes no difference whether you are driving into the "zone" or returning to Kiev. Once, it was in the fall of 1986, we were stopped at the control point; a "stow-away," a photojournalist from the republic newspaper, had been found among the journalists. While the guard was consulting with the bosses on whether to allow us through or not, I walked along the route which rings the 30-km zone. Roughly a km from the control point I saw a large hole in the barbed wire and two old women who were going into the "zone." We talked. The grannies had gone to the neighboring village for bread, salt, and matches.

"Do you live there?" I pointed at the "zone."

"We live at home, in our own houses," one of the old women answered. "The soldiers do not allow us on the road, so we must take the path."

"Are there a lot like you?"

"Half the village."

People have lived and continue to live in many villages of the "zone." They are called "squatters," although that is nonsense—what kind of squatters are they? People in their own homes, they simply can do nothing else—in one day, in one hour, they cannot turn their fates inside out and tear themselves from their customary way of life and build a new one—this is much stronger than radiation, the fear of death, and all the rest, including the barbed wire and the threats of the militia.

No, we cannot judge the old people who have returned to their homes, nor those who left for good, rupturing the threads which bind them with the past, nor those who try to come here if just for an hour, nor the militia members who try to convince people—fortunately they no longer force them!—to leave the "zone." It would seem that it would be sufficient to give the order for evacuation and thousands of buses would take people away, and afterward you could calmly "clean up the consequences of the accident." No. "Clean up" is also the concern of those people who remained. All the same until the end we did not recognize the scale of the catastrophe which had befallen our land. And we will be learning about it for many more years, each time struck by the depth of human suffering and pain.

The wool of animals was "shining." Sometimes more than the wheels of automobiles. And it was already impossible to wash it out. At first the cows, sensing danger, fled from people and ran wild, but the months passed and instinct again drove them toward people, and happily the "squatters" appeared at this time.

Now these cows are enduring a new misfortune.

Milk is the ideal carrier of cesium-137 from the natural environment to the human organism. It was not without reason that in the first days after the accident the medical workers devoted the main attention to dairy products, trying to set up a barrier on cesium's path. It must be admitted that even in this case we demonstrated our lack of a system. I remember numerous triumphant reports by bosses of all ranks: they had managed to give the population of the regions which had suffered a full supply of "clean" products; a considerable number of reports were published in newspapers on how much dry and canned milk there was and where it went. Once Mikhail Odinets, the PRAVDA correspondent in the Ukraine, and I decided to verify these data. On the road to Chernobyl we stopped in every settlement in every village and methodically went into the rural stores and asked the clerks about "clean" milk. Of the 17 stores only one had canned milk.

I was anxious about these results as I awaited the reports of the experts of the International Chernobyl Project. For they had carefully studied the contamination of food products, in particular grain, potatoes, and vegetables.

The experiment was conducted in Braginskiy, Novozybkovskiy and Ovruchskiy rayons.

From the Project documents: "... The measured values were lower than the values recommended by authorized domestic organs and also lower than the values set by the Alimentarius Code Commission (1989) for food products which are objects of international trade."

However, the experts discovered that in certain samples the levels of "radioactive contents significantly exceeded" permissible levels. On the whole even the milk is "clean," but at the same time there is a sharp increase in activity in certain samples. What is going on?

It turned out that the private sector is "guilty." The products which are not controlled by state organizations are rather strongly contaminated.

From a conversation with V. Gubanov:

"How do you feel about these findings of the experts?"

"They gave objective data. An infrastructure was set up to analyze the samples of food products. There are about 1,200 metrology laboratories in the country. As for milk plants, combines, and state producers, output with contamination above the norm is completely ruled out here."

"Is the talk about contaminated meat being sent to Tashkent from the Chernobyl zone lies?"

"That is impossible today."

"Can the establishment of an effective monitoring service during these years be considered one of the achievements?"

"Absolutely."

"So, the private sector worries you the most?"

"Yes. If normal agriculture is to be conducted in these regions, control is needed. And, it must vary depending on the climate, rainfall, and humidity. In general, this is very complex and painstaking work which many thousands of specialists are involved in. In my opinion, the experts gave them a high evaluation and that, I will not hide it, is very gratifying."

"It turns out that the transition to the market is dangerous for the 'zone.'"

"You may joke, but there is a fragment of truth in that. Any uncontrolled activity may destroy everything that took 5 years to create. So we should be talking about a civilized market rather than a bazaar."

V. Doguzhiyev clarifies the experts' findings: "Meat with a content of radioactive cesium which exceeds the provisionally permissible levels appears only where livestock must be slaughtered before they are fully fed out. According to data for 1990, the amount of such meat does not exceed hundredths of a percent. The highest figure is in Gomel Oblast, 0.09 percent. In 1990 Belorussia as a whole received 784,000 tons of livestock (slaughter weight) from the contaminated territories, and of that 0.01 percent had contamination higher than the provisionally permissible level."

I think that the findings of the International Chernobyl Project experts, regardless of whether we like them or not, should please us in terms of the quality of the equipment and the work on food products: it is one of the main directions in cleaning up the consequences of the catastrophe.

Riddles of the Thyroid Gland

Two blows against people's health followed one after the other. At first iodine-131. It came from the radioactive cloud which rose over the reactor and then was carried over Belorussia, Lithuania, and Sweden. After several days the wind direction changed and the breath of the accident unit began to be felt in the south, including in Kiev.

We could have been protected from the blow of iodine, but, unfortunately, that was not done. Medications did not begin to be distributed until after the thyroid was "filled" with radioactive poison.

Radiation... Like Damocles' sword it hangs over people who passed through the "zone" and over those who now live in it.

Please do not say that man does not feel it! And not just those whose reddened skin swelled and who experienced that "nuclear sunburn" which is so similar to real sunburn. No, we are speaking of those who received a certain stage of "exposure" and spent many months in specialized clinics. Each of the clean-up workers, if just for a short time, felt his own helplessness, when you already feel terribly tired by noon, when cold sweat flows even when the work is not difficult but ordinary, and when you have only one desire—to lie down.

Not until five years after the accident did the Law on Social Protection of Chernobyl Inhabitants appear, and there is a great deal that science still cannot explain to all of us: how are we supposed to go on living?

The experts did not have the opportunity to study the condition of the health of the clean-up workers and because of limited capabilities they could not provide an entire panorama of the radiation exposure of the population.

The experts tried to answer three questions:

1. How accurate were the official evaluations of radiation exposure?
2. What was the level of exposure of the population in the first days after the accident?
3. What are the present and future levels of radiation exposure of the people who remain in these regions?

And once again the experts approached the problems rationally. Why duplicate the work of Soviet specialists? What is more, it is impossible in such a short time to obtain, process, and analyze the gigantic volume of information which has been accumulated in 5 years. It is sensible to determine whether this information can be believed.

Soviet research centers were opened to the experts. They visited 20 institutes and departments in the three republics where all the data of the doses received by the population were gathered.

However, the principle "trust, but verify" operated in the International Chernobyl Project at all stages and directions of the work. So the experts chose certain groups of the population which were typical of the regions which had suffered and using their own methodologies and their own data bank created in the summer of 1990 measured external exposure for 8,000 inhabitants and internal exposure for 9,000. The results of the measurements were confirmed in laboratories of France and England.

The French Central Office of Protection from Ionizing Radiation offered the experts 8,000 individual film badges [for detecting radiation]. They were distributed. Unfortunately, the children had already gone on vacation and so a "gap" appeared in the study. The research plan was not fulfilled precisely because the experts had planned to cover all age groups.

The dosimeters had to be carried in one's pocket all the time and kept near one's bed at night.

From the Project documents: "Ninety percent of the results were lower than the detection threshold. High dose values were registered in people who live in the regions with strong surface contamination or have worked in the open fields or the woods for a long time."

Nothing was found in nine out of 10 people. Is it possible that the results were understated? The purity of any scientific experiment depends on conducting careful monitoring. And the laboratory in France received the dosimeters anonymously, those which belonged to the experts themselves as well as those which were not used. It was impossible to distinguish those and others in the laboratories of France; the secret of the dosimeters was carefully kept.

This fact once again reminds us of how important it is to set up mass production of individual dosimeters. All a person needs to know is exactly how many "roentgens he has picked up," and that either reassures him or makes him think about whether he is following the recommended methods of work and whether it is worth going into the forest so often; or should the question of protecting the equipment on which he works in the fields be raised more pointedly?

In mid-1990 the Project experts conducted dosimeter control of internal exposure. In all about 9,000 people were studied. A mobile laboratory equipped with four measuring devices for the whole body was used. This laboratory visited seven rayons.

What a pity that there is no similar equipment in our country. There are cumbersome stationary units at nuclear enterprises, but certainly thousands of residents cannot be brought there.

Everyone knows that the French gave us mobile laboratories and a few more were bought for hard currency—all that is useful and necessary, but it is offensive that our country, where the first nuclear power plant in the world was put on line does not itself produce such mobile laboratories.

From Project documents: "The group's main task upon arriving at a particular place was to measure the content of cesium in the organisms of local residents. More than 9,000 residents in the Belorussian SSR, the RSFSR, and the Ukrainian SSR were monitored using portable human radiation meters. The estimates of the doses received were one-eighth to one-thirtieth the estimates of the models of transfer in the environment. The estimates of dose levels obtained independently within the Project's framework were compared with official data for the population in the selected populated points presented by the Institute of Biophysics in Moscow. The values obtained within the Project's framework were lower than the officially submitted estimates of dose levels. On the whole the levels agree within the limits of a coefficient of 2-3."

To put it simply, the Institute of Biophysics overstated the estimated doses by a factor of two-three! Truly Academician Ilyin (the director of the Institute of Biophysics himself) ended up in an extremely difficult position. On the one hand, he is sharply criticized—do you recall the speech by the writer Belov at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet?—for hiding data: this opinion is very widespread in the republics. But on the other, the scientists of the International Chernobyl Project reproach that same Ilyin for overstating the doses!

But the truth is that, as true conservatives, the biophysicists provided the higher values rather than the average values—and disseminated them throughout the territory which had been attacked by radiation.

Incidentally, a psychological feature of certain subjects was very unique. They were extremely dissatisfied that little cesium (!) appeared in their organisms. Yes, that is exactly what happened: a person protests because he is certain there is more cesium-137 in him.

Low sophistication and ignorance on questions of medical radiology also affected the level of local doctors who relate almost every illness to the dose received by the sick person. Anything at all can be attributed precisely to the effect of cesium, even the lack of professionalism. The experts, among other things, very gently advised local scientists and specialists to participate more actively in international programs, seminars, and symposiums so that they can obtain the necessary know-how. Is it as if some of the local scientists refuse trips to Vienna or London? Well, unfortunately, most often it is not those who work in the "zone" and around it who are sent to such events, but altogether different people. And when we draw conclusions from the recommendations of the International Chernobyl Project, we must pay attention not only to "mistakes of two-three times" but to other advice of the experts as well, and that includes on the participation of our specialists in various types of international meetings.

While the Project experts' work was underway, a number of symposiums and talks with local specialists were held, and the experts recruited them to their own work. This type of contacts is exceptionally useful. Now the next step should be taken and the entire document of the International Chernobyl Project, including its "technical part," published. For it scrupulously describes each experiment in great detail, conducts an analysis of every figure, and carefully analyzes its own mistakes. In general this document is a unique kind of manual for specialists, and it contains all the knowledge which the world community of scientists has accumulated to the present day. It would be a pity if we did not have enough paper to publish these unique materials.

Health Effects

The greatest outlays and the greatest efforts of experts were focused on evaluating people's health and finding out what aftereffects could be expected in the future.

Their findings disagree with those stereotypes which have become established in our society. There is no doubt that when published they will cause a protest. There are various reasons: for five long years many scientists and politicians, residents and functionaries, specialists and demagogues have asserted the "dying out of the population," the "outbreak of cancer illnesses," "the catastrophic situation for children," and the like. Emotions have overflowed and consequently, the victims could not count on real help. Rallies were held when medicines were needed. Political passions heated up when effective medical aid was needed. The truth was replaced with slogans.

I will say right off: some of the experts' findings are questionable, it is difficult to agree with others, and some need to be carefully verified. And what is more, the scientists involved in the International Chernobyl Project themselves admit this honestly: "Any study of consequences for health begun 4 years after the accident must have certain shortcomings and limitations, and this study is no exception."

And here is one more point. The experts worked only in small and medium-sized villages and cities—it is there that the people subjected to the strongest radiation impact live. The research did not deal with the "clean-up workers"—other methodologies and new projects are needed for that work.

The populated points had from 3,000 to 15,000 residents. Groups of residents were chosen in them dependent upon year of birth, and 20 people were examined in each. In all there were 1,356 patients.

Similar work went on in the control settlements and cities.

From the Project documents: "Independent medical research in the survey and control populated points did not identify deviations in the health of residents which can be directly tied to radiation, but they indicated the existence of other deviations in the health of the adult population. The results obtained confirm that 10-15 percent of the adult population should see a doctor for medical care."

One out of 10 people does not suspect that he is seriously ill! But where is our universal preventive dispensary system?! Once again, it exists only on paper.

I ask you to keep in mind that 10-15 percent of the population is ill not in the contaminated regions but in the "clean," control regions.

From the Project documents: "The results of analytical research obtained within the Project for samples of food products, fabrics, and the environment do not support the public's concern that toxic elements used at the Chernobyl AES site soon after the accident may possibly have been scattered into the environment. Cadmium, mercury, and lead ingested from food by the residents studied by the experts were low as compared with the populations of Italy, the Sudan, and the United States."

And once again our health workers were put in a difficult position: Alarming reports have been coming from various cities of the country in recent years concerning new diseases which have appeared among children. In particular, hair falling out. And then reports have appeared that all this is related to Chernobyl. It is much simpler that way, because it is better to accuse a stranger rather than try to deal with "your own"; after all, our own enterprises whose purification structures do a poor job discharge an enormous quantity of heavy metals into the atmosphere and rivers. And what is more, the task of medical workers is simplified—it is sufficient to mention "Chernobyl" and the sources of environmental contamination no longer need to be checked carefully.

From the Project documents: "Inasmuch as the thyroid gland is a critical organ from the standpoint of impact of radioactive iodine, the main attention in the international evaluation was devoted to possible pathological changes in the thyroid gland. The data on the size of the thyroid gland and the existence of nodules in it were similar to data for other countries. Independent research using methods of radioimmunological analysis did not show violations of the functional condition of the thyroid gland in children 2-10 years of age or statistically significant differences in the functional condition of the thyroid gland in children of the contaminated and control populated points studied."

Eight hundred children were studied. The control group was in the United States. The rate of growth is the same there as in our country.

But what about the attack of radioactive iodine? Did it really pass by without a trace for the residents of the regions which suffered? No, the experts do not say that. On the contrary, they assert that careful monitoring of the condition of the thyroid gland is needed in children, and this requires special equipment which can be used to detect the appearance of nodules. But for now there is no "mass illness" of the thyroid gland, and to assert otherwise means traumatizing fathers and mothers for no reason.

And what about those numerous reports of leukemia and cancer? The experts gave the definite opinion that information on the increase in these diseases is not confirmed. Unfortunately, the number of these serious illnesses is increasing throughout the country. Is there a "Chernobyl addition" in this process? In the future it may be impossible to determine this, since it is very insignificant, to such a degree that it is impossible to use modern medical means to identify it.

From the Project documents: "The data we had did not confirm any substantial increase in the number of cases of leukemia or tumors of the thyroid gland; however, because of the system of classification being used and other factors the possibility of an increase in the frequency of appearance of these tumors cannot be ruled out. The only information on these tumors is in the form of rumors."

"No evidence of the appearance of cataracts as a result of radiation has been found among the population as a whole.

"A survey of Soviet data on populated points in the corresponding contaminated regions as well as in the republics as a whole showed relatively high levels of child and peritoneal mortality rates. These levels were found before the accident as well and are on the decline. No statistically significant evidence of an increase in anomalies of the fetus as a result of radiation was found."

"The food ration is not very varied, but adequate. Excess (according to international norms) weight (body mass) of the adult population was as a rule noted in all the regions studied.

"The Chernobyl accident generated a multitude of serious psychological problems involving an increased sense of alarm and stress. The overwhelming majority of adults examined both in the contaminated and the control populated points studied which the group of experts visited either believed that they had become ill as a result of radiation or had suspicions on that account."

It makes no difference to the mother of a child ill with leukemia whether he became ill from radiation or from chemicals. She just needs for her child to get well.

But knowing the sources is extremely important to a medical worker; otherwise, he will be unable to choose the correct treatment strategy.

Unfortunately, the psychological background which has become established in the afflicted regions does not promote effective work by doctors. To a certain degree they are dismayed that the recommendations of the scientists are sometimes diametrically opposed. But if academicians and professors cannot come to a uniform opinion, what can you say about the district doctor?

At times the scientists' theoretical models (essentially right ones!) do irreparable damage precisely because they do not take sufficient account of the psychological climate which has been created around Chernobyl.

Chernobyl means constant stress for hundreds of thousands of people. And for that reason it is not without reason there were not only specialists in radiation effects, pediatricians, hematologists, and specialists in thyroid gland diseases, ultrasound research, and internal diseases but also an expert on psychological and metal disorders. His findings are not only critical but also harsh. There are too many rumors and conjectures and too much speculation concerning people's health; they do substantially more harm than the radiation effects.

Let me give just one example. We call the children from the afflicted regions "children of Chernobyl." Yes, our purposes are noble ones—to help little boys and girls and to make them healthy; it is certainly they who are suffering most of all here. But the ringing phrase "the children of Chernobyl" has a negative tone. Both for children and at times for those around them. Why hide it, the children from the "zone" are seen as lepers.

The general conclusion of the experts of the International Chernobyl Project on the population's state of health sounds like a verdict on Soviet health care in general.

It is not without reason that the experts recommend first improving medical care using modern equipment, paying particular attention to hypertension among adults and hygiene of the cavities of the mouth, as well as to creating concrete programs for observing children who have had a high dose of radiation of the thyroid gland.

The experts tried to avoid dealing with the political problems facing our society in their evaluations. They invariably emphasized that they were interested in strictly scientific problems. But they immediately noticed that the scale of the Chernobyl accident had never been considered by the international community and no long-term safety measures for such a type of catastrophe had been envisioned.

Experience will not be found in the past, so the concept of the "maximum lifetime dose—35 rems" caused a furor of reaction among the population.

From the Project documents: "The changing socioeconomic situation in the USSR had an exceptionally serious impact on the decisions made regarding safety measures. It was these socioeconomic factors which so predominated in society that they almost supplanted the more concrete aspects of the principles of radiation protection."

Actions to localize the accident and protect the population were for the most part supported by the experts of the International Chernobyl Project. They noted that the government did everything possible to preserve the people's health.

In their report the experts assert that "the safety measures adopted or planned for the long-term, though they were certainly based on good intentions, on the whole go beyond the bounds of what was strictly necessary from the standpoint of providing radiation protection." Resettlement is just one more blow for people, and world experience shows that this type of measure reduces the life span by 10 years. The experts are confident that the risk from resettlement is substantially higher than the risk from 35 rems in a lifetime.

From the Project documents: "The effectiveness of using the resources allocated for measures to alleviate the consequences of the accident and of using the resources allocated for other programs to improve the health care system should be compared."

* * *

The debate over the findings of the experts of the International Chernobyl Project began as soon as the documents were published. Even at the conference in Vienna where they appeared, some Soviet scientists questioned a number of the Project's recommendations. It is difficult to argue with the experts not only because they are specialists of the highest category, but also because the research was done with such painstaking care—each experiment may be repeated and analyzed and attempts may be made to refute them. It is also

possible to end up in an awkward position. For example, when the medical specialists from the Ukraine tried to prove that statistics confirm a higher incidence of illness in the afflicted zones, the international experts demonstrated very convincingly right there that the quality of statistical research in the USSR not only does not meet world standards but does not reflect reality.

Incidentally, we have now changed to the international system of medical statistics. In my opinion, the State Committee To Clean Up the Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident took the criticism correctly.

Today the chasm between Knowledge and Ignorance is unfortunately expanding. That is one of the reasons that we are undergoing an age of catastrophes. Will we manage to build bridges across this chasm? If not, we will deprive our children of the future.

Ukraine's Minister for Chernobyl Aftermath Protests Findings of Experts 'Independent of IAEA'

91WN0578A Moscow TRUD in Russian 3 Jul 91 p 2

[Comments by Georgiy Aleksandrovich Gotovchits, Ukrainian SSR (UkSSR) minister of population protection from the Chernobyl accident's consequences, concerning conclusions of an international scientific conference in Vienna on the Chernobyl accident's consequences under the rubric: "Chernobyl: Echo of the Tragedy": "Who Needs False Optimism?"]

[Text] Reports from the recently ended international conference in Vienna, which examined the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power plant], has produced widespread repercussions in world public opinion. The expert commission's conclusion that the consequences are not so terrible, and that the resettlement of hundreds of thousands of people from the contaminated areas is obvious overcaution has puzzled many people.

Georgiy Aleksandrovich Gotovchits, chairman of the UkSSR [Ukrainian SSR] State Committee for Population Protection from the [Chernobyl] Accident's Consequences, was among the conference participants. The state committee was changed into a ministry with similar name literally on the eve of this report's publication. Indeed, G. Gotovchits protested the conclusion of the experts "independent of the MAGATE [International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)]." What caused this? We asked the minister to comment on the conference's conclusions.

[Gotovchits] Scientists from 38 countries took part in the rather representative conference. It was a special summarization of the prolonged work of hundreds of foreign experts in studying the radiological and medical situation that has developed in a number of areas in Russia [the Russian Republic (RSFSR)], the Ukraine, and Belorussia. The help was both necessary and—it goes without saying—professional. This independent expert examination was carried out at the request of N.

Ryzhkov's government. Let me note at the same time: The assignment was not coordinated with any of our, i.e., the republic's, agencies. Apparently this was considered unnecessary.

It is no accident that there are several obvious "blank spots" in the report. For example, the experts entirely omitted the problem of the group of people that has suffered the most—the more than 600,000 "liquidators" [not further identified] and the 116,000 residents from the 30-km zone, who were removed from the zone's confines in the first days after the catastrophe. The problem of the population that is living, even to this day, in areas with contamination above 15 curies per square km, which is a very pressing one for Belorussia and the Bryansk area, was also omitted from the international project.

We do not wish to cast aspersions on the foreign scientists in any way—they did that which they were asked to do and for which they were paid over a million dollars by our government alone, so it is said, in a highly professional and honest manner. The whole trouble, it seems, is that evaluating the health of the vast group of people which the Chernobyl tragedy touched was not called for by N. Ryzhkov's assignment. We do not rule out that this was done intentionally in order to downgrade the severity of the accident's consequences and calm world public opinion. In the expert's report, let me repeat, both the "liquidators" and the people resettled from Prip'yat and Chernobyl'skiy, Poles'skiy, and the other Rayons which received the first radiation blast were omitted from attention.

In the summarizing document, it is noted that the reports of consequences harmful to health "have not been confirmed by either local research or research within the present project's framework." But is this really so? After all, conclusive data of Ukrainian and Belorussian scientists and physicians attest to a clearly indicated depression of the immune system, an increase in hemoblastoses, a rise in the number of sexual disorders, and dysfunctions of the auditory and vestibular apparatus. Qualitative and quantitative blood changes and progressive leukocytosis have been discovered. An increase in women's gynecological complaints and diseases of the respiratory organs is certain. Data on an increase in cancer of the thyroid gland, especially among children, compel anxious attention.

Indeed, over 8,000 children received significant radionuclide shock to the thyroid gland, exceeding permissible norms by tens and even hundreds of times, in the Ukraine alone. Where is the guarantee that misfortune will not befall many of these in a year or two, especially inasmuch as the "classic period" for appearance of the sorts of diseases due to radiation has not yet passed?

That is why the drawing of such optimistic conclusions is, in our opinion, an inappropriate act. It must be taken into account, in this regard, that the international

experts' work was mainly conducted in just seven villages of the three republics. Is it right to extend conclusions about the radiation's effect on the health of a small group to vast areas and large populations in the presence, by the way, of the radioactive contamination's pronounced unevenness over the areas, which differ markedly in their isotopic mixes?

In the first six days, the emission of radionuclides from the damaged reactor of the ChAES [Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant] totaled from 10 to 15 million curies! This, of course, was a most powerful iodine attack on the thyroid glands of hundreds of thousands of people. In the opinion of V. Tokarevskiy, a doctor of physico-mathematical sciences and the head of the UkSSR Academy of Sciences Nuclear Research Institute's Atomic Energy Department, the iodine shock received by Kievans during the 1986 May Day Parade exceeded the permissible norm by 20,000 times! That is, an adult individual who was in that cloud received two annual norms to the thyroid gland—about 3 rem—during one hour. That is why the international experts' prediction of the accident's possible consequences and substantive evaluation of our concept of the permissibility of rural and rayon center [raytsentr] residents subjected to the contamination's continued residence and the necessity of their resettlement were very important. Unfortunately, however, there are no such prediction and evaluations in the findings.

We, let me speak frankly, expected this. Would the IAEA, the organizer of the conference in Vienna, with whose cooperation the international Chernobyl project is being carried out, really permit the shadow of doubt to be cast on its authority and on its practical recommendations made in the first weeks after the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant's fourth unit?

For that reason, the international consultative committee neither studied nor evaluated the situation in the 30-km zone surrounding the plant, where, in a 25-square-km area on the Pripyat River's left-bank floodplain, there lies a 12,000-curie strontium patch that may be washed into the Dnieper River by floods or heavy rains.... And is the content of the 639 hastily prepared underground disposal sites really not cause for serious concern when the strontium is already changing into a soluble phase and, along with heavy rains and melting snow, getting into the ground and into underground water sources....

However, we cannot criticize the foreign scientists even for these oversights, inasmuch as the 30-km zone, with its set of tremendous, most difficult, and costly problems...also was not included in the assignment; not, of course, without the support of the leading scientific institution for the population's radiation safety—the AN SSSR [USSR Academy of Sciences] Institute of Biophysics—with its director, Academician L. Ilin, as the leader.

In short, the international Chernobyl project's findings cannot be considered conclusive. I and our Ukrainian

Delegation fully espouse the evaluation given by Anatoliy Karpov, leader of the international nongovernmental humanitarian organization "Chernobyl Aid," in a press conference at the UN Headquarters in New York.

"As it seems to me," he said, "there exist two cliques in the USSR Government. One comes out for providing complete information, and the other—for providing partial information—inasmuch as it considers atomic power's development extremely important from the economic standpoint. Unfortunately, I must note that the Ministry of Atomic Power, which is absolutely disinterested in the recognition of its mistakes and real situation, was the international experts' constant partner during the study of the Chernobyl catastrophe's consequences."

Such false optimism about "the exaggerated danger" was needed precisely by that agency and a number of USSR AMN [Academy of Medical Sciences] scientists, who gave the assignment to the international experts through the country's government.

Well, just one thing worries me in this regard—Will we not reap what we have sown: I hope these varnished and biased findings of the foreign experts will not affect the amounts of international aid. After all, we shall be unable to cope with the Chernobyl tragedy's consequences by ourselves, even within the framework of the future union of sovereign states.

Program of Health, Compensation Measures for Residents of Chernobyl-Affected Areas

91WN0535A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 18 Jun 91 p 3

[“CONCEPT of Residence of the Population in Regions Suffering the Effects of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES (approved by Resolution of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers No 164, 8 April 1991)”]

[Text]

General Provisions

1. The Concept of Residence of the Population in Regions Suffering the Effects of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station] was developed in accordance with the USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution of 25 April 1990: “On a Unified Program To Eliminate the Aftereffects of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES and Its Related Situation” and USSR Council of Ministers Resolution No. 645 of 30 June 1990.

2. The aim of this Concept is the formulation of principles and criteria providing the basis for practical measures directed toward maximum reduction of possible negative consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES, population health measures, and compensation for damages.

3. The following were taken into account in drawing up the Concept of Residence of the Population in Regions Suffering the Effects of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES:

all protective measures previously accomplished, including resettlement of people out of regions suffering the effects of the accident;

available data on the radiation environment and radiation dosages of the population;

the state of health of the population and the sociopsychological environment in contaminated regions;

modern concepts of world science on the medical and biological effects of ionizing radiation;

principles of radiation protection and intervention-level recommendations in post-accident situations, including the recommendations of international organizations;¹

the state of agricultural production, the true extent of radioactive contamination of products (especially milk); prospects for reducing contamination and their effectiveness;

experience gained in the conduct of protective measures and data on their effectiveness (the Chernobyl accident and others), and possible undesirable consequences of mass resettlement;

the presence of other, non-radiation related factors influencing the health of the population;

specific protective measures which enabled significant reductions in radiation dosage of the population to take place over 1986-1990,² as well as the fact that during initial weeks following the accident, certain measures were not conducted in timely fashion or to the full extent. As a result, incomplete data show that tens of thousands of people received thyroid gland radiation higher than 0.3 Sv [Sievert].

4. In addition to placing emphasis on the radiation factor, this Concept also stresses the sociopsychological factor (stress, people's state of fear, or heightened excitement) characteristic of all extreme situations, but intensified in this instance by incomplete, and sometimes distorted information presented to the population regarding the true situation, the inadequacy of decisions made in applying protective measures and (or) their untimely implementation.

It is stressed that the accomplishment of measures aimed at decreasing accumulated dosage should at the same time be directed toward reducing sociopsychological tension and stress in the population.

Main Principles and Criteria of the Concept

5. A person residing in territory contaminated by radionuclides, or who has resided there at least the established minimum period of time, has the right to award for damages according to procedure established by law in

the form of benefits, compensations, and guarantees, in the social security and medical care systems.

6. The main index used in making decisions on the necessity for taking protective measures, their nature and scope, and for awarding damages is the radiation dosage caused by radioactivity due to the accident at the Chernobyl AES.

7. Emphasis is placed on the need to complete mandatory resettlement out of population centers (which listing is approved taking into account the established intervention level and socioeconomic conditions), and to conclude the urgent measures stipulated in the state Union and republic program for 1990-1992 on eliminating the aftereffects of the accident at the Chernobyl AES.

Implementation of the stated program and the conduct of efforts to lower dosages accumulated by the population and their predicted levels, when taken along with consideration of criteria recommended by international organizations, will make it possible to avoid a mandatory mass resettlement in the future.

8. It is considered that additionally exceeding (above the natural and anthropogenic background radiation level for a given locality) the amount of radiation to the population from accidental radioactive decay as a result of the Chernobyl accident, yielding an average annual effective equivalent radiation dosage for 1991 and the subsequent period which does not exceed 1 mSv [milli-Sievert] (0.1 rem), is entirely permissible and does not require any intervention whatsoever.

For an additional radiation dosage level of 1 mSv (0.1 rem) per year and lower, conditions of residence and labor activity for the population do not require any restriction whatsoever. General medical and hygiene measures adopted for the USSR are applied in this territory.

9. Protective measures (countermeasures) must be taken when there exists an additional radiation dosage level of 1 mSv (0.1 rem) per year (above the natural and anthropogenic background level). These measures include:

the conduct, when necessary, of radiation monitoring of the environment and food products;

measures aimed at reducing the content of radionuclides in the air, soil, and water;

measures aimed at reducing the content of radionuclides in agricultural production;

reduction of accumulated dosages from the effects of radon entering premises from the environment, through the use of radiation diagnostics.

The package of protective measures must be aimed at effecting a permanent reduction of the accumulated radiation (including through the lowering of food-product contamination) while simultaneously relaxing restrictions which infringe upon people's accustomed

way of life. Optimization of protective measures should be pursued under consideration of the condition that the average effective equivalent radiation dosage for 1991 not exceed 5 mSv (0.5 rem), with maximum possible annual reduction of this limit warranted by economic and social factors of up to 1 mSv (0.1 rem).

To encourage and monitor the conduct of protective measures, republic organs must establish annually for each population center (or group of population centers) differentiated radiation dosage monitoring levels, taking into account the level reached and the possibility of further reducing it.

It is necessary to develop a unified methodology for determining the dosage intervention levels from 1 mSv (0.1 rem) to 5 mSv (0.5 rem), and effect mandatory application of this methodology.

10. Protective measures, in addition to radiation protection, must include:

improved medical and hygienic services for the population, including special medical observation of high-risk groups, treatment at medical and health resorts, and health improvement;

provision of full-value nourishment;

measures for reducing sociopsychological tension and disadaptation (psychological consultation, regular dissemination of scientifically trustworthy information, organization of free economic zones, and other measures);

socioeconomic measures (compensation, benefits, guarantees).

The significance of each factor and its relative weight should be evaluated based on the principle of optimization to achieve maximum effect in protecting the health of the population dependent on funds invested.

11. We should proceed from the fact that an individual residing in territory contaminated with radionuclides has the right, based on objective information provided to him on the radiation environment, radiation dosages, and possible health consequences, to make an independent decision on continued residence in the given territory or resettlement to another place of residence. No decision made should yield direct economic advantages.

Conditions of resettlement (including priority and amount of compensation) may depend on accumulated dosage and the influence of ecological, social, and other factors. The development and implementation of appropriate plans are accomplished by Union and republic organs.

Here it is necessary to take into account the fact that the sociopsychological consequences of resettlement may have a greater negative influence on people's state of health than the radiation factor in and of itself.

12. The effects of the Chernobyl accident on people's health and related protective measures must be examined in a package with other natural and anthropogenic risk factors (chemical contamination of man's habitat, endemic characteristics and particular bio- and geochemical features of regions, other factors).

13. For the population receiving significant radiation dosages as a result of the Chernobyl accident, a set of measures must be introduced for special permanent medical observation of the state of health, health restoration, and prevention of illnesses. Special attention is required for the following high-risk groups:

children who have received thyroid gland irradiation above 0.3 Sv (30 rad);

certain population groups, especially those who participated in eliminating the aftereffects of the Chernobyl accident (including military servicemen) who received external and internal irradiation in excess of the established limit for accidents.

14. A functioning state register of persons subject to effects of radiation as a result of the Chernobyl accident will be maintained at all levels—from rayon to Union. There will be increased supervision of the objectivity of initial data entered in this register on the state of health and incidence of sickness of the population.

15. Measures for protecting the rights and health of citizens who are in the zone of influence of unfavorable factors arising as a result of the Chernobyl accident and citizens who participated in eliminating its aftereffects must have comprehensive legal guarantees. To this end, the development and adoption of supplementary appropriate legislative acts and other normative acts are necessary.

16. Large-scale fundamental and applied research must be continued in radiation medicine, radiation genetics, radiobiology, radioecology, and agricultural radiology, as well as in socioeconomic and psychological factors related to problems of the influence of the Chernobyl accident on the health of the population.

Footnotes

1. The Atomic Energy Agency of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development developed recommendations in 1990 on intervention levels in the event of nuclear accident. For the intervention level in excess of which evacuation (or resettlement) is required, the following irradiation dosage amounts are proposed: 0.5 Sv (50 rem)—whole-body irradiation, and 0.3-0.5 Sv (30-50 rem)—effective dose for short term (days-weeks) and long-term (months-year) irradiation, respectively. The value proposed for the level of non-intervention is 0.1-1.0 mSv (0.01-0.1 rem) for the first year following the accident.

2. In 1989 in the Strict Control Zone (where cesium-137 radiation contamination density was 15 curies per

square kilometer and higher), average internal irradiation dosages (according to measurements from individual emissions counters) equalled 0.3-0.6 mSv (0.03-0.06 rem), which amounts on the average to 15-30 percent of the external irradiation dosage.

Effects of 1964 Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Investigated

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Union Edition p 3

[Article by IZVESTIYA Correspondent S. Yeremeyev, Ust-Kamenogorsk: "Chagan Is Not Chernobyl but This Does Not Make It Any Easier for the Person Who Eliminated the Aftereffects of the Surface Nuclear Detonation at the Semipalatinsk Test Range and Survived"]

[Text] They brought a bulky folder containing two years' worth of practically fruitless correspondence to the Izvestiya correspondents office. Because, as a rule, non-committal answers by which no one was bound or even frank referrals to other people followed in response to their pain and hope. And then even simply silence that falls under the definition of "deathly": they waste away, become disabled, and die. Ahead of time. Less than 30 people remain alive of the 300 who worked at the "Atomic Lake" during the winter of 1964-1965.

So, this is one more of Semipalatinsk Test Range's half-revealed secrets—which according to the account how many are ahead? In December 1964—some publications mistakenly name 1965—a nuclear explosion was conducted in the channel of the shallow Chagan River which formed a gigantic bomb crater: according to the information of the people who eliminated the aftereffects, nearly 3.5 million cubic meters of dirt and ash were ejected from the epicenter. Radioactive dust covered an enormous territory: villages, vegetable farms, and fields. Black ash instead of snow lay in an eight km radius....

I quote a collective letter to the IZVESTIYA editorial staff: "Residents were evacuated during the explosion but they were returned to their homes after the explosion as if nothing had happened. USSR Ministry of Public Health Third Department doctors continued to study the effect of radiation on the local population. Conditions were as follows: it was impossible to wear even shoes alone for a long time, they required painstaking decontamination which, however, no one conducted. But in order to prevent the flood from washing the dust, filth, and the dirt that had spewed forth across the valley into the Irtysh, the leading circles hastily made a secret decision: To break through the wall of the bomb crater with a channel, dam the river channel with a dike, and flood the lethal valley. Ust-Kamenogorsk residents, "Enterprise Post Office Box 16," hereinafter referred to as "Irtysh Construction Administration [IUS]," were tasked with the urgent work.

Vladimir Vasilyevich Zhiron tells the story—now he is chief of the Irtysh Construction Administration production-dispatch department but, at that time, he was the master of the post office box.

"I was 23 years old but neither I, nor those who were older or younger, thought that that bitterly cold winter's production task would turn out to be fatal for us. We had been raised that way: the Party ordered and the Komsomol responded: "Yes, sir!" Once they direct you, you need to go. Indeed, I asked the leader: what will I do about my night classes? The leader answered: 'Nothing, you will catch up, you are still young....'"

They rapidly collected the equipment and knocked together huts for temporary living. In January, they headed out from Ust-Kamenogorsk to Semipalatinsk and from there to the site of the explosion. The people who were eliminating the aftereffects of the explosion located the wooden village about five kms from the epicenter. There were small bourgeois iron heaters in the huts but the 40-degree frosts took their toll. The frosts diverted us from the numbing horror that had somehow seized everyone without exception:

"The explosion site was a monster, it was the wrath of God," continued V. Zhiron. "I went there and the blood rushed from my nose. I pulled the ski mask from my face, my clothing was soaked in blood, I exhaled, and I went on: I had to!"

"All of us were like that," Viktor Yefimovich Bogomolov, both then and now a geodesist joined in the conversation. "The proper and knowledgeable military topographers, of whom hardly anyone remains alive, warned: 'Peasants, you can excuse us for your health but the Homeland will not forget you.' These same military personnel, without any particular second thoughts, rejected the official report on the nature of the 'nuclear explosion-experiment for peaceful purposes.' An international moratorium on surface bursts was in force and this was planned to be an underground burst. But they had obviously changed their minds or the nuclear "stuffing" had not produced the desired results. This is a supposition, we do not have any documents."

How do I say... The very people who were eliminating the aftereffects brought a copy of the geological map to the correspondents office where it listed in black and white: "The bomb crater formed as a result of a nuclear surface burst t. 'Ch' (Chagan River, Semipalatinsk Oblast)." I stress: **The explosion occurred like a surface burst.**

But those people who remain alive are not at all interested in those fine points of grand policy or, I suggest, the small tricks of the military-industrial complex. After fulfilling the assigned task, people actually lost their health but they turned out to be not needed by the Homeland or, more precisely, by the department. Former Minister Yefim Slavskiy has died. "Post Office Box 16" became IUS, the tightly restricted Ministry of Medium Machine Building was transformed into the semirestricted Ministry of the

Atomic Energy Industry, and the work at Chagan remained a secret story. Healthy Vladimir Zhirov, who has fine heredity and whose parents are over 80 and still alive, was the first to begin to be bothered by the injustice after his last hospital stay where it took them several hours to stop his nose bleed. He turned to his comrades: Why are we being silent? They responded in different ways: it is a hopeless cause, no one can prove anything; they gave him signed statements—you need to be quiet or the KGB will put you away somewhere for a while. But the majority of them have become a minority—that sounds bitter—supported V. Zhirov: we need to fight for our rights. They proceeded up all levels in the department until they reached the current minister V. Konovalov. They did not receive a response directly from him but his subordinates do not always respond on the matter and they are quite indifferent.

Here is one response to V. Zhirov: "You listed the benefits that workers have in your letter... Other documents were not submitted according to government and ministry policy as it was done during the elimination of the aftereffects of the ChAES [Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant]. Deputy Organization Chief L.B. Zabiya." "

But this is not a question of symbolic benefits of a quarter of a century ago but about what happened to people as a result of the fact that they carried out a very dangerous job task and how now they would like to be compensated in part for what has been irretrievably lost. Another response, Deputy Minister A. Piruyev's, was a bit more cordial: "To the Irtysh Construction Administration workers' request who worked while carrying out the work [the author's style has been preserved—Author] to eliminate the aftereffects of the experiment at test sites 'Ch' and 'K' and the question raised by the workers about benefits and the offer of pensions, I report, that at the present time we are working on the issue of the possibility of extending medical and social security support to individual categories of USSR Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry workers that are similar to those adopted for participants in the elimination of the aftereffects of the accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station] in accordance with the USSR Council of Ministers and VTSPS [All-Union Central Trade Union Council] Resolution No. 325 dated March 31, 1990."

Here there are already other structures in place of the USSR Council of Ministers and the VTSPS. A Cabinet of Ministers order—(No 554 R) dated June 3, 1991—that is similar to last year's Council of Ministers resolution has already appeared. But the issue is still being processed and processed. Meanwhile, Geo-ecology Expert Professor Yevgeniy Yakovlev, having listened to the people who worked at the site along with me and having seen the miracle of the individual documents that have been preserved, defended them: "You had it much worse than at Chernobyl...."

But Chagan is not Chernobyl. And the Chelyabinsk MAYAK is not Chernobyl. There have been many

not-Chernobyls in our country. Other years and other morals. So what now: Will we wait until time writes off everything? Or this way: until time writes off everyone?..

Greenpeace Begins Pollution Study in West Siberia

91WN0617B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Jul 91
Union Edition p 3

[Article by IZVESTIYA Special Correspondent V. Kostyukovskiy: "Greenpeace' in Western Siberia"]

[Text] What attracted Greenpeace to Western Siberia? Doctor M. Hoffmann, a Greenpeace associate from the FRG, explained:

"We are wherever it is in a bad way and where there is hope of saving something. In this sense, Greenpeace does not know any borders. Really, pollution and contamination of the world does not know any borders and this is our common misfortune and pain. But Western Siberia and the conditions of its environment, especially of the Siberian rivers, increasingly concerns scientists and public opinion in the West. We do not know enough about what is occurring here. We only know what the Ob dumps hundreds of harmful admixtures into the Northern Arctic Ocean. And there is one World Ocean for all of us. We see that these problems are troubling the residents of Siberia to an even greater degree: both workers, leaders, and journalists.

Yes, Western Siberia has long ago become one of the major conglomerates of raw material and resource-intensive sectors of industry on the planet: coal and oil extraction, petroleum refining, metallurgy, chemical, and even the nuclear sectors. Many years of neglect of the ecological aspects of economic activity and the physically obsolete production technology—all of this has resulted in the fact that the region has become one of the largest environmental polluters in the world. And this is fraught with truly irreparable consequences. Already right now the incidence of disease of Siberian residents is higher than for residents of the European portion of the USSR. One can even talk about the ecological genocide of the peoples that are not numerous: the Shor, Teleut, Selkup, Khant, and Mansi peoples. The barbarous methods of extracting coal and oil and processing timber are leading to premature exhaustion of their reserves. Intensive lowering of the ground water level is occurring in Kuzbass. Naturally, ecological issues are increasingly becoming a part of policy, including in foreign policy, and a topic of concern of people's diplomacy.

Expedition participants have set as their task the conduct of a comprehensive study of the water environment of the Tom-Ob Basin and also the drinking water in the cities and villages on their banks. The route, which began in the Kuzbass, leads northwest through Tomsk and

Tyumen oblasts and Khanty-Mansiysk and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrugs right up to Salekhard. Yu. Kaznin describes the work methods:

"Michael Hoffmann and one other Greenpeace specialist Dutchman Vitse van der Haald brought microprocessing instruments and other equipment with them for express-analysis. However, we have known for a long time that express-analysis using any equipment does not provide answers to many questions. Only thorough decipherment of water samples in laboratories can answer them. We are conducting these tests at the Western Siberia Regional Ecological and Medical-Biological Research Center. This is a subdivision of a worldwide laboratory. However, even here, we cannot do everything due to a shortage of equipment, reagents and, finally, the most elementary laboratory vessels. That is why the next stage is work with water samples in Western European laboratories. We constantly sense the great attention of local authorities, scientists, and environmental protection service workers and we are storing up the data from many years of observations in order to compare our results later.

Attention and a proprietary, interested attitude was sensed, for example, in meetings with the leaders of Raspadskaya Mine and the City Soviet of People's Deputies at Mezhdurechensk. Having learned that an expedition had arrived in the city, Hunting Guide Sergey Kostyuk and Mezhdurechensk Forestry Engineer Yevgeniy Kalugin donned their boots, grabbed their rucksacks, and came to us to offer their help. We traveled on foot in those places where there are no roads (and the weather did not permit travel by helicopter) to take water samples from the Tom and Belsa. The Greenpeace people traveled in boats from Novokuznetsk to Kemerovo along with Western Siberia Center Executive Director Sergey Sergeyev and his coworker Andrey Kravchuk. Our colleagues obtained exhaustive information from Oblast Environmental Protection Chairperson O. Andrakhanova.

And here are examples of another approach. One of the leaders of Kuznetsk Metallurgical Combine was quite frank with us in the spirit that "Greens" have gotten out of hand: "You see there is nothing for them to breathe." In his opinion, you do not need to breathe but to work in the plant's shop. And whoever does not like the air, let them move to the country, he said, we are not holding anyone here.

One more example from another sphere, although of that same type. Scientists of the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences at Tomi have detected dioxins—an extremely harmful substance that affects a man's genetics. However, there is no open information about this yet although the law obliges them to provide this information without delay. This is explained by the fact that the results of the research are allegedly the property of the customer who ordered them. And the customer is vitally interested in blocking the Kuzbass' main river with a dam and it is extremely unfavorable to

publicize it. How much dioxin is in the water? Where is its source? Answers to these questions require complicated and expensive research. We hope to obtain them at Greenpeace laboratories in the FRG and Netherlands.

What do the foreign participants say about their impressions? They are tactful, restrained people who regard our problems with understanding and only sometimes do they display their emotions without restraining themselves. I caught sight of the unfinished Greenpeace Krapivinskiy Hydrosystem. This "construction of the century" has been conducted for many years and was announced at one time as "ecological." The idea of customers from the previous Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources and Kazgidroproyekt designers was quite primitive—to build a gigantic "wash tank" on the Tom in the very center of the Kuzbass. They want to accumulate floodwaters and then dilute the harmful admixtures of Keremovo's industries with a large amount of water from the reservoir. To jointly build a hydroelectric plant on this site. However, there is already a prepared and once again thickly grown over reservoir's river bed (27 villages and a multitude of hectares of beautiful flood plain land died during construction!). With this quantity of drainage polluting the Tom, the "Krapivinskiy Sea" simply must become nothing other than a gigantic collection of dangerous sewage. And they are going to "dilute" them? This problem has a large number of arguments against the dam and only one "for": the Tom which has become shallow will obtain a reserve supply of water. What kind, for whom and for what—is clearest of all. They are preparing this water for a new round of "industrialization" and for the most primitive, unreliable, and obsolete level. And for the most dubious achievements of our wretched scientific-technical progress.

For example, for the advertised coal pipeline for the entire country. Yes, the idea of uninterrupted transportation and delivery of coal for hundreds and thousands of kilometers along a pipeline is extremely tempting. But it has been realized in such a way that the coal pipeline, which has undergone several tests and has poured coal suspension on the ground which contains a plasticizer that is harmful to health, is doomed to failure. And here is the "Krapivinskiy Sea"? The fact is that the coal can only be transported in a mixture with water. That is, take the last drops from the dehydrated Kuzbass and drive them to other places, all of this will reach a dead end. But you cannot even take these drops anywhere. And here a hydrosystem could be of service.

Oblast residents long ago recognized all of this, even during the 1989 strike. The miners insisted on stopping the next "turn of the river." Only conservation work is allegedly going on at the hydrosystem. But then why do energy industry builders continue to place emphasis on an electrical transmission line from Krapivinskiy GES [hydroelectric power plant]? It is as if the most ordinary continuation of construction is occurring.

But several words about the guests and journalists among whom were Americans Frederick Kempe (WALL STREET JOURNAL) and James Dorsey (READERS DIGEST), and Dutchmen Herard Jakobs, Paul Babeliovski, and Theo Witenboggard [all names as transliterated]. They made coverage of the industrial region's ecological problems their primary task. However, journalists are journalists and they have a large number of other themes, all the more so since the majority of them were in our country for the first time. For example, they visited Kemerovo UKGB [Committee for State Security Administration] and they turned out to be the first foreign visitors at this administration.

Long conversations with the leaders of Oblkemero-vougol Lease Association—A. Zaytsev, Polosukhinskiy Mine which is entering a Soviet-British joint venture—I. Gladun, Mezhdurechensk Gorsovet Chairman—S. Shcherbakov, and M. Sitkhali, a farmer from Topkinskiy Rayon, made a profound impression on them. While we were driving from Anatoliy Pavlovich Zaytsev's office, perplexed, Fred Kempe told me: "But you have so many intelligent business people...." He did not continue to speak but the continuation was also understood: Why do you live so poorly?

Well, we will have to talk about that on the way to the Northern Arctic Ocean.

Cyclic Concept of Baltic Sea Ecology Advocated

91WN0554A Vilnius VECHERNIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian 15 Apr 91 p 2

[Interview with Baltic researcher Oleg Pustelnikov by Irena Tishkute under the rubric: "Topical Interview: The Problem of the Baltic—In an Unexpected Light—What Sea Will We Swim in This Year?"]

[Text] *Spring and the approaching summer are forcing us to recall the Baltic Sea, which was in the orbit of enhanced attention from the public just two or three years ago thanks to the Greens movement. The political winds, however, have not had an instantaneous effect on the sea. We became interested in asking the experienced researcher of the Baltic and repeated participant in international Baltic expeditions and programs, Oleg Pustelnikov, what waves are washing the amber shores today, what they are bringing to the beaches, and we found out that this specialist has his own (and, perhaps, unexpected for many) view of the pollution of the Baltic. Here is what he said:*

[Pustelnikov] It has become fashionable to talk about pollution, including the Baltic. All—the public and the specialists talking about this issue—name industry, shipping and urbanization, i.e. man-made influences, as the guilty parties in the contamination of the sea. It is somewhat more complicated in reality.

It is impossible and unnecessary to deny the man-made contamination of the sea. But it is most often of only local significance. Say there are a few "hot spots" in

Lithuania: the estuary of the Nemunas, the Klaipeda Strait and Palanga. Not Mazeikiai, by the way, as many are inclined to feel. I carefully studied the effects of the Mazeikiai Oil Refinery on the Baltic for two years. It is less than the effects of Palanga, which has no treatment facilities and where all the sewage effluent drains into the sea.

These and other "spots," of course, have significance for the pollution of the Baltic. An attentive study of the interrelationship of natural and man-made factors in the ecology of the Baltic, however, gives a somewhat different picture. It is felt that petroleum products and heavy metals, for example, are dangerous sources of pollution. But they do not enter the sea and accumulate from ships and industrial facilities alone. It is well known that petroleum (hydrocarbons) are also contained in soils, living organisms, vegetation and the Earth's interior. It is well known, after all, that there are oil-bearing structures on the Baltic shelf, and moreover not just a few. All of this has a great, often negative, significance for the ecology of the Baltic.

[Tishkute] So it turns out that we, as well as other nations, have been sounding the alarm that the Baltic is perishing, that it will not withstand the press of contamination, without sufficient grounds.

[Pustelnikov] I did not want to say quite that. Research data makes it possible to presume that the state of the Baltic and the causes of it cannot be evaluated in such simplistic fashion. Conclusions can be drawn only by studying a period, say, of 300-500 years. Analyzing it, we see that natural cycles exist in the Baltic that are determined by a host of natural, even often global, factors. The changes in the planet's climate, for example. Why did the merchant's league collapse in the Middle Ages? Because the herring disappeared in the Baltic. And why did they disappear? People, after all, were not polluting at that time.

Today we talk about the terrible pollution of the Kursha Strait. But the disappearance of the eels also cannot be linked to that alone. The pollution is even worse along the shore near Szczecin, but eels appeared there anew two years ago. Not just to serve as a source of hard currency, was it?

[Tishkute] Do all scientists and researchers agree with this new conceptual framework of the ecology of the Baltic?

[Pustelnikov] Understandably not all. But many of the scientists of the Baltic countries are changing their views.

By the way, a book prepared by our Akademiya Publishing House and edited by me on the state of the Baltic and the role of natural and man-made factors in polluting it should be appearing in a few years.

[Tishkute] What would you say, in light of the concepts you have set forth, to those who intend to spend the

summer at the Baltic seashore? Will we often learn this year than swimming is banned?

[Pustelnikov] Speaking very generally, the situation in the Baltic is not getting any worse. There is simply an unfavorable cycle right now, determined, as I have already said, by a multitude of factors, and far from all man-made ones.

As for "swimming prohibited," I can say that that depends chiefly on the swimmers themselves. I am relying on observations performed by hygienists. The "swimming prohibited" warnings, you may recall, began to come out only a year or two ago. That is the result of glasnost. But there were always a very great many bacteria in the sea around Palanga and Klaipeda. Especially on hot days. And on a hot day, when as many as a hundred thousand have accumulated to relax on a small section of beach, many of them, shameful as it may be to say, are too lazy to run to the bathroom. The number of bacteria in the water then increases catastrophically, and it becomes less than safe to swim—especially for children.

But the hydrological conditions near Palanga are favorable in general—they have a constant current there from south to north, and the water does not stagnate.

Lemeshev Reviews Morgun's Book on State of Environment

91WN0554B Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
12 Jun 91 p 5

[Review of book "Konets Sveta? Ili..." [End of the World? Or...] by Fedor Trofimovich Morgun, Kiev, Radyanskyy Pysmennyk Publishing House, 1991, by Doctor of Economic Sciences Professor M. Lemeshev, head of the laboratory for ecological-economic problems of a commission of the USSR Academy of Sciences and a UN expert on the environment, under the rubric: "New Books: Our Common Pain"]

[Text] People have only really come to notice and be aware of the global changes in the habitat on the planet, resulting from the rapid expansion of industrial and economic activity, in the last 15-20 years. Ecological concerns encompass all of mankind today.

Irresponsible technocrats use outer space itself, and not only the atmosphere, as a "scrap heap" due to their ecological ignorance. All of this is having a ruinous effect on the weather and the conditions for the influx of solar radiation—and thus on the whole environment, the habitat of people and everything living on Earth.

The broad public in the highly developed industrial countries is aware of the lamentable consequences of that approach to the management of nature. Scientists are literally stunned by the depressing information on the destruction of natural systems and the growing ecological trouble around the world. And the flow of that information is increasing.

People are becoming more and more distinctly aware that their prosperity and well-being depend more and more on the health of the environment.

Despite the impending ecological catastrophe, however, the industrially developed countries are mindlessly plundering natural resources. Many of them are either close to total depletion or can be utilized only on a limited scale, as with hydroelectric power. The paradox is that the closer those resources are to depletion, the more intensively their development is proceeding. Other sources of energy—geothermal or solar power, for instance—are, at the same time, not being utilized at all or are resorted to only in rare instances. And they are, after all, virtually inexhaustible. There is a clear underestimation by people of the power of the wind, tides and heat exchange from biomass, among others.

The world is at a line that cannot be crossed. The leading scientists of the world feel that the planet can withstand the contemporary burden for only a few decades, and then ecological catastrophe is inevitable. Sensible people with the gift of foresight are advancing bold ideas and rushing to incarnate them. There are many serious publications on this score. When becoming acquainted with the book by F. Morgun titled "The End of the World? Or..." (Kiev, Radyanskyy Pysmennyk Publishing House, 1991), you unwillingly come to the conclusion that you have before you a concentrated and all-encompassing analysis, deeply felt by the author, of the state of nature on Earth and, at the same time, a visible search for ways to save it.

This book, small in size, presents rich factual material on the state of the environment in the Soviet Union and the world overall. The author sets forth experiences from the successful environmental-protection activity of science and practice in the USSR and the other industrial nations in popular and accessible form.

Fedor Trofimovich Morgun is far from a novice in the widespread propagation of ecological knowledge. He has been bringing to life the noble idea of a careful attitude toward our chief national asset—the land—for many years. His books devoted to boardless methods of working the soil, making it possible to preserve and improve its structure and protect against erosion, are well known and have been recognized by many readers, especially rural ones. Fedor Morgun was one of the first enthusiasts of the new biospheric thinking in cultivation, who understood that many of the laws of nature were criminally ignored in agriculture. His name is also linked with the incarnation of a new structure for state management of all environmental-protection activity in the country.

The son of a peasant, a person who loves the land not out of official duty but since his barefoot childhood in the village, with all his heart, Fedor Trofimovich argues with pain and alarm in his new book about what awaits mankind in the event that people do not radically alter their consumerist attitude toward the biosphere. "From

the old habits to the new thinking," is the name of one of the chapters in "The End of the World? Or..." The author exclaims that "The disruption of the balance of society and nature is the common pain of mankind. It affects everything..." And he concludes that only the village is the most reliable protector and preserver of nature, and he expresses serious concerns on the score that, in the face of the enormous resources that the country has at its disposal, "the village is being kept on starvation rations or left to face its own problems one on one." The author reasonably calls into question the very thesis of the historical irreversibility of this destructive phenomenon: "The inevitability of a reduction in the rural population is an old and false myth... A far-sighted social policy should prepare the village for an energetic resurrection."

The conclusion that the most complex ecological situations that the country has been falling into, especially in recent years, are to a considerable extent the result of an excessive concentration of the population in the cities is a no less serious one.

And in order for the land not to be doomed to an orphan's vegetation once again, it is essential to resurrect the principle of inheritance "from the grandfather to the father to the son."

Many pages in the book are devoted to those people who helped the author master biospheric cultivation on the fields of Poltava, the goal of which was to feed people to the full without disrupting the environment.

This book by F. Morgun will undoubtedly become a reference book for ecological specialists, students and even pupils in grade schools, and will win widespread popularity among readers. It is a shame that it was issued in a small quantity. But that is, it must be assumed, a matter easily corrected.

Official Looks to Economic Levers for Lithuania's Environmental Program

91WN0534A Vilnius LIETUVOS AIDAS in Lithuanian 3 May 91 p 4

[Interview with Rimvydas Andrikis, chief of the Department of Environmental Protection Economics Office, by Angele Adomaitiene: "Commenting on the Law. Respecting Nature Through Taxes,"]

[Text] The oaks and lindens of our homeland have been felled, victims of land reclamation, our lives have been deported to kolkhoz settlements or under smoking monster chimneys. This is more than just tearing the peasant away from the land. The Soviet five-year plans, which brought city and village to an equal level, have also mercilessly devastated Lithuania's landscape and poisoned Lithuania's water and soil with heavy metals, nitrates and other abominations, and the air with sulfates and nitric acids. The environment is polluted, and because of this improper food has already done its part: hundreds of deformed languish in institutions, and cancer and heart

diseases have already predominated for a long time. To set environmental protection from its head onto its feet is possible only with an economic mechanism that is normally balanced. This is not easy because the economic management of environmental protection is still only in its infancy. To make production finally submit to the laws of ecology more is needed than good intentions—vast sums of money and advanced technologies. And where is one to get them, when the budgets of our resurgent state and of the local governments are full of holes? How can economic levers be used to enforce a thrifty husbandry of natural resources and the improvement of the ecological situation? I am discussing these questions with Rimvydas Andrikis, chief of the Department of Environmental Protection Economics Office.

[LIETUVOS AIDAS] During the years of "mature socialism" it was fashionable to create various programs of economic and social development, which also reflected the official point of view concerning the protection of nature. At first, no room could be found in them for the protection of nature, and it was only later that it managed to wrest a few lines for itself in the final sections of these programs. In graphic terms, protection of nature received only the last crumbs. Could it be that the economists were unable to comprehend the laws of nature?

[Andrikis] What kind of protection of nature can we speak about, if even the famous food and housing programs have collapsed like soap bubbles? The programs created according to the CPSU instructions were based neither on life's logic, nor on normal economic relations. Only in 1981 did individual sections on natural resources and the protection of the environment appear in the complex programs for scientific and technological advancement. Rather advanced for that time was the complex project for environmental protection in Lithuania (1986-2005). Its data about the extent of pollution astonished many people, because this information had been concealed for a long time. Lithuania found out what danger of slow destruction was threatening it. But there was not much consolation in merely knowing that. The sections of the project, which were prepared by good experts were not in any way related to economic resources. It became apparent that there were not enough funds for the implementation of the project. Hence, progress is impossible without a change in economic relations.

[LIETUVOS AIDAS] A half a year ago, an economics office was established in the Department for Environmental Protection. A unit of this kind had not previously existed in our system of environmental protection. What are its functions?

[Andrikis] The main purpose of the office is to incorporate a block of management of natural resources and protection of the environment in the new mechanism of Lithuania's economic administration. After all, we did see a repetition of the old "style" a year ago. Again, no attention was paid to the fact that the economic levers

must be reinforced by laws in the areas of utilization and protection of nature. Now we must find the most effective ways how to economically manage the utilization and protection of nature, and to constantly keep perfecting them. The main economic regulatory levers in this case will be taxes on natural resources and the pollution of the environment, a system of prices and subsidies, and economic sanctions. The parliament has already ratified the laws we have drafted, introducing taxes on natural resources and the pollution of the environment. It is regrettable that the debate on this question is stuck in the Supreme Council.

[LIETUVOS AIDAS] Why was it necessary to introduce such taxes?

[Andrikis] We have done so much agitating for the conservation of electric power and resources, and against despoiling nature with wastes. Unfortunately, the ecological situation has continued growing worse and the natural resources have kept diminishing. Lithuania is not rich in natural resources, but we are not conserving even those that are available. For instance, we can be happy about the quality of our aquifer, but it is used to wash the cattle sheds and to clean the streets. Now, when a cubic meter (to be used for technological needs, where aquifer water is not necessary) will cost up to 20 kopeks, we may start saving. Once the rent tax is introduced, that price will go up even higher.

Oil, clay, sand, peat, mineral resources will also be taxed; in the future, one will also have to pay for the use of forests, for hunting trophies, and for other state property. And the taxes for pollution should not cause much discussion: the more you pollute, the more you pay. This is where the machinery regulating production and the market goes into action: the production costs include the cost of the raw materials and of the quality of the environment. They cannot continue rising constantly, because competition and the consumer will not allow that. Either the pollution or the production will have to be reduced. The taxes will be paid into the state or local government budgets, while the fines will be transferred to a state fund for environmental protection. Its monies will be used for the ecology and for the protection of health.

[LIETUVOS AIDAS] When the above-mentioned projects were being discussed in parliament, the amount of taxes prompted a debate. How were they determined?

[Andrikis] This was the first time that taxes were being set, and therefore there had to be a debate. For instance, the taxes for polluting the environment were determined by giving due consideration to the level of development of the Lithuanian economy and its technological condition: we are not demanding that enterprises immediately stop exceeding the pollution norms or that they adhere to standards of environmental quality that are being observed in developed countries. Therefore, two normative standards have been introduced—the maximum

permissible pollution (MPP) and the temporarily permissible pollution (TPP). The latter will be determined, keeping in mind the existing technology, and will gradually be made stricter until the MPP is reached. These normative standards have made it possible to introduce 3 kinds of tariffs for pollution—standard, increased, and preferential. They will prompt the enterprises to improve their technology and to reduce production expenses. For instance, the main power station of the Lithuanian Republic (VRE) will pay about 10 million and the Jonava Azotas (Nitrogen) plant, 1.4 million rubles per year. These sums will prompt the giants to take care of the ecology.

[LIETUVOS AIDAS] Various foreign firms are at present offering their services to Lithuania. Isn't there a danger that our fascination with foreign currency will make us sacrifice our environment?

[Andrikis] The foreign firms will also be required to undergo an ecological inspection; they will have to pay taxes set by the laws of the Republic of Lithuania and to respect the Law on the Protection of the Environment. That is why I feel no danger in this area. The threat lies elsewhere: which normative standards and which standards of environmental quality shall we follow—the earlier Soviet ones, or the global ones? When foreign firms perceive the possibility of investing in Lithuania, the first ones to knock at our door will be those whose technology cannot effectively compete abroad. Therefore, I take a skeptical view of the rush to respond to any first offer. There should be no haste without first having heard the experts' findings. We must move as quickly as possible to the adoption of global environmental quality standards, so that several years later we will be spared having to spend ten times more money for cleaning up new sources of pollution.

[LIETUVOS AIDAS] In your opinion, as an economist and as a champion of environmental protection, which industries in Lithuania should be developed and which ones should be eliminated?

[Andrikis] I think that the introduction of taxes for the pollution of the environment and for the use of natural resources will help us to find a rational solution, because the costs of production will reflect actual expenditures and consumption. We must pay attention to all that as we proceed with the price reform, because the production costs of such basic branches as the power or the chemical industry must encompass all the production expenses, including those caused by pollution. I disagree with opponents who are saying that the taxes will have a negative effect on producers and consumers alike. Their effect can be only positive: when we pay for the real value of every item or service, then we will know what and how much Lithuania must produce and consume. The future economic structures and directions must, of course, already be anticipated now. We must depend as little as possible on the raw materials of our eastern neighbor and we must expand those sections of our

economy that require a greater intellectual input and to consider the use of geothermal, wind, solar and other non-traditional energy.

[LIETUVOS AIDAS] What is the greatest obstacle in setting environmental protection on its feet?

[Andrikis] First of all, it is the unwillingness or the inability of the directors of some enterprises and agencies to undertake essential reforms and to change the Soviet mind-set. The shortage of instruments, equipment and funds is, after all, common to all areas of the economy. It is time to understand that we shall not improve the condition of the environment by merely removing the results of the pollution. We must also remove the causes, to introduce higher quality technologies and to devise new instruments. I am an optimist, and I believe that it is possible to create an essentially new system for managing the utilization of natural resources and protecting the environment. When some enterprises, in their effort to survive, are compelled, for instance, to take care of the instruments, and others, to manufacture them or to introduce new technologies, then the problems will slowly diminish.

[LIETUVOS AIDAS] Your optimism is certainly conditioned by your youthful age and by the experience in protecting the environment you have accumulated at the Institute of Economics. I most sincerely wish that you will not lose it.

[Andrikis] Thank you.

Results of Caspian Sea Conference Outlined

91WN0598A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY
in Russian 18 Jun 91 pp 1-2

[Article by Kh. Imanov and V. Shulman, Azerinform correspondents: "The Caspian, an Arena of Cooperation: The International Conference on Problems of the Caspian"]

[Text] The First International Conference on Problems of the Caspian, which lasted for five days in the capital of Azerbaijan, ended today with the adoption of a package of proposals to help develop a comprehensive program to save the largest lake in the world.

The creation of a preparations committee to organize the Supreme Caspian Council was another result of this representative forum which brought together in Baku the leaders of nature protection departments and ecological commissions of the Union republics and leading Soviet and foreign scientists. This nongovernmental organ will be given the greatest powers. It is supposed to combine the efforts of the states of the Caspian region to stabilize and normalize the economic situation on the Caspian.

The resolution of the conference, which Professor V. I. Lukyanenko, honorable figure of science of the RSFSR, read to its participants, illustrates this. As became known from his statement, the preparations committee has been

instructed to formulate the necessary materials to form the Supreme Caspian Council and define its basic functions and tasks, structure, and status within a 2-month period. This important document also expressed the request to the presidents of the region's states to introduce the institution of republic ecological commissions, which will work under the Council's leadership.

The conference participants appealed to A. N. Mutalibov, the president of the Azerbaijan Republic, to head the Supreme Caspian Council.

"Such interaction on the Union and international levels," U. K. Alekperov, the vice president of the Azerbaijan Republic Academy of Sciences, emphasized, "will allow us to make a general evaluation of the ecosystem of the sea and of the enormous territory adjacent to it, establish the priorities of the problems existing here and the mechanism to realize them, and coordinate national plans and formulate the concept of a unified regional program to save the Caspian. We must also lay the legal foundations for rational use of nature and formulate recommendations on the directions of further cooperation of the states involved in this."

The conference participants also appealed to the governments of the Caspian region states to create a regional fund to save the Caspian.

The appeals to UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar and the world community adopted at the conference among other things say that based on the consequences of the Aral catastrophe, one can assert with certainty that the scale of the ecological crisis of the Caspian Sea would be global. Taking into account the uniqueness and climate-forming significance of the Caspian and the need to preserve the diversity of living nature for world civilization and prevent the negative consequences of technogenic development, the First Baku International Conference deemed it necessary to bring the attention of the world community to the problems of the Caspian Sea.

Bearing in mind the crisis status of the economies of the Caspian region republics, the documents continue, we appeal to all international organizations and funds to provide assistance in this important and noble cause.

The conference participants expressed the hope that the United Nations and its structural subdivisions and international ecological societies and movements will be moved by alarm and concern and will provide assistance in organizing the International Fund To Save the Caspian Sea.

In connection with this, the conference participants adopted the Statement to USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev which expressed profound gratitude to the leader of the Soviet State for the attention to resolving the most important ecological tasks facing the peoples of the Caspian region.

Considering the significance of the Caspian for the entire world community, the global nature of the impending cataclysm, and the impossibility of resolving these problems through the efforts of the states of the Caspian region alone, the conference participants, recognizing the international authority of the president of the USSR, appealed to him to support the conference's appeal to the world community and provide assistance in the cause of creating an International Fund To Save the Caspian Sea.

The appeal of the children of Azerbaijan to M. S. Gorbachev read at the conference is also full of pain for the fate of the Caspian.

Overall about 50 reports, speeches, and messages of scientists and specialists in the area of marine ecology and representatives of public organizations were made during this representative scientific forum. All of them were carefully reviewed during six plenary meetings, one of which was held on 15 June on board a motorboat which traveled to Neftyanaye Kamni, an oilfield city on piles in the open sea. Here the conference participants were introduced to films of Soviet documentary film makers which tell about the irreparable damage which the merciless exploitation of its resources and contamination of its waters with industrial run-off from the Volga have done to the Caspian.

The sinister circles of oil creeping across the water, the flares of liquefied natural gas which burn in the wind around the clock, and their smoke which covers the horizon—this is by no means a complete list of nature's accusations against man. The pile-supported little towns of Azerbaijan maritime oil workers where valuable raw material has been extracted from the bottom of the Caspian for more than 40 years also look unsightly now.

"All this is staggering," M. M. Alklychev from Makhachkala, the senior scientific associate of the All-Union Scientific Research and Planning Institute of Geophysics, said on board the boat. "It is difficult to imagine that this is the work of the hands of man. It is important to analyze all the mistakes made and not repeat them. The geophysical processes occurring within the depths of the earth are also important, in my opinion. We must not intervene in natural processes in an uncontrolled way, without careful consideration. That might lead to unpredictable consequences. And in this regard extraction of oil is no exception."

V. P. Ivanov, the director of the Caspian Scientific Research Fishing Institute of the USSR Ministry of Fish Industry is more optimistically inclined.

"Work to introduce ecologically clean technologies everywhere may be done within five-six years," he believes. "And other nature protection measures may be carried out during that time. The most important thing is to insure that what has been planned does not remain on paper, as has happened more than once before. The know-how of other countries, the United States, Canada, and Great Britain in particular, must be used extensively in this work, for instance the use of strict economic

penalties. Conditions must be created where it would be unprofitable for industrialists to pollute this unique body of water."

In the scientist's opinion, specialists must also be united by creating a unified center to save the Caspian which could develop a strategy of struggle and an order for carrying out scientific programs.

"I am not an advocate of categorical statements," he added, "either oil or fish.' Man needs both the one and the other. We just have to find the 'golden mean,' and it would be rational to achieve all this on a profoundly scientific basis."

On 16 June the conference participants visited Khachmasskiy Rayon in Azerbaijan. This zone, which borders the shoreline, is well known for its fruit orchards and vegetable plantations. The delegation also visited the coastal part of the Yalam-Nabranskiy Zone, where endemic broad-leaved forests are located. The encroachment of the Caspian is especially obvious here. The roads laid not far from the shore which the participants followed are almost flooded. The water threatens to flood the boarding hotels, houses of rest, and pioneer camps here.

The accusatory photo exhibit housed in the republic Academy of Sciences next to the meeting hall of the forum, which finished its work on 17 June, also recalls the obstinacy of the sea and man's careless attitude toward nature and their consequences.

So, the First Baku International Conference on the Problems of the Caspian became a part of history and an important milestone in the evolution of interrelations of man and this unique body of water. From now on it will be an arena of international cooperation. There is great and responsible work ahead to save the Caspian.

E. M. Kafarova, the chairman of the Azerbaijan Republic Supreme Soviet, and F. G. Muradaliyev, the secretary of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee, took part in the final plenary meeting.

Azerbaijan Environment Chief on Caspian Sea Conference

91WN0598B Moscow *DELOVOY MIR* in Russian
21 Jun 91 p 1

[Interview with A. Mansurov, chairman of the republic State Committee for Protection of Nature, by Namik Azizov in Baku; time and date not specified]

[Text] On 17 June the First International Conference on Problems of the Caspian, organized at the initiative of the Academy of Sciences and the Azerbaijan State Committee for Protection of Nature [Goskompriroda], finished work in Baku. Scientists and specialists of the USSR, Iran, and, Turkey and representatives of UNESCO and UNEP [United Nations Environment Program] and international ecological organizations participated in it.

DELOVOY MIR correspondent Namik Azizov met with the chairman of the Azerbaijan Republic Goskompriroda and asked him to tell about the forum's goals.

[Mansurov] The initiators for holding the International Conference pursued, one might say, a three-part goal. First, to direct the attention of the Soviet and world communities to the ecological problems of the Caspian Sea. Secondly, to consolidate the scientific and ecological communities of countries of the Caspian region to solve the urgent ecological problems. Finally, to combine the efforts of the state and scientific research establishments working on preserving and studying the natural environment into a unified comprehensive program to save the ecosystem of the Caspian Sea.

The conference's program was compiled in such a way as to ensure that scientists and specialists from Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Dagestan as well as Turkey and Iran could become thoroughly familiar with the ecological situation.

It is no secret to anyone that the Caspian has been chronically ill for a long time. The anthropogenic load on the Caspian ecosystem is so great that if an instrument existed which could measure it, the reading would have been off the scale long ago.

Many departments have made and continue to make their contribution to destroying the ecosystem of the Caspian. They include those which pollute the sea with oil and petroleum products, sewage, and sludge and discharge millions of tons of dust and other harmful substances into the atmosphere. As a result, the Caspian Sea, known throughout the world for its huge reserves of sturgeon and beautiful sandy beaches, has become an all-Union settling tank where many species of animal life remain only names in the Red Book and swimming in its warm waters is dangerous to health.

The national wealth of Azerbaijan, petroleum, has brought the republic countless ecological disasters instead of economic prosperity. More than 25,000 hectares of land, and of that 10,000 on the Apsheron Peninsula alone, are completely or partially contaminated with petroleum products and layer waters escaping from wells.

Petroleum extraction sectors, it must be said directly, are now unprofitable for the republic; their technological equipment does not meet elementary demands of ecological safety and serves as one of the basic causes of pollution of the Caspian Sea. But this is not only the largest lake in the world. It is a unique regulator of the climate which levels the amplitudes of air temperature fluctuations of the entire Caspian region. The Caspian supplies moisture to many regions of Europe and Asia, delivering an enormous quantity of water vapor into the atmosphere. And finally, it serves as the only obstacle to the spread of the Central Asian deserts.

In recent years one more, most terrible illness has been added to the list of illnesses of the Caspian. I mean the

change in the level of the sea; in the last 15 years it has risen by almost two meters. And this process is not ceasing. Unfortunately, as yet there are no scientifically sound predictions of the dynamics of its development. Just the economic losses from the fluctuations of the level of the sea will be measured in hundreds of billions of rubles.

In the last decades we have witnessed many ecological catastrophes. The fate of the Aral is right in front of us all. Fortunately, the damage to the Caspian has not reached the level beyond which the process is irreversible. And we still have a chance to act in advance to begin normalizing the ecological situation in time.

It is clear to everyone that no one state of the Caspian region can deal with the common misfortune by itself. Consolidated efforts, combined scientific, technical, and technological potential, and active involvement of capital and the capabilities of the international community are needed.

We hope that the First International People's Conference on the Caspian will not be a one-time event, but will initiate the process of regular contact of the region's scientists and specialists and their joint participation in large-scale nature protection measures. On our part we intend to present an initiative to organize the International Fund To Save the Caspian.

Petrozavodsk's Water Supply Polluted; Inaction Cited

91WN0595A Moscow *LESNAYA GAZETA* in Russian
8 Mar 91 p 1

[Article by V. Litvinov, staff correspondent: "Don't Drink the Water, Ivanushka; You'll Become a Goat Kid"]

[Text] All year round reddish, rust-colored, oily water flows from the faucets in the apartments of Petrozavodsk. If it stands in a bowl or a bathtub, their sides become covered with a dirty film. The water is particularly bad in the springtime, when the snow melts.

This happens because a mass of unpurified, untreated household and industrial discharges drain into the Petrozavodsk Inlet of Lake Onega, from which water is also taken for the population of this autonomous republic [i.e., the Karelian ASSR]. Such discharges are also borne here by the Shuya River, on whose banks quite a few livestock-raising farms, garages, and the Petrozavodsk Sawmilling-and-Furniture Combine are situated. An even greater volume of unpolluted water is discharged into the municipal water intake by Petrozavodsk's wood-processing and home-building combines of the Petrozavodskbummash and Zhelezobeton Associations, as well as by other industrial enterprises. In order to safeguard people from diseases, the municipal sanitation and epidemic-control center regularly advises the inhabitants of Petrozavodsk to drink only boiled water.

The water-supply problem has been discussed at all levels since the very early 1970's. But so far nothing specific has been undertaken.

For more than a decade now it has been planned to shift the municipal water intake to a cleaner part of the lake. And here again nothing has been done. At first this was blocked or interfered with by the construction of the pompous building for the CPSU Gorkom and Gorispolkom, then such buildings for the city rayon party committees, various types of departmental offices, the granite-and-concrete embankment in the central park, etc. And the only thing that these Karelian authorities cannot find either the strength or the funds for is the water intake and water pipe on which the health of Petrozavodsk's 260,000 inhabitants depends.

Social-Ecological Union Becomes Official Organization

91WN0595B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 4 Jun 91 p 4

[Article by Olga Plakhotnikova: "They Have Made the Transition to a Legal Status"]

[Text] The USSR Social-Ecological Union was recently registered in the USSR Ministry of Justice. This union combines about 200 organizations and public associations from all the republics (except for Lithuania and Latvia).

Svyatoslav Zabelin, the chairman of the Social-Ecological Union, began to create his organization at a time when—for most people—the words "environmental protection" meant merely protecting rare species of wild animals and butterflies.

Then, in 1985, the founders of this union decided the following: The goal of the future organization should be to protect and safeguard not only the natural and cultural environment, but also human beings, whose very existence is threatened.

The causes engaged in by the Social-Ecological Union are linked basically with shutting down such fratricidal projects as, for example, the lamentably well-known Tyumen Complex. At least half of the AES's [nuclear electric power stations] which have been shut down have been closed resulting from the activity of these "Greens." It was specifically they who began the campaign to declare a moratorium on constructing new AES's. As a result, such a moratorium has been adopted in Russia and the Ukraine.

Just a year ago such achievements were applauded. Not by the leading officials of those ministries and departments guilty of pollution, of course, but by the broad masses of the people and the press. Nowadays the situation has changed. Reproaches and rebukes such as the following have begun to pour in: Here now, they say, some plants have been shut down, and so we are left without the most necessary things. By that logic, the guilty parties are not at all those persons who designed

and built enterprises whose discharges strew a powder-like dust on our windowpanes. Have they ever thought about technologies or about purification facilities? Let's just cut some more pink ribbons, and let's build communism further. And if children are literally dying off in the industrial zones, let them burn with a bright fire....

By the way, those persons are mistaken who think that it is only in our country that informal-ecologists are so "unbridled" or "unruly." Two months ago the Social-Ecological Union conducted a large Soviet-American Conference; it was participated in by representatives of 40 organizations from "that" side and by more than 100 from our side. It became clear that the representatives of the world where capital reigns have been fully able to put this matter or cause on a broad-based footing. They have created excellent data banks regarding harmful production facilities, their effects on people's health, and technologies (whether they are "dirty" or "clean"). The Americans are prepared to offer detailed information to the Social-Ecological Union, and nowadays this is extremely topical and urgent for us. It is, of course, preposterous and absurd to see spies in all foreign firms—spies who are striving, at all costs, to pollute the Russian land. Nothing ever prevents or hinders anybody from being able to learn how things turn out.

Members of the Social-Ecological Union have no membership dues or "official" duties. However, they do have a few more rights than ordinary citizens. Thus, they can exercise monitoring controls on the condition or status of the environment, as well as valuable entities—whether natural or cultural. Union members also have the right to keep track of whether the laws are observed in the field of utilizing nature. Their reputation among polluting-enterprises (as "fanatics," etc.) confirms the fact that they are extremely active in exercising their rights.

For those persons who want to help this union in some way or share information with it—the address is as follows: S. Zabelin, Apartment 85, Building #25, Krasnoarmeyskaya Street, Moscow, 125319. That is the organization's official address.

Allegations on White Sea Chemical Munitions Dumping Continue

91WN0595C Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 20 Jun 91 p 4

[Article by K. Belyaninov: "You Can't Hide Something by Sewing It Up in a Bag. And That's a Good Thing!: The White Sea: The Answer Lies on the Bottom"]

[Text] Despite the assurances from many of our military leaders that there is nothing but starfish and mussels on the White Sea bottom, we can definitely assert that if this bottom is not strewn with containers of old chemical weapons, then somebody buried their residue there with excessive caution. At least as much as in the Barents, Kars, and other northern seas which came within the field of vision of our country's generals.

Even now KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA has at its disposal testimony proving that there are not just two sites where chemical munitions were buried in the White Sea, as noted by all navigational charts without exception, but many more such sites.

Here is what we have managed to ascertain with the help of our readers.

1. From February through May of 1956 echelons loaded with chemical munitions traveled continuously from the Obozerskaya Station, Arkhangelsk Oblast to Severodvinsk. In Severodvinsk these munitions were loaded onto ships and then sunk in the White Sea. The entire trip took scarcely more than 48 hours. A year later the remnants of the munitions from the Obozerskaya Station were buried in the region of Shpitsbergen Island. These echelons were accompanied to Severodvinsk by military guard details of an artillery regiment which was subsequently disbanded. Our editors have the testimony of persons who accompanied the cargo, the numbers of the military units [chasti], and the names of the ships which hauled these weapons.

2. During the years 1960-1961 chemical munitions were shipped to Pechenga not only from the Leonidovka Station in the Volga region (see KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, dated 13 June 1991), but also from storage facilities located in Saratov Oblast. Trains loaded with these weapons were accompanied by cadets from the Saratov School for Training Chemical-Warfare Troops. Among other things in the echelons were aerial bombs weighing 100, 250, and 500 kilograms; they had been produced during the years 1938-1939 and were charged with sarin [a nerve gas], yperite [mustard gas], and lysite [?]. In Pechenga these munitions were loaded onto ships of the Murmansk Merchant Shipping Company which had been leased by the Ministry of Defense, after which these weapons were sunk in the region of Novaya Zemlya. A total of 183 echelons of chemical munitions were shipped out of Pechenga.

This is only part of the information which the editors now have at their disposal, and all this data needs to be verified. But the data communicated by our readers is really too detailed—right down to the names of the ships and the numbers of the military units—and too coincidental for it not to be trusted. And, by the way, almost half of these readers—professional seamen who have served for more than a decade in the Soviet Far North—assert that the currents in the Northern seas are such that the munitions sunk near Novaya Zemlya certainly had to have run onto the southern shore of the Dvina Inlet—the site where the starfish perished. It remains to be explained where the remainder “went.”

Therefore, the “Club of the Curious” requests answers from those persons who have at their disposal the precise coordinates of the sites where these chemical munitions were submerged. We appeal for help to those scientific

institutions and public organizations who are ready to render assistance in preparing a new expedition to the White Sea.

Greens Campaign Against Radioactive Ore Storage in Krasnoufimsk

91WN0595D Moscow TRUD in Russian 9 Jul 91 p 4

[Article by V. Ponomarev, editor, Krasnoufimsk city newspaper entitled VPERED—for TRUD: “Death Beyond the Boarded-Up Enclosure: Intervention Is Needed”]

[Text] From reminiscences:

“We moved here and settled down in 1958; at that time grain was stored in the warehouses. Later it was hauled out, and boxes began to be put in there. People unloaded them day and night. Dust arose in a column. It sometimes happened that people ate their dinner right there on the boxes. Nobody even suspected that the “nonferrous metal” ore, as it was designated in the documents, was lethally dangerous.

“First a horse collapsed, and its hair fell out. They ordered it to be buried. Then one of the women fell ill with cancer and quickly died. At that time I was a strong young man with a sports rating. I began to feel a terrible heaviness in my body. There were times when I bled from my nose and my ears; and my hair began to fall out.

“I quickly went to Kharkov, where my uncle was working as a neurosurgeon. And he saved my life. But I did not succeed in completely recovering my good health. And I arrived back home as an invalid.” (N. BONDARENKO).

“At times the boxes broke, and the substance was shoveled up into paper bags. We did not know about the danger involved, and so we took no precautions. It was only later that instructions appeared, protective gear was handed out, along with dose meters (for measuring radiation), and facilities for taking showers were set up.” (T. KHOMUTNIKOVA).

“We became alarmed when my husband began to complain about terrible headaches and sleeplessness. In 1961 he became ill, underwent treatment at a hospital, and went back to work. Nevertheless, in 1965 he was accorded the status of an invalid, i.e., a disability. No matter where we went for treatment, they could not cure him. His vision got worse; his memory declined; his hair and teeth fell out. (on 9 April 1966 V. Spitsyn, a former frontline soldier and a 42-year-old facility chief, died” (A. Spitsyna).

“We even used to taste that substance; it was a lot like bird-cherry meal. People loaded vegetables into the empty railroad cars and hauled them away somewhere. In 1965 they stopped delivering the substance, since the warehouses were completely full” (N. PETUKHOV).

These and other items of testimony have been collected by N. Serebrennikova and N. Yegarmina, activists in the "Green" movement who are struggling for the removal of the warehouses containing radioactive ore located near Krasnoufimsk.

The railroad from Moscow to Siberia passes through this rather small town in the Urals. Of course, when the passengers look out the railroad-car windows at the 20 or more warehouses beyond the boarded-up fence, they do not suspect that this is the so-called "Zone of the Dead"—until recently a secret facility of the Pobeda Combine. Rumors have been circulating around it; they are caused by the severe illnesses and deaths of the people who used to work there. But the facility was a closed zone for decades, and nobody knew what was really there.

This silence was broken by the local newspaper entitled *VPERED*, which published some letters about the facility's lethal contents. The public began to seethe, and the local authorities demanded explanations from those in charge of the warehouses—the Main Administration for Material Resources (GUMR) under the USSR Council of Ministers. And just last year a commission arrived from Moscow, headed up by G. Koliberda, chief of GUMR's Fifth Division. Inhabitants of Sverdlovsk and Krasnoufimsk were attached to this commission. Such an impressive delegation arrived at the warehouses.

In the courtyard we were met by a guard dressed in a protective, khaki-colored pea-jacket but without a weapon. We were even amazed at how much a kind of secrecy there seemed to be.... We walked between the warehouses, which had already become decrepit. They had begun to be built even before the war by prisoners, and they were finished by German POW's. This facility turned out to be temporarily closed; the staff amounted to four guards and a chief.

But the most unpleasant things were what awaited us indoors. I must confess that a cold chill ran down my spine; it was as if I physically felt my entire body being penetrated by invisible rays. The warehouses were chock-full of piled-high stacks of boxes containing paper bags filled with a cinnamon-colored, sandy type of material. This is a concentrate of the radioactive substance thorium. Some of the boxes had been crushed, and the "sand" had spilled out of them. The radiation level was very high. As the specialists explained, my dose meter registered a radiation dose allowable for 48 hours. But we had been inside for only 10 minutes.

At the conference which was held later the conversation proceeded in excited tones. The local authorities persistently demanded that the facility be removed—the probability of an accident was too great. The Zyuraya Railroad Station is located right alongside. Suppose something should suddenly tear loose; as you know, such things do happen in our railroad stations and yards. In that case, thorium would be scattered all over the surrounding area. Or suppose that the warehouses were inundated in the

springtime by the Ufa River. Already now the groundwaters seep through the floor there; the warehouses are situated on a swamp. And right next to them are the warehouses of Agropromkhimika, the loading platforms of the Krasnoufimskiy Sovkhoz, and an onion-processing plant. Anything might happen there too.

The guard is symbolic; there is no protection against fire; any good hurricane—and they are not rare in our region—could overturn or flatten these aging warehouses. And then the radioactive dust would fly all around. However, the representatives from the GUMR stood their ground; although they did not exclude the possibility of an accident, they said: "We will not touch this ore."

The city- and oblast-level newspapers have spoken out on this matter more than once; there was a protest meeting in the city's central square—a meeting at which thousands of signatures were collected. Letters have been written and sent to all levels of authority. At the 7 November and 1 May demonstrations the most popular slogans were: "Down with the 'Zone of the Dead'" and "Better To Be Active Today Than Radioactive Tomorrow."

From time to time certain commissions arrive in Krasnoufimsk; they write something in reports there, which is not communicated even to the local leadership; but nothing is changed. Meanwhile, the danger from the lethal warehouses increases from month to month—as they get older and more and more apt to collapse or be destroyed. What size of disaster awaits the inhabitants of Krasnoufimsk? Will it be their own kind of "little Chernobyl"?

And what is really strange is the following question: Is it possible that our country does not need this ore, containing a whole range of rare-earth elements, for which the widest use could be found? If we do not need it ourselves, we could sell it abroad. At worst, we should bury this thorium in a secure place, while observing all the rules pertaining to such matters. Any of the above-mentioned steps would be better than keeping this entire city and several villages in a state of tension. Their population feels that they are living in a minefield which is just about to explode.

Data on Deforestation Caused by Industrial Air Pollution

*91WN0596A Moscow VESTNIK STATISTIKI
in Russian No 6, Jun 91 pp 57-59*

[Unattributed report under the rubric: "New Information From USSR Goskomstat: Loss of Forests From Industrial Pollution of the Atmosphere"]

[Text] Industrial emissions are doing tangible damage to the forest products industry. Every year this factor results in the loss of roughly 60,000 hectares of forests, and that is almost one-third the area of forests which dry

up within a year for any reason, including damage by insect pests, diseases, wild animals, and other factors.

Based on the pressing nature of the problem of the destruction and loss of forests from emissions of harmful substances into the atmosphere, USSR Goskomstat conducted a special sample survey on 1 October 1990. It was conducted at state forestry stations, timber procurement establishments, and other forestry management enterprises of the USSR Goskomles [State Committee for Forestry] and the USSR Minlesprom [Ministry of the

Timber Industry] systems located in 33 oblasts, krays, and ASSR's of the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan as well as Lithuania, Latvia, and Armenia. As a rule forestry management enterprises lying near industrial cities were included.

The survey showed that there were forests which had become weakened or died in response to harmful emissions on the territory of 218 of the 305 enterprises surveyed. The following data (on the enterprises surveyed) characterize the destruction and loss of forests from these emissions:

Table. Destruction and Loss of Forests from Harmful Emissions

	Area, in thousands of hectares		Reserves, in millions of cubic meters	
	In All	Including Coniferous Forests	In All	Including Coniferous Forests
Forests Damaged and Lost Since the Start of Observation	854	830	47.4	46.6
Including Forests of the First Group	848	825	46.3	45.5
Dead Forests Felled at the Moment of Inventory	30	28	2.7	2.5
Existence of Damaged or Dead Forests at the Moment of Inventory	782	759	39.2	38.5
Including:				
Weakened or Severely Weakened Forests	461	441	19.7	19.1
Dead Forests (Drying Up or Dried Up)	321	318	19.5	19.4

The green zones around cities and other specially protected forests were most affected by harmful emissions—848,000 hectares (99 percent of the total area of damaged forest stands). They perform chiefly water conservation, protective, hygienic, and health-restoring functions (forests of the first group).

Coniferous forests are the most sensitive to emissions of harmful substances. This factor has damaged 830,000 hectares of them or 97 percent of the area of weakened or dead forest stands, including larches—566,000 hectares (66 percent), and pines—198,000 hectares (23 percent).

Industrial emissions resulted in a decline in the net increase in felled timber and in forest quality. In 1989 the damages from the loss of the commodity value of

timber amounted to 4.3 million rubles or about 75 percent of its estimated standard value.

As a result of felling, partial reforestation, or transfer of areas with dead stands for construction, agriculture, and other nontimber economic uses, at the moment of the inventory damaged or dead forests in fact amounted to 782,000 hectares, or 1.3 percent of the total forested area of the enterprises being surveyed.

Forests were damaged to the greatest degree in the Bratsk, Krasnoyarsk, Sverdlovsk, Nikel and Monchegorsk (Murmansk Oblast) regions, as well as in a number of cities in Chelyabinsk Oblast (Verkhniy Ufaley, Troitsk, Satka, Karabash, and Katayev-Ivanovsk).

Data on the existence of damaged or dead forests for the individual regions are cited below (for the enterprises surveyed):

Table. Damaged and Dead Forests by Individual Region

	Area		Reserves, in millions of cubic meters
	Thousands of Hectares	Percentage of the Total	
In All	781.7	100	39.2
RSFSR	770.4	98.6	37.0
Murmansk Oblast	82.5	10.6	1.3
Sverdlovsk Oblast	14.2	1.8	2.4

Table. Damaged and Dead Forests by Individual Region (Continued)

	Area		Reserves, in millions of cubic meters
	Thousands of Hectares	Percentage of the Total	
Chelyabinsk Oblast	16.5	2.1	2.3
Irkutsk Oblast	77.8	10.0	7.9
Krasnoyarsk Kray	565.2	72.3	21.2
Ukrainian SSR	3.1	0.4	0.5
Lithuanian Republic	7.2	0.9	1.6
Belorussian SSR, Kazakh SSR, Republic of Armenia	1.0	0.1	0.1

Such toxic substances contained in industrial emissions as sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, nitric oxide, and fluoride are especially deadly to the forest.

The following are the main offenders in terms of the harmful emissions which resulted in suppressed vital activity and destruction of forests: the Pechenganikel (city of Nikel) and Severonikel (city of Monchegorsk) metallurgic combines, the Norilsk Metallurgic Combine, the Bratsk Aluminum Plant, the nickel combine in the city of Verkhniy Ufaley, the copper smelting combine in the city of Karabash, and other enterprises.

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UN Help Sought in Curbing Construction of Hydroelectric Facilities in Siberia

91WN0596B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 9 Jul 91 p 3

[Article by Valeriy Yaroslavtsev: "The 'Mines' on the Siberian Rivers: Where the Construction Projects of the Century Are Leading Us"]

[Text] The supposed low cost of the largest hydroelectric power plants in the world on Siberian rivers is now resulting in ecological disaster, degradation of the indigenous population, and the withdrawal from use of thousands of hectares of taiga and agricultural lands.

No one has borne responsibility for the impending catastrophe from the time of industrialization to the present. For that reason, obviously, the Siberians have decided to appeal to the United Nations. But will that help?

The Ust-Khantayskiy GES

This is the northern-most hydroelectric power plant in the world. The machine room was cut in rock at a depth of 47 meters. But the level of the Khantayskiy Reservoir is lower than planned. The permafrost is being eaten away because of the great amount of water filtration. From the day it was brought permanently on line, the Ust-Khantayskiy GES [hydroelectric power station] has simply not produced the projected amount of electricity.

The Kureyka GES

In late December 1989 the fourth unit of this plant near the Arctic Circle, which by that time had produced its first billion kilowatt hours of electricity, was put on line. The fifth and last unit has been set in and is to be launched next year. The GES can produce 2 billion kilowatt hours of electricity every year, but it produces only half that. The excess water from the reservoir has to be discharged unused over the crest of the dam. The plant, which was intended as the main source of power supply for the Norilsk industrial region, has been under construction for more than 15 years. During that time Norilsk residents have received energy for themselves from central heating and power plants and can only receive energy from two of the AES [nuclear electric power station] units. True, Turukhansk needs electricity. The Turukhansk residents just recently got the capital from USSR Minenergo [Ministry of Power and Electrification] to build an LEP-220 [electric power transmission line]. People in Igarka would also like to change their heat supply to electricity, but once again Minenergo asked such an exorbitant price per kilowatt that it was cheaper to haul coal from the "mainland."

The unfinished power plant works at half strength, while the Krasnoyarsk Gidroproyekt [hydro planning organization] has already begun technical-economic substantiation for construction of the Upper Kureyka Hydroelectric Power Plant.

The Turukhansk GES

The plan to construct this gigantic plant with a capacity of 20 million kilowatts on the Lower Tunguska caused mass protests of the region's residents and a furious three-year debate in the country. Both the public and scientists assessed the substantiation (TEO [technical and economic substantiation]) for the construction presented by Lengridropoyekt as an ecological and ethical catastrophe. The project in fact might ultimately result in the disappearance of the Evenki people, and so the ispolkom of the Evenki District Soviet justifiably refused to consent to the TEO at dam elevations of 200 and 140 meters. At the instruction of the USSR and RSFSR councils of ministers, in the summer of 1988 the Siberian Department of the Academy of Sciences conducted a

comprehensive ecological and socioeconomic expert study of the future project. The presidium of the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences agreed with the findings of the expert commission headed by Academician A. A. Trofimuk and adopted a resolution to recommend no construction. Meanwhile, without waiting for the expert study, the hydroelectric power plant builders began to build a road and an LEP from Svetlogorsk to the location of the future plant's dam, but the people stopped construction. Yu. Semenov, the minister of power engineering and electrification, announced that the question of the Turukhansk GES would be put off until the year 2000, but planning work continues.

The Middle Yenisey GES

After decisive protests by the public and scientists against construction of gigantic hydroelectric power plants on the Yenisey, the planners of Gidroproyekt did just the opposite. Instead of one Middle Yenisey GES with a capacity of 6 million kilowatts, they proposed constructing a whole series. The belief is that this will help reduce the area of drowned valuable agricultural lands to less than half. But there still has been no public expert study. And what is more, ecological scientists believe that there should be no hydroelectric power plant-obstructions on the Yenisey in order to avoid unpredictable global ecological consequences. Construction of medium pressure GES's is possible only on the tributaries of the Yenisey, but the "povorotchiki" [scientists who in the past proposed reversing the flow of large Siberian rivers] continue to strive to curb the great river.

The Boguchanskiy GES

Long-term construction of 15 years here. But the rate of construction did not speed up at all after the Angara was spanned in October 1987. The time periods for launching the first units have been carried over several times. Now 1995 has been named. How can launching be planned if there have still been no decisions on the formation of the Lower Angara Territorial-Industrial Complex?

And the ecological situation in the Angara region is deteriorating. Agriculture has declined and a centuries-old way of life is collapsing. About 20 populated points will fall in the drowned zone, and that includes the former rayon center of Kezhma, an ancient Angara village founded by Russian pioneers many years ago, in 1665. Roughly 30,000 hectares of farm lands and valuable floodplain lands and 126,000 hectares of forests which will rot will go under water; thick deposits of hard coal and iron ore will be drowned. The Angara will form a fourth artificial sea and will cease to exist as a river. It will become a swamp. But why do it? Even now one must not drink the once-clear Angara water or swim there, nor can one eat the fish. The channel is becoming stagnant.

In mid-1989 the residents of Kezhma and other Angara villages set up an initiative committee to save the Angara.

People are against the construction projects of the century. But they are already tired of fighting with the supporters of those projects. After letters to M. S. Gorbachev and to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the President's correspondence was published, giving instructions to "examine the matter and finally clarify it." But there still is no clarity. O.S. Shenin, the former first secretary of the Krasnoyarsk Party Kraykom (and now secretary and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo), and L. A. Voronin, the first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, have already given their word to the country's President "to envision in a short time..." and so on and so forth.

The Angara region inhabitants call all this "obvious disinformation." The joint expedition along the Angara in June 1990 of the kray nature protection committee, the Academy of Sciences Siberian Department, and Gidroproyekt was pursuing the strictly departmental interests of Minenergo. In confirmation of its order of 10 November 1989 No 344, which authorized the Boguchanskiy GES for the list of priority construction projects, the department is stepping up construction of the dam, despite the protests.

Where else can people turn? Now they have come to the idea of calling on the United Nations. But will the UN help the despairing inhabitants of the Angara region? There is no state program to save Siberia. As a monopoly Minenergo is preparing a program to introduce new hydroelectric power plants by the year 2000. One hundred large and small hydraulic power systems are planned with a total capacity exceeding the existing capacities by a factor of 2.5. New hydro-mines are being laid in the plan.

Moscow's Losiny Ostrov National Park Threatened by Development

91WN0615A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 9 Jul 91 p 2

[Article by S. Vishnevskaya: "Will Tracked Vehicles Consume the Island? How They Are Turning a National Park Into a National Vegetable Garden"]

[Text] Defenders of the national park, students and schoolchildren, of course, quite recently gathered under the linden and pine trees, worked without sparing their hands or young feet, and later sang along to a guitar and recited poems.... With fire in their eyes, the volunteers, who have been summoned by the age, discussed the fate of nature. There are hands, head, and heart, there are thousands of persons holding similar views, there are those reliable assistants and educators like Nikolay Fedorovich Reymers, those Danko's of ecology and Esperanto like Leva Medvedev.... What else do you need?

Come to Losinka right now. It is quiet and empty in the national park. A newspaper, full of "glasnost that is crying out in the desert," is protruding from a refuse container but neither the clatter of shovels, cheerful voices, nor the strumming of a guitar are heard.

Did the music not play for long? Did the volunteers become tired? Has the ecological movement fizzled out?

But arm yourself with patience and, what is better, with transportation and, it is desirable, with any sort of tranquilizer (Russian State Committee for the Environment First Deputy Chairman L. Shelest also said: "This may be reduced to a heart attack"), and let us see what is being done right now on the periphery of the national park.

You catch sight of State Timber Fund trees, mighty and beautiful, which lie on the ground, toppled and maimed by some mindless axe, not mindless but very prudent.... Here they suddenly begin to blaze—in the entire sky—flames from the pine trees in the prime of life.... A wasp, attracted by the honey odor of the still living wood, circles over the fresh slivers.... Metal tabs have been fastened to the living trunks....

A peaceful Soviet tractor, one, yet another, and yet another, hums at the other end of Losinka.... A "labor battle" is occurring to dig up the new forest that society planted last autumn (the last burst of free labor in the national park)—the only one in the Moscow area during the entire last 40 years. Already the entire future forest is under the tracked vehicles. The people also said: "Replow it—and you will get your plot." Who said that? You cannot find the sources. Just like in Vilnius. There the tracked vehicles crushed people, here they are crushing other small lives. Naturally, the replowing began right after the well-known lightning- fast decision of the authorities to provide gardens "to all who desire them at the expense of any land users." Do you hear? Any!

This is ecology on Losinyy Ostrov. You know someone is abandoning all of this—all of these volunteers of lawlessness.... When Losinka's director approached Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin with nearly a scream for assistance at the Congress of People's Deputies a year ago, Yeltsin reasonably answered: "Wait a bit. We need to seize power." Power has been seized. Russia's time itself will save what now remains of its nature. And not only on Losinyy Ostrov. Baykal.... Samarskaya Luka.... Sochi National Park.... Mariy Chodra.... Valday.... Everywhere—it is the same.

And without the Finns, we all knew that there are many harmful compounds at Losinka and that they exceed the maximum allowable concentrations by tens and hundreds of times. But the Finns who arrived in Moscow at the invitation of the energy industry to render their verdict on the infamous Northern TETs [heat and electric power plant], to dot all of the i's which we possibly did not raise our hands to do. They perhaps would also construct the Northern TETs (indeed, after compliance

with the additional conservation measures advanced by them). But in their view, that is not the matter. And without it, Losinyy Ostrov will not withstand that man-caused press that crashes down on this never coddled regal forest area on a daily basis. First of all, the pine tree will go away. The spruce. Then the oak and the linden.... All of this that is not beyond the mountains. Maybe we can save the beech. But it also does not have many chances.

Krasnoyarsk Experiencing Mercury Contamination Scares

91WN0615B Moscow LESNAYA GAZETA in Russian
16 Jul 91 p 1

[Article by LESNAYA GAZETA Correspondent P. Dubynin, Krasnoyarsk: "Mercury Alarm"]

[Text] Panic has hardly ever broken out in Krasnoyarsk. The local radio station interrupted its broadcast several times in a row to report that bread "with possible mercury contamination in it" had arrived at Sverdlovsk Rayon stores. Civil defense headquarters urgently requested that the purchased product be returned and those who consumed the product should report to the nearest out-patient clinic for a medical examination.

Competent organs are now involved with the emergency situation. They will comment only after they have conducted a painstaking investigation.

We need to add to what has been said that there have literally been two mercury alarms in Sverdlovsk Rayon where primarily woodworkers and furniture makers live. First of all, two broken 250-gram "bulbs" filled with the liquid metal were discovered on the pedestrian stair crossing. Later an entire tank with 50 kilograms of the dangerous substance was "found" on the grounds of the kindergarten that belongs to the DOK [woodworking combine].

Well, there have already been nearly 10 such incidents since the beginning of the year. What can you do: mercury is being found in Krasnoyarsk and that is everything here! [rtut i vse tut!—a play on words].

Radioactive Waste Problems in Kazakhstan Examined

91WN0615C Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Jul 91
First Edition p 2

[Article by PRAVDA Correspondents G. Dildyayev and T. Yesilbayev, Kazakh SSR: "The Burial Ground—'The Radioactive Waste Storage Problem Has Been Concocted'. To Think That Is a Dangerous Misconception!"]

[Text] The following fact was recently publicized in the Kazakhstan press as a curiosity. A certain provident toolmaker had kept some sort of incomprehensible small item in his toolbox for a long time. When the iron box

practically accidentally "began to light up," it was determined that this small item was a strong radioactive radiation source. The readers began to smile, they said, how unlucky this toolmaker was. Although, as they say, not in any mood to laugh.

Judge for yourself: You are happy that a little boy is enthusiastically involved in a technical club and that the chiefs-aviators gave him written-off navigational instruments and similar such "iron boxes." But they "hum" and contact with them does not add to your health.

The Chernobyl disaster and the demand to cease testing at the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Range have stimulated an increase in the number of participants of the antinuclear movement in Kazakhstan. Radiation-phobia has also appeared and rumors have also begun to circulate that the republic has been transformed into a radioactive waste dump. This is on the one hand. But on the other hand, this is some sort of criminal frivolity of the numerous users of isotopes.

How justified is this conclusion and how do we protect people from random sources of radioactive radiation? Here are several qualified opinions.

V. YAZIKOV—Kazakh SSR People's Deputy and USSR Ministry of Geology's Volkovskiy Geological Production Association chief director.

"In May 1989, the government of Kazakhstan tasked our association to study the radiological situation on the territory of the republic. According to the program that was compiled jointly with the sanepidstantsiya [sanitary and epidemiological station], Kazakh giromet [Hydrometeorology], and the Ministry of Public Health, we have already studied such cities as Alma-Ata, Karaganda, Semipalatinsk, Ust-Kamenogorsk, Kzyl-Orda, and Chimkent. We have discovered 37 sectors of radioactive contamination.

"As a rule, their causes were instruments and construction and other materials with ionizing radiation that had been discarded because they were no longer needed. Say, during a helicopter flight, a so-called radiation source was detected on the outskirts of Kzyl-Orda that had been lying in the ground at a shallow depth for several years.

"Or take this example. We found a 120-meter long section of road that had been paved with radioactive slag in the area of Semipalatinsk Armature Plant. And a pile of this slag was lying on the territory of the plant itself. The city authorities, having learned about this, decided to remove it. The slag was hauled away... to a hay field on one of the oblast's farms.

"I must recall in this regard Poet Olzhas Suleymenov's graphic comparison who once said during a conversation with me: 'Our republic reminds me of an apartment in which there is not even a trash can. And actually everything is thrown away and discarded in it wherever and however it ends up.' But a 'trash can' is simply necessary

and with solid walls and a lid. That is, it is a question of constructing long-term radioactive source storage areas in Kazakhstan."

R. SVETLITSKIY—Head of the Republic Sanitary and Epidemiological Station radiological department:

"Sanitary and epidemiological stations primarily monitor the radiological situation in the republic's cities and villages. Our service is involved only with those enterprises and institutions where radiation sources are used for production purposes and where they are registered. However far from all enterprises inform us about them. As a result, many sources of radioactive radiation are not monitored. Institutions and organizations themselves write off these instruments and discard them at a dump or dismantle them for parts. And all of this remains unsupervised and poses a danger to people. Here is just one example. For nearly 20 years, 60 radioisotope instruments, that belonged to Yuzelevatormelstroy Trust's Production and Technological Equipment Administration and that have not even been unsealed, have been lying around not far from Alma-Ata.

"We have proposed more than once than we take responsibility for all dosimetric monitoring work. But our proposals do not receive support at the enterprises. Moreover, the leaders of some of them do not at all want the raw materials and materials that they produce to undergo an inspection for radioactivity. Do you see that it is overhead and onerous for them. That disorder may be very expensive for the population."

A. SHAMENOV—Head of the Kazakh SSR President's Department of Ecology and Natural Resources Utilization Staff:

"The problem associated with the burial of radioactive sources has not been subject to widespread publicity for a long time. Information concerning the radiation theme has been held in deep secrecy at various institutions under the 'secret' stamp. And it has turned out that many people, due to their own lack of information and at times disinformation, saw danger where there was none and believed rumors and idle gossip. Thanks to the policy of openness [otkrytost] and an honest dialogue with the population that is being conducted right now in the republic, publicity is being imparted to things that were previously held under the tightest secrecy.

"But the stereotypes of the past are not so easy to break. The republic government already in 1979 adopted a resolution on the construction of long-term radioactive waste storage facilities. But it has remained unfulfilled. Three years ago, the Kazakhstan Council of Ministers once again returned to this problem. And once again the matter has not moved off of dead center. Oblast Soviet ispolkoms, on whose territory they planned to build these storage facilities, cite public opinion and continue to ignore the government's decision, even without trying to conduct explanatory work. In the meantime, as the experience of Canada and the United States shows, these countries obtain the "go-ahead" from the population

prior to building something and to do this they conduct a dialogue with the people, consult with them, and explain things to them.

"In short, we need glasnost and the broadest propaganda of knowledge associated with the issues of radiation safety. Here there should not be any kind of secrets from the population. Only then can we count on its understanding and support. Ultimately, construction of long-term radioactive waste storage facilities meets the need to protect people's health."

Let us add: There are increasingly fewer "white spots" and restricted zones on journalists' paths, however, try to find out in more detail about the activities, for example, of semi-mythical Rodon—a specialized organization which, according to rumors, carries out the collection and utilization of radioactive wastes in our country. Here the "top secret" stamp has confused the issue that, in our view, it has not so much hidden as much as it has given rise to horrible rumors, conjecture, and suspicion. And as can be seen from just the small number of facts cited, they are very often unfounded.

So, openness [otkrytost] of information is needed on the activities of specialized services. This will make them subject to the control of public opinion, will permit us to reliably protect people from the consequences of disorder, and charge those guilty for the disasters we

discover. We need to face facts: We do not need to stop progress and we cannot get by without the varied uses of those same radio isotopes. Say, the amount of exploratory drilling in Kazakhstan right now is high (and it will increase significantly) during which the log survey exploration of countless wells is conducted. And an instrument with a radioactive source is lowered into each one.

For now people are only afraid of the word combination "buried radioactive wastes" and this causes a feeling of protest and an understandable lack of desire to live anywhere nearby. However, dangerous waste storage areas are simply necessary. And the more reliable they are, the calmer our souls will be. The world experience of their construction and content suggests: we need to locate burial sites at significant depths in hard and salt rock which withstand earthquakes very well.

And one more thing. It has so often occurred in Kazakhstan that quite a bit of land that has already been contaminated by various types of testing has been taken out of circulation for a long time. Maybe we need to locate the burial grounds here without hiding either the danger or the urgent need for these types of facilities from the people. According to our current "market" times, we need to pay for everything and in the literal sense of this word. Consequently, material compensation for the location of the "trash can" in some or other small corner of the republic will only be fair.

Current State of Soviet Psychiatry Examined

91US0589A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Jun 91
Second Edition p 3

[Article by Yu. Popov, psychiatrist, USSR people's deputy: "Is Everything OK in Mental Hospitals? An Acutely Urgent Topic"]

[Text] It seems that talk about abuses in Soviet psychiatry, talk which was—let me note—all-too-often completely justified, has begun to decline. World public opinion has come to believe that all those nightmares of the 1960's and 1970's have remained in the past. Two years ago the All-Union Society of Psychiatrists was reaccepted into the World Psychiatric Association. Work has been virtually completed on the Law on Psychiatric Assistance—a law which had previously been lacking in our country. This law is in full accordance with the norms of international law and is called upon to provide a foundation for deciding all questions and solving all problems connected with mental illnesses.

Does that mean that we can be calm and rest on our oars? Alas, there are still no grounds in our country to justify this.

The low amount of material, i.e., financial, support (in the United States about 30 billion dollars is spent annually on the needs of psychiatry, whereas in the USSR this item ranges between 4 and 5 billion rubles) has led to the impoverishment of most psychiatric institutions. Not even the elementary sanitary-hygienic norms are observed. For example, in Leningrad the per-patient space allocation comes to 3.5 square meters (as compared to the norm of seven), while in Kaliningrad it is even less—about two square meters (!). During the years of the Soviet regime in Leningrad not a single new mental hospital has been built, even though this city's population has doubled.

And if we are to speak about human-rights violations, then—in connection with the impoverished position of psychiatry—the rights of almost all the officially registered 4.5 million mental patients in our country are being violated in a practical sense. Even a patient's right to receive treatment is being violated, inasmuch as the guaranteed supply of medications, including psychotropic medications, i.e., those acting on the mind, nowadays does not even amount to 20 percent of the need for them. Moreover, we must bear in mind that the actual number of mentally ill persons is much greater than the number of registered patients, and that the harsh conditions of the approaching market-type economic system will cause them to become further maladjusted, and thus they will become our patients.

What kind of observance of human rights can we talk about, for example, with regard to those persons disabled by mental illnesses who are living in dormitories or boarding houses run by the Social Security Division. And yet, you know, that is where even four-year-old children without parents sometimes end up after leaving

the children's homes. And sometimes they remain there throughout their entire lives. We are not talking about just imbeciles and idiots. Among these children there are those who are simply retarded in their mental development or who have behavioral difficulties. Without even mentioning the enormous amounts of money which, despite our overall poor financial shape, we are spending on them, I would like to note that—with the necessary organization of treatment and rehabilitation work—some of these children could be returned to society.

Nor can we speak about any human rights with regard to the treatment-and-work clinics, where the situation of the patients, ill—let me emphasize—with the disease of alcoholism, is comparable only with the situation of persons incarcerated in prisons.

Those persons disabled by mental illnesses have recently been threatened by yet another misfortune. The LTM's [treatment-and-work workshops], where they have been employed earning poor, sparse wages, but enough to maintain their own existence, and receiving the treatment which they need, have been unable to achieve economic independence and are being removed from organized medicine's sphere of influence. Upon being converted to small-scale enterprises, enterprises with limited responsibility, etc., the LTM's—initially by means of increasing their profits—also increased the earnings of the mental patients employed there. But production interests inevitably lead to the appearance of more and more complex types of labor, and the mentally ill are gradually crowded out by those persons disabled by other groups of diseases, as well as by healthy persons. And if we are to speak about the inevitability of impending unemployment, then we must do everything to make sure that it is not the millions of the mentally ill who lose their means of existence. And there is only one way to prevent this from happening—that is to strengthen the LTM's within the medical sphere, to subordinate them, as was the case previously, to the leading officials of the psychiatric institutions.

It is likewise completely necessary to make sure that, based on the example on the developed countries, a quota of two-three percent of the jobs at all this country's enterprises is set aside, i.e., reserved, for mentally ill persons. In Tsarist Russia, by the way, most of the social problems of the mentally ill used to be solved by the guardianship councils, which existed in the guberniya-level cities. In addition to psychiatrists, these councils included well-known and substantial persons, along with representatives of the authorities. Thus, in Petersburg the guardianship council included Count A.F. Ignatyev, the eminent lawyer A.F. Koni, the singer L.V. Sobinov, the composer S.I. Taneyev, and others.

Now let's talk about something that is less striking to the eye but which presents no less of a problem for the society. This country has approximately 600,000 or 700,000 children with defective mental development. Failure to discover them in good time and, accordingly, the lack of treatment and corrective work with them

subsequently conditions and causes various forms of deviant behavior among these children, including even criminal behavior. About half of all underachieving children are children with retarded mental development. Timely discovery of mental defects could be facilitated by setting up centers for functional diagnostics.

The high level of tension and instability in society, reduction of the living standards, lack of confidence in the morrow have all facilitated the spread of self-destructive forms of behavior, beginning with the abuses of alcoholic beverages and alcoholism and ending with suicide (every year more than 80,000 persons commit suicide).

In connection with this, there has been an increased role to play for psychiatry not only in treating the expressed forms of mental illnesses, but also in preventing them and in correcting the incipient forms of various mental disorders.

These problems must be solved primarily by psychotherapists and medical psychologists. But at the present time our country clearly does not have enough of them. For the sake of comparison let me cite the following figures: In the USSR there are 2,000-2,500 psychotherapists and about 1,000 medical psychologists, whereas in the United States these amounts are 30,000 and 90,000 respectively. But the most discouraging thing is that, with a minimal need of at least 20,000 medical psychologists, no more than 50 persons are being trained annually for this profession. A radical solution to this problem would be to open up new departments at institutes for upgrading physicians' skills and at the country's existing medical schools in order to train medical psychologists from the ranks of physicians.

In thinking about solutions to the various problems of present-day psychiatry, we would do well to turn our attention to the experience of the past.

By the second half of the 19th century a well-constructed system of psychiatric care had already evolved in Russia. It was rightfully considered one of the best in the world and served as a model to be imitated. By that time large mental hospitals (and now again there is a predominance of hospitals accomodating from 2,000 to 3,000 patients) had already revealed their shortcomings, and psychiatric care was transferred to the zemstvos [district councils].

Of course, even the minimal changes need material funding, i.e., money. It is completely impermissible, when the residual principle is being applied to financing medicine in general, that psychiatry, in turn, out of all the fields of medicine, should be financed according to this residual principle.

Nevertheless, in thinking about the present-day problems of psychiatry, we must realize and be aware that what we are actually talking about is forming this country's psychiatric service for the 21st century. But no single piece of psychiatric legislation—no matter how perfected—nor any kind of organizational changes in

and by themselves will be able to humanize psychiatry and bring it as close as possible to the human soul unless and until psychiatric physicians with a high sense of morality mediate between suffering human beings and psychiatry as a service.

Unemployment on Rise in Uzbek SSR; Black Market Hiring Practices Reported

*91US0660A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 28 Jul 91 pp 1-2*

[Article by V. Gladilov: "A Right to...Unemployment?"]

[Text] It always used to be that in our country the specter of unemployment was considered to be a phenomenon exclusively of the nightmares of the capitalist world. But—all things considered—this specter has now decided to materialize among us; could it be that he intends to take up permanent residence here?

But we, just as before, are attempting to convince each other that nothing terrible is happening. When I tried to ascertain from various officials how many people here in Uzbekistan were without work, I received evasive and contradictory answers. The figures cited ranged from 600,000 to just under 1.5 million. For a republic whose total population amounts to 21 million, those are large numbers.

Tashkent has a modest-sized square named Chorsu, located in the district of the so-called Old City. On Saturdays and Sundays a whole crowd gathers in this square and near it. But these are certainly not just some carefree persons out for a stroll. Operating here is a "black-market" type of labor exchange, which "fills in the gaps"—let's say—for the legal or state type of exchange. On several occasions attempts were made to break it up and disperse it, but they did not succeed in doing so: People simply moved from one place to another.

Shavkat Usmanov is a constant "client" here. Presented below is his simple, guileless story:

"In the autumn I returned from the army, where I had specialized in being a radio operator; even prior to my period of service I had acquired this skill in a DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy] technical school. I was a respected person in the army, an outstanding specialist—at least, that's what my commanding officers said. But after my period of service it turned out that nobody needed me. Have I done a poor job of looking for a job? Perhaps so, but I did apply at the job-placement office and at various enterprises probably at least a hundred times. Nothing worthwhile. They advised me either to enroll in secondary-school courses for fitters and lathe-operators, or to join a training combine so as to master some other field of specialization. But, you know, I'm over 20 years old now, and I'm a healthy fellow. I can't go back to school with kids and be a burden to my parents. I find the

solution here in the "black market." The work is so-so, but jobs do turn up quite frequently."

The mechanism of "buying and selling" manpower here is extremely simple and—at the same time—complex. Suppose that I need a person to whitewash a house or, let's say, to dig a cellar: I approach the people assembled here and inquire who can do such things. We haggle about the conditions and the amount of payment—and then we start off.

Alas! This exchange is called "black" because Mafia-type "families" have evolved here. And, as a rule, you "negotiate" not with the actual person to perform the work, but with his "boss," a robust kind of "beetle" [?] who follows a set of rules which have not been written down by anyone but which are strictly observed.

On several occasions Shavkat attempted to assert his independence of this "system." Who would want to "kick back" almost one-third of his pay to someone? But he was badly beaten up and received the following warning: If you go on this way, things will get even worse for you. He had to come to terms with them. For although there have been no out-and-out cases of homicide here, there were certain obstinate persons—among whom were some "bums" for whom nobody would look—who disappeared from this exchange and were lost track of.

In short, the "rules" are strict and rigid. But if a person is lucky, the wages are not bad.

Well now, for the time being such an exchange has succeeded in helping people to earn money. But it is primarily for those persons who do not have labor books. And in recent times fellows like Shavkat—after graduating from school and completing their army service—have been coming here more and more often. Our native socialist enterprises are abandoning or rejecting such persons. Because, after all, our working youths are now in a "fragile" position—inexperienced persons are the first to be "let go." They try to keep the jobs for "their own people," but nowadays have little or nothing for "outsiders."

Still: Could there be some help for Shavkat Usmanov? I went to the Tashkent Municipal Labor-Placement Office and there talked with its chief, L. Borishchenko.

"As of today," she replied to me, "there are 14,322 vacancies in Tashkent's enterprises and organizations. The industries alone need 8,000 workers, whereas the construction organizations are looking for 2,500. The Aircraft Production Association imeni Chkalov alone can take on 2,500 specialists; the Tashtekstil'mash Plant—2,000 persons; and the Foton Association—800 persons."

Stop! What about Shavkat?

"A radio operator? I don't know.... Try again next week...."

Shavkat has already heard things like that more than once. Therefore, he won't be overjoyed in a hurry. Still....

"To my way of thinking, the greatest problems arise in the case of high-school graduates and those persons sent into the reserves by the army...."

"Last year 5,500 jobs were allocated just for the high-school graduates," L. Borishchenko parried.

Let me note parenthetically that it was specifically last year that my own son graduated from school and tried to get a job. With his field of specialization as a computer operator, he made the rounds of about ten organizations without avail. Not one needed him.

But let's return to Shavkat.

"There are virtually no problems with demobilized service personnel," said the office chief. "They return to their previous place of employment."

"But what if he has no 'previous place of employment'? Because, you know, during the interval between school and army service, as it has been explained, practically no kids are accepted for work."

"Oh, come on now, there are no such problems!"

And so it turns out that neither my son nor Shavkat were "problems."

She continued: "I've already told you that Tashkent's enterprises today need 14,322 specialists. These jobs are for highly skilled fitters, lathe-operators, welders, textile workers, and drivers."

"But what if the young persons have no skills? What then?"

"Let them study and learn some!"

The tone of our conversation was becoming more and more exasperated, and so I hastened to pose my final question: Are young persons turning to your office to a greater or lesser degree than they did last year?

"Their number has tripled," she replied with a faintly curious note in her voice. But what makes me sad is that no more than a third of these kids obtain jobs from their initial attempt. The remainder are shunted to the sidelines. And the presently graduating classes from high school give no cause for optimism. Tashkent has planned 6,619 jobs for them—the preciseness is astounding, but is it probable? Nobody could give me an answer on that score.

Great hopes were placed on the "job fair," which was held in May by the city's job-placement center. But, of course, the demand again was for skilled manpower. And

what is an "unskilled" young person to do? Where should he acquire experience? Does it not have to be on the "black-market" type of exchange?

By the way, two districts in Tashkent recently witnessed the opening of what let's call...semiofficial labor exchanges. There too they are attempting somehow to

solve the problem of employing the population. But this is a drop in the bucket. At any rate, Shavkat and I found nothing suitable there.

We will go on seeking and hoping: Perhaps the government may take notice of us....

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